Management of annual reported income in the UK: the search for indicators by El Hossade, Salem Ismail
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
MANAGEMENT OF ANNUAL REPORTED INCOME IN THE U. K.: 
THE SEARCH FOR INDICATORS 
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Salem Ismail El Hossade 
BA University of Garyounis, Libya, 1974 
MA Ball State University, U. S. A., 1978 
August 1987 
SUMMARY 
Summary of Thesis sutmitted for Ph. D. degree 
by Salem Ismail EL-HOSSADE 
on 
Management of Annual Reported Income in the U. K.: 
The Search for Indicators 
The main purpose of this research was to ascertain 
whether users of reported income are receiving measurement of 
past activity that is free from management bias. 
This research consisted of two major parts, namely the 
theoretical and the empirical. 
In the theoretical part, attempts were made: (i) to 
determine the roots of the theoretical propositions for empirical 
investigation and (ii) to examine, theoretically, the assertion 
that managers are able to manipulate reported results through 
acceptable accounting means. 
In this part,, it was argued that managers of listed 
f inns are more likely to smooth reported income and bias their 
accounting policies towards income- increasing methods, while 
managers of unlisted firms are more likely to bias their 
accounting policies towards income-decreasing methods. Also it 
was argued that managers are able to manipulate reported income 
through acceptable accounting means. 
In the empirical part,, an attempt was made to determine 
the relative adherence of listed and unlisted firms to one of 
three reporting strategies, namely smoothing of, increase of and 
decrease of reported income. In this regard, two principal 
hypotheses were developed and tested. 
The first hypothesis stated that the proportion of 
listed firms with relatively smooth income streams is 
significantly higher than that of unlisted firms. The empirical 
findings are consistent with this hypothesis for all objects of 
smoothing considered in this research. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that ordinary income is the most common object of 
smoothing among listed firms. 
The second hypothesis was that there is a significant 
difference in the means of the profitability rate between the two 
sets of firms. 
The empirical findings are consistent with this 
hypothesis. Also,, the magnitude and the direction of the 
differences in the profitability rates indicate that listed firms 
report higher profitability rates than unlisted firms and the 
observations of the profitability rates among listed firms are 
more concentrated around their means than those of unlisted 
f irms. 
Based on the findings of this research, it is 
justifiable to conclude that users of reported income are 
receiving measurement of past activity that is not free from 
management bias. 
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ABSTRACT 
The main purpose of this research was to ascertain 
whether users of reported income are receiving measurement of 
past activity that is free from management bias. 
This research consisted of two major parts, namely the 
theoretical and the empirical. 
In the theoretical part, attempts were made: (i) to 
determine the roots of the theoretical propositions for empirical 
investigation and (ii) to examine, theoretically, the assertion 
that managers are able to manipulate reported results through 
acceptable accounting means. 
In this part,, it was argued that managers of listed 
firms are more likely to smooth reported income and bias their 
accounting policies towards income- increasing methods, while 
managers of unlisted firms are more likely to bias their 
accounting policies towards income-decreasing methods. Also it 
was argued that managers are able to manipulate reported income 
through acceptable accounting means. 
In the empirical part, an attempt was made to determine 
the relative adherence of listed and unlisted firms to one of 
three reporting strategies, namely smoothing off increase of and 
decrease of reported income. In this regard, two principal 
hypotheses were developed and tested. 
The first hypothesis stated that the proportion of 
listed firms with relatively smooth income streams is 
significantly higher than that of unlisted firms. The empirical 
findings are consistent with this hypothesis for all objects of 
smoothing considered in this research. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that ordinary income is the most common object of 
smoothing among listed firms. 
The second hypothesis was that there is a significant 
difference in the means of the profitability rate between the two 
sets of f irms. 
The empirical findings are consistent with this 
hypothesis. Also,, the magnitude and the direction of the 
differences in the profitability rates indicate that listed firms 
report higher profitability rates than unlisted firms and the 
observations of the profitability rates among listed firms are 
more concentrated around their means than those of unlisted 
firms. 
Based on the findings of this research, it is 
justifiable to conclude that users of reported income are 
receiving measurement of past activity that is not free from 
management bias. 
x 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In modern accounting, the income determination process 
involves two steps: 
1. Identification of the revenues properly attributable to the 
period reported upon, and 
2. The matching of the corresponding costs witn the revenues of 
that period. 
However,, these two steps are governed by generally 
accepted accounting principles which are far from uniform, and 
much leeway exists in their selection, interpretation and 
application. In fact R. Chambers estimated that it is possible 
to measure the income of a given firm by using any one from as 
many as 30,, 000,, 000 figures all determined according to acceptable 
accounting principles. ' Of course, there have been changes, 
since then, towards narrowing acceptable accounting principles, 
but the number of possible combinations still remaining is large. 
This diversity of accounting alternatives has produced the 
concept of accounting risk upon which L. Bernstein has had the 
following to say: 
"This risk is inherent in the existence of alternative 
accounting principles, the loose criteria which define 
Chambers,, R.,, "A Matter of Principle",, The Accounting 
Review, 41, (July 1966),, p. 443-57 
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them, and the consequent loose standards of practice. 
This lack of assurance about the principles used or the 
method and rigor of their application may lead to a 
wide variety, pf results and hence to a great degree of 
uncertainty. ' 
The existence of such a type of risk nad led some 
observers to suggest that management may seek to and succeed in 
2 distorting reported income. The idea behind such distortions is 
that management may present their results as tbey want them to 
'k- 
be, rather than portraying economic results in the fairest or 
least biased fashion. Thus the environmental problem, to which 
this study is related, is the income distortion that may be 
occurring if management set out to and succeed in managing 
reported income. The presence of this potential problem means 
that users of reported results may be misinformed, and hence the 
conclusion follows that firms' reports may contain information of 
dubious quality. Such conclusions could have at least two 
related consequences: 
Bernstein,, L.,, Financial Statement Analysis Theory 
Application and interpretation,, R. Irwin,, Inc. 1974,, p. 33. 
For example see: 
- Gordon,, M.,, "Postulates, Principles and Research in 
Accounting"r The Accounting Review, April 1964, p. 251-63. 
- Schiff, M.,, "Accounting Tactics and the Theory of the 
Firm", Journal of Accounting Research,, vol. 4,, No. l,, Spring 
1966. 
- Smith,, E.,, "The Ef fect of the Separation of ownership from 
Control on Accounting Decisions", The Accounting Review, 
Oct. 1976. 
- Dhaliwal,, D.,, Salamon,, G.,, Smith,, E.,, "The Effect of Owner 
Versus Management Control on the Choice of Accounting 
methods", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 4,1982. 
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1. The immediate usefulness of such reports will be 
questionable, and 
2. Lack of information is widely regarded as a source of marKet 
imperfection and hence such misinformation will hinder the 
mobilisation of resources and their allocation to socially 
productive uses. In this regard, we can argue that 
investors will not be able to compare alternative 
investments and hence they cannot maximise their expected 
wealth. 
Purpose of the Study 
The central purpose of this study is to ascertain 
whether users of reported income are receiving measurement of 
past activity that is free from management's bias. Accordingly, 
an answer is sought to the following main question of this study: 
Do managers act to use accounting alternatives to serve 
non-accounting ends? 
In this regard, literature suggests that there are at 
least three possible non-accounting ends which might be sought as 
follows: 
1. Managers may seek to increase early reported income at the 
expense of the future reported income. 
2. Managers may seek to decrease early reported income to 
benefit the future reported income. 
3. Managers may seek to smooth reported income so as to report 
a stream of income with a smaller variation from a 
3 
predetermined trend than would otherwise nave appeared. 
The aim of this study is, therefore, to investigate 
whether the above ends are in fact sought and whether tney appear 
actually to be obtained. Consequently, the following related 
questions are also addressed in this study: 
1. Why, theoretically, might managers seek to "manage" reported 
income in the three manners outlined above? 
2. Can, theoretically, such behaviour be expected to be 
successful? 
3. Is there empirical evidence to suggest that such behaviour 
occurs? 
Significance of tne Study 
Economic theory emphasises the important role of 
information when searching for the most efficient use of 
resources by simply assuming that perfect knowledge of the market 
is available. In tnis regard, S. Ozga has suggested the 
puossibility that: 
loose knowledge may not be perfect has never been 
seriously faced up to". 1 
On the other hand, lack of information has been widely 
regarded as a source of market imperfection. For example, 
Leftwich has stated that: 
Ozga,, S.,, "Imperfect markets through lack of knowledge", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1960, p. 29. 
4 
"Investors make mistakes when they lack knowledge of 
alternative investment opportunities... Lack of knowledge also may prevent potential resources from 
being channelled into resource supply categories in 
which thly will contribute most to net national 
product". 
The important role of accounting information for 
investment analysis in the U. K. has been re-emphasised in a 
recent study by J. Arnold and P. Moizer (1984). They concluded 
that: 
"As might be expected,, the most influential 
sources are perceived to be the company's annual prof it 
and loss 2 account and 
balance sheet and its interim 
results. ' 
The study is about the quality of accounting 
information and hence, if it can be shown empirically that 
managers manipulate reported results,, then it can be suggested 
that market imperfection may exist. To support the above 
assertion, we may argue that,, just as the lack of information has 
been widely regarded as a source of market imperfection, so too 
are the limitations in the quality of available information where 
decision-makers may not only be informed or uninformed, they may 
unknowingly oe misinformed. 
In the past three decades, management manipulation of 
reported results has been the subject of a growing number of 
------------------- 
Lef twich,, R.,, 
----- 
' 
The 
-------------- 
Price System 
----- 
and 
---------------------- 
Resource Allocation, 
Holt,, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966,, p. 300. 
2. Arnold, J. and Moizer, P.,, "A Survey of the Methods used by 
U. K. Investment Analysts to Appraise Investment in ordinary 
Shares",, Accounting and Business Research, Summer 1984, 
p. 202. 
5 
accounting and non-accounting studies, especially in the U. S. A. 
The early two contributions in this area were the works of S. 
Hepworth (1953) and M. Gordon (1964). Hepworth argues that 
owners and creditors of an enterprise will feel more confident 
towards a corporate management which is able to report stable 
earnings than towards those reporting unstable ones. ' Although 
not advocating income manipulation, Gordon stated that: 
a management should, within the limits of its 
power,, i. e. the latitude allowed by accounting rules,, 
(1) smooth reporte income, and (2) smooth the rate of 
growth in income. " 
A number of empirical studies have followed, for 
example, Copeland and Licastro (1968)3, Cushing (1969)4, Simpson 
(1969)5,, White (1970)6, Morris and Breakwell (1975)7, Imhoff 
Hepworth, S., "Smoothing Periodic Income",, Tne Accounting 
Review, January 1953,, p. 33. 
2. Gordon, M., op. cit. p. 262. 
3. Copeland,, R. and Licastro,, R., "A Note on Income Smoothing", 
The Accounting Review, July 1968. 
4. Cushing,, B.,, "An Empirical Study of Changes in Accounting 
Policy", Journal of Accounting Research,, Autumn 1969. 
5. Simpson,, R.,, "An Empirical Study of possible Income 
Manipulation",, The Accounting Review, October 1969. 
6. White, G. j, "Discretionary Accounting Decisions and Income 
Normalisation", Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1970. 
7. Morris,, R. and Breakwell,, H.,, "Manipulation of Earnings 
Figures in the United Kingdom", Accounting and Business 
Research, Summer 1975. 
6 
(1977) 1,, Eckel (1981)2 , Penno and Simon (1986)3. These and other 
related studies attempted to investigate whether or not managers 
intentionally manipulate reported results. Considerable numbers 
of such studies seem to indicate that managers behave "as if" 
they are manipulating reported income. Otner studies such as 
Gonedes (1972)4, Beidleman (1973)5, Lambert (1984)6 aimed at 
advocating income manipulation by considering income smoothing as 
a rational behaviour. 
However,, on the empirical side, it is surprising that 
little has been done in this area in the U. K. Morris and 
Breakwell (1975) provide a summary of U. K. studies and an 
empirical study of income manipulation in the U. K. Their results 
indicate that: 
"There is no evidence at all of widespread doctoring of 
earnings figures, though this does not rule out the 
possibility that a very small minority may have 
imhoff,, E.,, "Income Smoothing -A Case for DouK)t",, 
Accounting Journal,, Spring 1977. 
2. Eckel, N.,, "The Income Smoothing Hypothesis Revisited", 
ABACUS, vol. 17, No. l,, 1981. 
3. Penno, M. and Simon,, D., "Accounting Choices: Public Versus 
Private Firms", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
13 (4) , Winter 1986,, p. 561-569. 
4. Gonedes,, N.,, "Income Smoothing Behaviour Under Selected 
Stochastic Processes", The Journal of Business, Oct. 1972. 
5. BeidlErnan,, C.,, "Income Smoothing: The Role of Management"j, 
The Accounting Review, October 1973. 
6. Lambert, R.,, "Income Smoothing as Rational Equilibrium 
Behaviour",, The Accounting Review, October 1984. 
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resorted to such tactýcs to boost their results when profits were falling. "' 
A similar result was reported by Dev and Webb (1972) 
when they examined the accuracy of prospectus forecasts. 2 But 
the methodologies of these two research papers are totally 
different from the methodology proposed in the present study and 
hence different conclusions may be reached. Furthermore, Ashton 
states that: 
"on the empirical side there is a dearth of U. K. 
studies on the effect of changes in accounting policies 
on the stock market prices of those firms concerned and 
nonknown to this author on substantiating, or 
otherwise, the 'income smoothing hypothesis'. Future 
research should there ore cover both the theoretical 
and empirical issues. 11ý 
This has been a brief introduction to the empirical 
literature on income manipulation and a more detailed discussion 
of this literature will be conducted in the next two chapters of 
the present study. However,, there are two conclusions that can 
L-le. - drawn at this stage: 
1. Because of inconclusive findings, there is not yet a general 
agreement about whether managers manipulate reported results 
or not and hence further research is required. 
1. Morris, R. and Breakwell, H., op. cit. p. 183. 
2. Dev, S. and Webb, M., "The Accuracy of Company Prof it 
Forecasts", Journal of Business Finance, 1972. 
3. Ashton,, R., U. K. Financial Accounting Standards A 
Descriptive and Analytical Approach, Woodhead-Faulkner Ltd., 
Cambridge, 1983, p. 139. 
8 
On the empirical side this phenomenon has not yet been 
adequately studied in the U. K. situation where differences 
in environmental factors may play an important role in the 
existence of income manipulation. 
Consequently,, the uniqueness of the present study may 
reside in that: 
1. The three potential behaviours have not yet been 
comprehensively investigated in the U. K. environment; 
2. Never have all three behaviours been studied simultaneously: 
this procedure may provide insight into how widely, 
regardless of forms, management of reported earnings may be 
practiced; 
3. This research relates theories of the firm and managerial 
finance to accounting theory and practice and henoe, to this 
extent, it has a wider scope than previous research. 
A Broad Statement of the Methodology 
To investigate the possibility and modes of management 
of reported income by f irms, three general approaches were 
suggested in the literature as follows: 
' 
i) Through direct contact with management; 
ii) Through contacting third parties such as public accountants; 
or 
Copeland,, R., "Income Smoothing", Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies, The Institute of Professional 
Accounting, Chicago and London,, 1968,, p. 105. 
9 
iii) Through examining ex-post data. 
Theoretically, it would appear that the f irst two 
approaches should provide more insights than the third approach, 
and hence they could be more appropriate. Unfortunately, the 
first two approaches do not seem to be feasible alternatives 
basically because management would be reluctant to reveal the 
needed information, while public accountants might consider such 
information confidential. As a result, most available studies in 
this area have applied different methods within the third 
approach. In this respect the present study does not differ from 
previous research. 
Since many of the economists concerned with manager- 
controlled f irms believe that changes in behaviour are expected 
merely by applying the self-interest axiom of the neo-classical 
theory of the firm to the new type of firms in which ownership is 
separated from operational control, alternative theories of the 
firm are of interest. ' Such theories predict a difference 
between the behaviour of managers in manager -controlled (MC) 
firms and those in Qwner-controlled (OC) f irms. Based on such a 
difference, several studies have used OC firms as a control group 
in their attempts to investigate the possibility of income 
1. For example see: 
Monsen,, R. and Downs,, A.,, "A Theory of Large Managerial 
Fims", The Journal of Political Economy, vol. LXXIII,, 
June 196ý-,, No. 3. 
(2) Berle, A. and Means,, G.,, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property,, Harcourt,, Brace and World Inc., New 
York, 1968. 
10 
manipulation within the domain of publicly traded firms on the 
New York Stock Market. ' 
In the present study an attempt will be made to extend 
this area of research to listed and unlisted firms, knowing that 
all limited companies in the U. K. are subject to the Companies 
Acts with regard to financial reporting requirements. By doing 
so, management might have additional incentives to manage 
reported income beside that resulted from the extent of ownership 
control. For instance listed firms are more likely to be 
concerned about the impact of reported income numbers on their 
share prices, while unlisted firms are more likely to be 
concerned about the impact of reported income numbers on income 
tax. In the next chapter, it will be argued that if managers 
choose to manage reported income then: 
10 listed firms are more likely to smooth and bias their 
accounting policies towards income - increasing methods to 
post their share prices, and 
2. unlisted firms are more likely to bias their accounting 
policies towards income - decreasing methods to reduce 
current tax charges. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
For example see: 
(1) Smith, E., op. cit. 
(2) Kamin, J. and Ronen, J., "The Smoothing of Income 
Numbers: SomeEmpirical Evidence on Systematic 
Differences Among Management-Control led and owner- 
Controlled Firms",, Accounting Organisations and 
Society, vol. 3, No. 2,1978. 
(3) Salamon,, G. and Smith,, E.,, "Corporate Control and 
Managerial Misrepresentation of Firin Performance", The 
Bell Journal of Economics, Spring 1979. 
11 
'm- 
Here if the empirical evidence of this research 
supports the above mentioned propositions, then it might be 
expected that the dichotomy of listed and unlisted firms could be 
a more powerful influence with respect to managing reported 
income than the division between OC and MC firms. 
The Main Hypothesis: 
The main hypothesis of the present study is that there 
are major differences between listed and unlisted firms 
regarding the criteria of choice among accounting alternatives, 
and hence differences should exist between certain properties of 
their reported results. If this hypothesis is accepted or proved 
to be true, the differences in the criteria of choice among 
accounting alternatives will lead to differences in the Zi 
accounting rules of measurement which will be reflected in the 
reported results. Thus if managers choose: 
1. to increase early reported income at the expense of the 
future reported income; or 
2. to decrease early reported income to benefit the future 
reported income; or 
to smoth reported income, 
then these strategies will be reflected in their reported 
results. Therefore, it is feasible to investigate the main 
hypothesis of the present study by analysing the reported results 
of two comparable sets of firms whereby one represents listed 
firms,, while the otrier represents unlisted firms. The aim of 
12 
such an analysis is empirically to examine the relative adherence 
of one set compared with the other to one or more of the above 
reporting strategies. This will be the broad approach with 
respect to the empirical part of this study. A detailed 
methodology of this part will be described in the fourth chapter 
which will include the data domain, the sampling process, the 
operational hypotheses, and the statistical methods. 
However, the empirical part approached so far requires 
a theoretical background which will be discussed in the second 
and third chapters. The central objective of the second chapter 
is to identify the roots of the theoretical propositions that 
will be empirically investigated in the present study. 
Accordingly, the research domain is the literature on theories of 
the firm, relevant empirical studies and managerial finance. 
With regard to the third chapter, the main purpose is to assess, 
theoretically,, the management's ability to manipulate reported 
income through acceptable accounting means. Accordingly, the 
research domain is the literature on the development of 
accounting rules of measurement and the state of accounting 
practice. 
Plan of the Study 
The development of materials for the present study is 
organised in the subsequent chapters as follows: 
Chapter II: 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the roots of 
13 
the theoretical propositions that will be investigated in this 
thesis. Consequently,, this chapter will include the following: 
1. A brief review of theories of the firm. 
2. Implications of the alternative theories of the firm with 
regard to: 
- Income smoothing strategy, and 
- increase and decrease strategies. 
3. Further analysis of management incentives: 
- source of finance and management incentives. 
Chapter III: 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess,, 
theoretically, the management's ability to manipulate reported 
income through acceptable accounting means. Consequently, this 
chapter will include the following: 
1. The development of accounting rules of measurement, and 
2. The state of accounting practice. 
Chapter IV: 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
methodology of the empirical part of the present study. 
Consequently, this chapter will include the following: 
1. The data domain; 
2. The-sampling process; and 
3. The operational hypotheses and statistical methods. 
14 
Chapter V and VI: 
These chapters will include the following: 
- presentation of the results and 
- analysis of the results. 
The fifth chapter will be devoted to income smoothing strategy, 
while the sixth chapter will be devoted to increase and decrease 
strategies. 
Chapter VII: 
This chapter will offer an overall summary and a set of 
conclusions. 
15 
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Terminology and Definitions 
Accounting End... The measurement and presentation of results 
which portray economic events in the fairest or least biased 
ashion. 
Income objects (classifications): 
1- Adjusted Trading Profit... It is defined as gross profit 
after charging distribution, general and administrative 
expenses including depreciation,, directors remuneration and 
audit fees. It should be noted that this income figure does 
not include exceptional items,, other ordinary income, 
finance and tax charges. It is referred to as income I. 
2- Ordinary Income before Finance and Tax Charges... In the 
present study,, the expression "Ordinary Income" is defined 
as prof it on ordinary activities after taxes. This income 
figure is the result of ordinary income plus finance and tax 
charges and it is referred to as income I,. 
3- Ordinary Income Bef ore taxes... It is defined as income I, 
less finance charges and it is referred to as income 12. 
4- ordinary Income... It is defined as profit on ordinary 
activities after taxes. It is referred to as Income 13. 
5- Net Income... It is defined as ordinary income after taking 
into account extraordinary items net of their taxes. It is 
referred to as Income 14, 
Management of Reported Results... The measurement and 
presentation of the results so as to conform as nearly as 
possible to management requirements rather than their portraying 
17 
economic events in the fairest or least biased fashion. 
Manipulation of Reported Results... The ability to increase or 
decrease reported results at will within the limits of management 
power,, i. e. the latitude allowed by accounting principles. 
Manipulation Strategies: 
1- income Smoothing... It is a strategy to report an income 
stream with a relatively lower degree of variation from a 
predetermined trend than would otherwise have appeared. 
2- Decrease of Early Reported Income... It is a strategy to 
report a lower measurement of current reported income in 
order to benefit the future reported income. 
3- Increase of Early Reported Income... It is a strategy to 
report a higher measurement of current income at the expense 
of the f uture income. 
Profitability Rate... It is defined as reported income for a 
given year as a proportion of turnover for the same year. 
Profitabi ity Rates: 
1- Profitability Rate of Adjusted Trading Profit... it is 
defined as adjusted trading profit as a proportion of 
turnover and it is referred to as PRI. 
2- Profitability Rate of Ordinary Income Before Finance and Tax 
Charges... It is defined as ordinary income before finance 
and tax charges as a proportion of turnover and it is 
referred to as PRIi. 
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3- Profitability Rate of ordinary Income Before Tax Charges... 
It is defined as ordinary income before taxes as a 
proportion of turnover and it is referred to as PR120 
4- Profitability Rate of Ordinary Income... It is defined as 
ordinary income as a proportion of turnover and it is 
referred to as PR13, 
5- Profitability Rate of Net Income... It is defined as net 
income as a proportion of turnover and it is referred to as 
PRI 4* 
Types of Control and Status: 
1- Manager-Controlled Firms... Those public firms with 
greater dilution of ownership with no evidence of one party 
0 
owning sufficient voting power to exercise control. 
2- owner-Controlled Firms... Those public firms which are 
more concentrated in terms of ownership with evidence of one 
party owning sufficient voting power to exercise control. 
3- Listed Firms... Those firms which have their shares listed 
on the London Stock Exchange. 
4- Unlisted Firms... Those firms which are either privately 
owned or their equity capital is not officially listed on 
the London Stock Exchange. 
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Chapter II 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this chapter is to identify the 
roots of the theoretical propositions that will be investigated 
in the present study. Accordingly, this chapter consists of 
three major parts. 
In the first part, the literature on theories of the 
f irm is reviewed because several empirical studies in this area 
of research was based on the assumption that alternative theories 
of the firm predict a difference between the behaviour of 
managers in firms with diffuse ownership and the behaviour of 
those in other firms. 
In the second part, the implications of alternative 
theories of the firm are presented, as are previous studies which 
provide interpretations to those implications particularly 
related to accounting reports. 
In the third part, further analysis of management 
incentives to manage reported income is conducted. In this 
analysis, the recent developments in the theory of the f irfn and 
certain properties of listed and unlisted f irms are considered. 
Finally the propositions for empirical investigation are 
presented. 
Theories of the Firm 
While the focus of this study is on the implications of 
alternative theories of the firm,, it may be appropriate to start 
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with a brief review of several theories of the firm. 
This review begins with the neoclassical theory of the 
firm which is a logical begiming because modern theories of the 
firm have been advanced as modifications, revisions or 
substitutes to the neoclassical theory and it includes several 
alternative theories which have distinctive motivational 
foundations. In this review, an answer is sought to a number of 
questions, such as: 
1. What is: (i) the main objective of the firm; 
(ii) the profit concept; and 
(iii) the firm's concept? 
2. To what extent do managers have discretion under the 
corporate system? 
3. What might be alternative objectives of the firm? 
4. How does management achieve such objectives? 
Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 
The basic axiom of neoclassical theory is that firms 
maximise profits. Hence the theory assumes that the f irm moves 
towards its objectives and selects those alternatives which will 
bring the f irm nearer to profit maximisation. From this 
assumption,, two concepts are of interest, namely the prof it 
concept and the f irm concept. 
The Prof it Concept: Economic prof it may be def ined as the excess 
of af irm's total revenue over its total costs where cost must be 
measured in terms of the alternative opportunities foregone by 
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the firm for all employed resources. This definition has been 
presented in the following mathematical form: 
7T = TR - TC 
whereby (Tr) represents pro fi ts,, (TR) is total revenue and (TC) is 
total cost. 
To maximise prof it, there are two necessary conditions: 
1. The f irm must operate with perfect knowledge: that is., the 
firm must know what TR and TC would. be at all levels of 
activity to identify that level at which the excess of TR 
over TC is greatest; and 
2. the firm seeks to maximise profit: that is, absolutely 
nothing that conflicts with profit maximisation yields any 
utility. 
The second condition is of particular interest because it leads 
us to the f irm's concept and its behaviour. 
I 
The Firm Concept: On the one hand, the theory considers the f irm 
as a primitive concept, a device in an economically decentralised 
system for transforming input into output. ' The firm is 
therefore a "black box" operated so as to meet the relevant 
marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs. 
2 On the 
other hand, and to study the f irm behaviour, the theory assumes 
Crew,, M.,, Theory of the Firm, Longman Group Limited,, Essex, 
1975j, p. 13. 
2. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviourl, Agency Costs arxi Ownership Structure", Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3,1976, p. 306-307. 
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that af irm is the entrepreneur who is the owner of the f irm. 
Also the theory assumes that the entrepreneur is rational in his 
movement towards the prof it goal. On such rationality,, McGuire 
has the following comment: 
"Rationality in the economic theory of the firm 
implicity assumes no action will be undertaken by the 
business enterprise that will move it away from its 
goal of profit maximisation. "l 
Meanwhile, the assumption of profit maximisation has 
allowed the theory to ignore the characteristics of f irms - such 
as differences in size and internal organisation - because if all 
firms have such a single objective then all firms will reach 
their decisions on the same basis. 
In summary, the fundamental motivation of the 
entrepreneur,, according to this theory, is to extract maximum 
profit from his activities. The entrepreneur is the owner or 
ownersof the firm, and owners make all decisions concerning the 
firm. The environment is certain and the movement towards the 
objective of profit maximisati-o-n is ra-tional. Differences in 
size and internal organisation are irrelevant and the only 
constraints are the technical limitations of 'production and 
distribution. The criterion of choice among alternatives is the 
profit maximisation. 
However, the neoclassical theory of the firm has been 
heavily criticised by several economists. To serve the purpose 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
McGuire,, J.,, Theories of Business Behaviour,, Prentice-Hall,, 
1964,, p. 56. 
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of tnis study, the dissatisfaction with the neoclassical theory 
as a result of the separation of ownership from control is of 
special interest. Hence the focus of this section must be on 
such dissatisfaction. 
The separation of ownership from control became an 
issue with the publication of the study by Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner means. In their revised edition Berle and Means 
distinguished between three functions: that of having interests 
in an enterprise, that of having power over it, and that of 
acting with respect to it. ' They argue that the owner position, 
under the corporate system, has been reduced to that of having a 
set of legal and factual interests in the enterprise, while 
managers are in the position of having legal and factual power 
over it. 2 With managers having such kind of power,, Berle and 
Means questioned the assumption that managers would choose to 
operate the enterprise in the interests of owners. 3 Moreover, 
several modern theories of the firm have recognised the 
discretionary power of management and they suggest that managers 
may seek to maximise their own utility by simply applying tne 
self interest axiom in the neoclassical theory to a new type of 
f irm. 
To this extent, the basic criticism of the neoclassical 
theory is that it cannot explain how the divergences of the 
Berle,, A. and Means, G.,, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.,, New York,, Revised 
Edition (1968),, p. 112. 
2. ibid., p. 112-113. 
3. ibid. j, p. 113. 
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conflicting interests of the members of the diffused ownership 
firm are brought into equilibrium in such a way as to maximise 
profit. In dealing with such dissatisfaction, economists have 
proposed several alternative theories. Basically, these theories 
postulate that the divorce of ownership and management allows 
discretion to the managers in goal setting. 
The next section includes a brief review of some of 
these theories. 
Alternative Theories of the Firm 
In modern organisations, the role and power of 
rmnagement have contributed to the search for alternatives to the 
neoclassical theory of the f irm. Several alternatives have been 
proposed in the literature and principally these alternatives 
suggest that f irms are more complex organisations and hence they 
should not be considered as "black boxes" operating in the 
neoclassical mode. These theories conceive the firm as a 
"coalition" of several parties and the most important member of 
such "coalition" is top management because of its power in 
decision-making and access to information. Such theories may be 
grouped into: 
(i) managerial theories of the firm, and 
(ii) other alternative theories of the firm. 
1. Managerial Theories of the Firm 
owing to the special importance of management in modern 
firms, several alternative theories are, not surprisingly, called 
managerial theories of the firm. The basic axiom of such 
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theories is that managers maximise their own utility, subject to 
a minimum prof it constraint to satisfy the stockholders and for 
satisfactory operations of the firm. However, there is no 
consensus among the managerial theories as to how the 
maximisation of managements' utility will be attained. 
Consequently three theories of managerialism are presented in 
this study, namely Baumol's theory of "sales Revenue 
Maximisation", Marris's theory of "Managerial Capitalism", and 
Wi I amson's theory of "Managerial Discretion". 
BAUMOL'S THEORY: Baumol's views originated from his own 
experience as a consultant to large firms where he found that 
managers are preoccupied with maximisation of sales rather than 
prof its. As a result, he indicates that management will bend its 
efforts to the augmentation of sales revenues rather than to 
further increases in profits, provided that profits are high 
enough to keep stockholders satisfied and contribute adequately 
to the financing of company growth. 1 Later in his book, he 
modifies this hypothesis in two respects: 2 
1. He considers maximisation of rate of growth of sales as a 
better approximation of management goals than maximisation 
of current level of sales; 
2. In the long run, he considers prof it to act as an 
instrumental variable -a means whereby management works 
Baumol,, W., Business Behaviour, value and Growth,, Harcourt, 
Brace & World Inc., New York, Revised Edition,, 1967, p. 49. 
2. ibid., p. 96. 
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towards its goal - rather than a constraint imposed from the 
outside. 
He argues that a higher profit level will reduce the 
magnitude of firms' current operations, while too low a profit 
level will prevent future growth and hence the optimal profit 
stream will be that intermediate stream consistent with the 
largest rate of growth of output over the firm's life. ' For 
2 empirical support, Baumol draws upon the study by McGuire et al. 
and he concludes that managers attempt to increase the f irm size 
because: 
"Executive salaries appear to be far more closely 
correlated with the scale 0, Soperations of the firm 
than with its profitability. " 
With regard to the source of financing future sales 
expansiop,, Baumol indicates that firms will retain a greater 
4 proportion of earnings than stockholders would prefer, Also 
Baumol indicates that the rise of separation of ownership from 
control has resulted in a more conservative management and 
managers may consequently seek to bring the year's earnings into 
line to avoid giving over-optimistic expectations to the 
5 stockholders. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. ibid., p. 97. 
2. McGuire, J., Chiu, J. and Elbing,, A.,, "Executive incomes, 
Sales and Profits", American Economic Review, 52 (September 
1962). 
3. Baumol, W., op. cit., 46. 
4. Baumol, W., op. cit., P. 52. 
5. ibid., r p. 102-103. 
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Marris's Theory: Marris develops a theory of "managerial 
capitalism". His theory relies on two basic propositions. 
1. The existence of a degree of monopoly power in the product 
market and hence the possibility that firms may have viable 
alternative objectives other than adopting prof it 
maximisation, and 
2. The existence of a lack of strict stockholders control in 
the capital market and hence management has considerable 
f reedom of action. 
Then he argues that management derives utility from 
size and growth because of the power, salary, status and security 
that come with them. In Marris's model, the firm's goal is the 
maximisation of the rate of growth in size, subject to a 
constraint imposed by the security motive. ' Therefore, the 
managerial utility has two dimensions, namely growth and 
security. The former represents the increase in total assets and 
acts as an indicator of the several satisfactions with scale, 
while the latter represents the market valuation and the more 
2 positive utilities connected with market quotation. 
According to Marris, the manager finances such growth 
of total assets primarily out of retained earnings and the 
manager will increase retentions until he runs up against the 
minimum valuation constraint. But, increasing the rate of growth 
Marris,, R.,, The Economic Theory of "Managerial" Capitalism, 
MacMillan and Company Limited, Londont Revised'Edition, 
1967, p. 47. 
2. ibid, p. 107. 
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has two effects with opposite results on the share prices - the 
lower current dividend decreases the value of the shares, while 
the higher growth rate increases the value of the shares and 
these two effects need not exactly balance. In fact Marris 
indicates that: 
there are important possibilities for trading off 
between growth rate and variables on other dimensions 
of managerial utility. Growth may be traded for 
security and a similar though not identical effect 
arises if direct utility is obtained from the stock 
market quotation as such,, "' 
Williamson's Theory: The basic rationale of Williamson's theory 
is perhaps more graphically summed up in his own words: 
in the absence of rigorous competition in the 
product market and where the separation of ownership 
from control is substantial, there is no compelling 
reason to assume that the firm is operated so as to 
maximise profit. on the contrary, such behaviour would 
appear to require an unusual variety of rationality - 
and one not widely found in human affairs - namely a 
canplete detachment of individual interests from 
,, 2 occupational decision makers. 
Accordingly, Williamson believes that imanagers will 
behave in a fashion that reflects their own interests. In his 
model,, the manager seeks to maximise his utility function, 
subject to a minimum profit constraint and this minimum profit is 
that amount required to keep stockholders satisfied. According 
to Williamson, the manager's utility function includes: 
1. ibid., p. 107. 
2. Williamsonv 0.,, The Economics of Discretionary Behaviour: 
Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm,, Markham 
publishing Company,, Chicago,, 1967,, p. 55. 
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i) 
ii) 
The size and salary of his staff; 
An emolument term "management slack" which refers to that 
portion of management salaries and perquisites which, if 
removed, would not cause the manager to seek other 
employment; and 
iii) Discretionary profits which refers to that amount by which 
earnings exceed the minimum prof it constraint. ' 
In Williamson's static analysis, salary is linked to 
the size of staff where an expanded staff is the path to 
promotion and larger salary. 2 But in a dynamic sense, staff size 
is linked to size related variables which will increase with 
firm's expansion. Also Williamson argues that the managers 
derive no satisfaction from dividends per se, but the manager 
3 retains earnings as a source of discretion. Hence, the manager 
will turn over to the stockholders just the minimum level of 
dividends necessary to satisfy them. For reasons of stockholder 
relations, Williamson hypothesises that the managers exercise 
their control over the information released regarding firm 
4 perfonnance. 
1. ibid., p. 34-35. 
ibid., p. 34. 
3. ibid., p. 135. 
4. Williamson,, 0., "A Dynamic Stochastic Theory of Managerial 
Behaviour", in A. Phillips and 0. Williamson, eds., Prices: 
issues in Theory, Practice and Public Policy, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967, p. 11-13, [p. 131. 
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Other Alternative Theories of the Fitin 
There have been two other approaches to develop a 
theory of the firm: 
1. the behaviouralist approach, and 
2. the agency approach. 
Generally, the behaviouralist approach has two bases. 
The first basis is that instead of hypothesising about how 
rational decision makers respond to various situations or saying 
how they should respond, one should study how decision makers 
take decisions in practice. The second basis is the belief that 
one can no longer look at f irms as being one major decision maker 
(e. g. entrepreneur) , but instead one must look at firms as 
canplex organisations with different goals and conflicts between 
these goals have to be solved within the f irm. Examples of these 
theories are: (1) Simon's framework of Bounded Rationality 
Theory' and (2) Cyert and March's Behavioural Theory of the 
2 Firm. Under these theories, the firm is conceived as a 
"coalition" of different groups and each group has its own set of 
goals and the criterion of choice is that the alternative 
selected meets all of the demands (goals ofthe "coalition"). 
Cyert and March indicate that conflicts between goals are not 
3 
expected to be fully resolved within an organisation. In 
Simon, H., "Rational Decision making",, The American Economic 
Review,, Vol. 69, No. 4, September 1979. 
2. Cyert,, R. and March,, J., A Behavioural Theory of the Firm, 
Prentice-Hall Inc, New ýork,, 1963. 
3. ibid., p. 43 
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general, behaviouralists believe that satisf icing is the ruleof 
the game rather than prof it or utility maximisation. 
In recent years, several studies that reject the 
classical model of the firm but assume classical forms of 
economic behaviour on the part of agents within the firm,, have 
been developed. ' These studies have viewed the firm as a complex 
compromise of conflicting demands reflecting a large constituency 
whose members act from self-interest but realise that their 
destinies depend to some extent on the survival of the team in 
its competition with other teams. 2 Based on this logic, a firm 
cannot have a well defined objective function, instead the f irm 
is viewed as a set of individuals interested in maximising their 
own welfare through their choice of actions within the 
constraints specified by the set of contracts among them. 
3 Examples of these studies are the work of Alchain and Demsetz, 
Jensen and Meckling, 
4 
and Fama. 5 
Jensen and Meckling consider the contractual 
relationships as the essence of the firm and hence in defining 
the firm, they stated that: 
Fama,, E.,, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", 
Journal of Political Economics, Vol. 88,, No. 2, (1980), 
V040-70 
2. ibid., p. 289. 
3. Alchain,, A. a. nd Demsetz, H., "Production Information Costs,, 
and Economic Organisation",, American Economic Review, 62 
(December 1972). 
4. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., op. cit. 
Famar E., op. cit. 
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"It is important to recognise that most organisations 
are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a 
set of contracting relationships among individuals. 111 
Also they indicate that if all parties to the 
relationship are utility maximisers, then there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests 
2 of the principal. According to Jensen and Meckling, the 
principal can limit divergences from his interest by introducing 
appropriate incentives for the agent and by expanding resources 
on monitoring activities (i. e. auditing financial statements). 
Also they suggest that when the manager's compensation is 
conditional on the outcome of his decisions, suchiproblems are 
alleviated. 
Implications of Alternative Theories of the Firm 
The foundation of alternative theories of the f irm has 
led several economists and accountants to examine empirically 
some of the assumptions and implications of such theories. On 
the one hand, economists have attempted to f ind answers to a 
number of questions some of which are: 
3 
1. Do owner -controlled firms have higher average profit rates 
(i. e. profit over total assets) than manager controlled 
f irms? 
--------------------------------- ------------------------------ 
1. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., op. cit., p. 310. 
2. ibid., p. 308. 
3. The results of such empirical studies are summarised in: 
mcEachenj, W. j, Managerial Control and Performance,, Lexington 
Books,, 1975,, p. 21-56. 
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2. Do manager-controlled firms retain a higher proportion of 
earnings than owner-controlled firms? 
3. Is the manager's income more related to the scale of the 
firm's operation than to the firm's profit or market value? 
4. How effectively does the market for corporate control 
discipline managers? 
On the other hand, several accountants and some 
econcmists have attempted to examine the hypothesis that managers 
in firms with diffuse ownership attempt to exercise control over 
the information contained in their annual accounting reports. 
This hypothesis has stemmed from two main sources: 
1. Alternative theories of the firm suggest that managers in 
diffuse ownership firms have discretionary power to exercise 
almost total control over such a firm and, since they are 
motivated by their own self-interest, that often leads to a 
conflict of interests; 
2. If there is a conflict between the managers and owners' 
interests,, the availability of alternative accounting 
procedures gives an important advantage to the managers. 
In this latter regard, Berle and Means state that: 
"The directors have another powerful weapon which may 
be combined with any or all of the foregoing. They 
have a large m asure of control over the company's 11ý 
income accoULIL. ' 
1. Berle,, A. and Means,, G.,, op. cit., p. 182. 
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Based on this hypothesis, several theoretical and 
empirical studies have been conducted. These studies may be 
classified into two groups: (1) those related to income 
smoothing, (2) those related to increase and/or decrease of early 
reported income. 
Incane Sm2othing 
Barnea et al define smoothing as: 
"The deliberate damping of fluctuations about some 
level of earnings considered to be normal for the 
f irm. #I' 
The early contribution in this area was the work of 
23 Hepworth,, while Gordon has presented a formal exposition of 
what is known as the income smoothing hypothesis. Gordon's work 
is mainly an attempt to develop a criterion of choice among 
accounting alternatives. In the early part of his work,, Gordon 
elaborates upon the usefulness of financial statements to the 
owners and he concludes that: 
"The primary role of the financial statements, the role 
peculiar to them,, is to test the soundness of the 
general policies the owner has been following. 'A 
Barnea,, A.,, Ronen, J. and Sadan, s.,, "Class if icatory 
Smoothing of Income with Extraordinary Items",, The 
Accounting Review, January 1976,, p. 111. 
2. Hepworth,, S., "Smoothing Periodic Income",, Accounting 
Review, January 1953. 
3. Gordon,, M. j "Postulatesi, Principles and Research in 
Accounting", The Accounting Review, April 1964. 
4. ibid., p. 257 
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And as long as the owner's objective is to maximise his 
wealth, Gordon suggests that: 
in selecting among alternative principles to 
employ in preparing these statements the crit. Irionthe 
owner wants is the maximisation of his wealth. " 
To implement this criterion, Gordon elaborated upon the 
impact of the income tax on accounting principles and concluded 
that: 
"The minimisation of reported current income, in so far 
as income reported to stockholders influence the figure 
accepted for ax purposes, maximises the wealth of a 
corporation. " 
As a result of the separation of ownership from 
operating control, Gordon considers an alternative criterion of 
f-h , choice among accounting alternatives. With regard to such an 
alternative criterion,, Gordon starts with four propositions in 
line with the aforementioned alternative theories of the firm. 
These propositions are as follows: 
3 
Proposition I: The criterion a corporate management uses in 
selecting among accounting principles is the maximisation o its 
utility or welfare. 
Proposition II: The utility of a management increases with (1) 
its job security,, with (2) the level and rate of growth in the 
1. ibid.,, p. 256. 
ibid., p. 260. 
3. ibid., p. 261-262. 
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management income, and (3) the level and rate of growth in the 
corporation's size. 
Proposition III: The achievement of the management goals stated 
in Proposition ii is dependent in part on the satisfaction of 
stockholders with the corporation's performance. 
Proposition IV: Stockholder satisfaction with a corporation 
increases with the average rate of growth in the corporation's 
income (or the average rate of return on its capital) and the 
stability of its income. 
Based on these four propositions,, Gordon proposes the 
following theorem: 
"Given that the above four propositions are accepted or 
found to be true,, it follows that a management should 
within the limits of its power, i. e. the latitude 
allowed by accounting rules, (1) smooth reportyd 
income, and (2) smooth the rate of growth in income. " 
Most prior research related to income manipulation was 
concerned with income smoothing as suggested by Gordon's work. 
The aim of previous empirical studies was to provide an answer to 
one or more of the following three questions: 
1. does the income smoothing phenomenon exist? 
2. How can such a practice be achieved? 
3. is such a practice justifiable? 
1. ibid., p. 262. 
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With regard to the first question, the findings of 
several studies - such as Dascher and Malcolm. 
' Barefield and 
Ccx*nisky, 2 Beidleman, 3 Ronen and Sadan4 and Barnea et al, 5 suggest 
the existence of the income smoothing phenomenon, while other 
67 studies such as Gordon et al, Dopuch and Drake, Copeland and 
8 Licastro,, Imhoff9 and Eckel. 10 are rather inconclusive. 
Furthermore, these studies have used different objects of 
smoothing,, for example, net income was the object of smoothing in 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dascher, P. and Malcolm, R.,, "A Note on Income Smoothing in 
the Chemical Industry",, Journal of Accounting Research,, 
Autumn (1970). 
2. Baref ield, R. and Comisky,, E.,, "The Smoothing Hypothesis: An 
Alternative Test", The Accounting Review, (April 1972),, 
pp. 291-298. 
Beidleman,, C.,, "Income Smoothing: The Role of Management", 
The Accounting Review,, October (1973). 
4. Ronen " J. and Sadan, S., 
"Do Corporations use their 
Discretion in Classifying Accounting Items to Smooth 
Reported Income? ",, The 
, 
Financial Analyists Journal, 
September - October 1975. 
5. Barnea, A., Ronen, J. and Sadan, S., op. cit. 
6. Gordon,, M.,, Horwitz, B. and Meyersi, P. r 
"Accounting 
Measurement and Normal Growth of the Firm",, in JAEDICKEj, 
IJIRI and NIELSEN, eds. Research in Accounting Measurement, 
(Evanston, 111: A. A. A. 1966),, pp. 221-231. 
7. Dopuch,, N. and Drake,, D.,, "The Effect of Alternative 
Accounting Rules for Non Subsidiary Investments". Empirical 
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies,, The Institute of 
Professional Accounting, Chicago, London, 1966. 
8. Copeland,, R. and Licastro,, R., "A Note on Income Smoothing", 
The Accounting Review,, July (1968). 
9. Imhoff,, E.,, "Income Smoothing -A Case for Doubt", 
Accounting Journal, Spring 1977. 
10. Eckel,, N.,, "The Income Smoothing Hypothesis Revisited", 
ABACUS, Vol. 17, No. 1,1981. 
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Dopuch and Drake' and Copeland and Licastro, 2 while ordinary 
income (income after tax, but before extraordinary items) was the 
ob3ect in Ronen and Sadan 3 and Barnea et al. 4 Most of the 
remaining studies have not specified the object of smoothing. 
Regarding the second question, that is,, how income 
smoothing can be achieved, the literature suggests three 
.5 dimensions of smoothing as follows. 
A) Smoothing through events occurrence and/or recognition. In 
this dimension the focus is on the management's ability to 
time actual transactions in a way that would tend to dampen 
the variation of reported income over time. For example, 
management might control the timing of advertising expenses, 
research and development cost, and assets disposal, as well 
as changing its policy of shipments, etc. 
B) Smoothing through allocation over time. The ability of 
management to smooth through allocation can occur in two 
different respects. Firstly, within the generally accepted 
accounting principles, in most countries there can be more 
than one alternative accounting policy for dealing with the 
same item (or transaction) - such as the variety of 
accounting policies regarding depreciation, stock valuation 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Dopuch, N. and Drake, D., op. cit. 
2. Copeland, R. and Licastro, R., op. cit. 
Ronen,, J. and Sadan, s., op. cit. 
4. Barneal A. j, Ronen, J. and Sadan, s., op. cit. 
5. ibid., P. M. 
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etc. Secondly,, the selection of one rather than another 
policy from generally accepted accounting alternatives still 
requires subjective judgement, for example,, the rate of 
depreciation within a straight line method. 
C) Smoothing through the classification of iteins in the income 
statement. If the object of smoothing is not the final net 
income, it is suggested that management may possess the 
ability to smooth through classifying intra-income statement 
items to reduce the variations over time. This dimension 
stems frofn the vague and inexact rules of accounting 
definition that can sometimes surround the way certain intra 
income statement items are classified. 
Along with these dimensions, fairly recent researchers 
such as Imhoff' and Ecke, 2 have emphasised the need for 
controlling natural smoothing in order to reach proper 
conclusions about intentional smoothing by management. In this 
regard, Imhoff suggested that: 
if 0 *0 smoothing research studies which have identified 
f inns as income smoothers, based on what is essentially 
the afore-mentioned definition (where smoothing is 
defined as a relatively low degree of variation about 
some income trendline), may have reached inconclusive 
results because of the inclusion of natural smoothers 
in the income smoother sample. 
Eckel provides the following statement on natural 
smoothing: 
1. Imhoff, E., op. cit. 
2. Eckel,, N., op. cit. 
Imhoff,, E., OP-cit., P. 89. 
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"A naturally smooth income stream simply implies that 
the income generatinj process inherently produces a 
smooth income stream. " 
Regarding the general methods for identifying income 
smoothing behaviour, Copeland suggests three methods: (1) through 
direct contact with management; (2) through contacting third 
parties such as public accountants; or (3) through examining 
2 
ex-post data. Theoretically, it would appear that the f irst two 
xiethods will provide more insights and hence more valuable 
results. However, most researchers to date have selected the 
last method,, basically because management might be reluctant to 
reveal needed information,, while public accountants might 
consider such information confidential. 
After presenting the possible dimensions and the common 
methods for identifying income smoothing, it is worth noticing 
that a great number of previous studies attempted to investigate 
the existence of the income smoothing phenomenon by first 
identifying one or more smoothing instruments,, and secondly 
examining whether such instruments provide smoother income. For 
example,, Baref leld and ComiskY3 used the choice of cost or equity 
fnethod,, Barnea et a14 used extraordinary items, Beidleman5 and 
1. Eckel,, N.,, op. cit., p. 28. 
2. Copelandf R... "Income Smoothing",, Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies, The Institute of Professional 
Accounting, Chicago,, 1968,, p. 105. 
3. Barefield, R. and Canisky, E., op. cit. 
4. Barneal A., Ronen, J. and Sadan, S., op. cit. 
Beidleman,, C., v op. cit. 
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Dascher and Malcolm' used several accounting variables - such as 
pension costs,, R&D costs, dividend from nonconsolidated 
subsidiaries etc. Therefore,, one of the problems that is 
occurring in the previous studies is that of identifying whether 
those instruments are used by management for smoothing. In 
practice, it is possible that management could achieve smoothing 
by a combination of variables other than those that have been 
used for testing. Alternatively, one variable may apparently 
smooth income, while others which have not been considered may 
counter the smoothing effects. Another problem inherent in 
several studies occurs where their methods of testing are 
incapable of discriminating between a naturally smooth income 
stream and one which is intentionally smoothed. Moreover, 
several studies tended to test only for smoothing in one period 
and hence they could not distinguish between random adjustment of 
profit on the one hand and income smoothing on the other hand. 
Imhoff's methodology provides sound solutions to some of these 
problems in the process of investigating the existence of the 
2 income smoothing phenomenon. Therefore, the present study 
applies a methodology similar to that of Imhoff with the 
following extensions: 
A) While Imhoff applies his method to one set of firms, the 
present study applies such methods to two sets of f irms, 
namely listed and unlisted firms, where unlisted firms are 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Dascher, P. and Malcolm, R., op. cit. 
Irnhoffi, E. j, op. cit. 
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used as a control group. The reason for such an extension 
is to enhance the validity of our results by simply applying 
the same methodology to two sets of f irms on the assumption 
that they have a different motivational foundation and this 
will be discussed later in this chapter. 
B) The possibility of natural smoothing is examined using a 
different approach from that suggested by Imhoff. 
C) Two expectancy models and several income objects will be 
considered in the present study rather than just one inodel 
and one object. 
Regar ing the third question concerning the 
justifiability of income smoothing, several reasons have been put 
forward for smoothing, beside that of maximisation of 
managements' utility, as suggested by Gordon. ' Hepworth argues 
that smoothed income will lead to tax saving, better internal 
relations, and it can help to stabilise activity and maintain 
confidence in the economy. 2 To this extent,, we can see no 
differences between unlisted and listed firms because both will 
attempt to save tax, experience better internal relations and 
operate under a stable economy. Hence that degree of smoothing 
recognised by Hepworth is expected to be exercised in both type 
of firms and, since we are using unlisted firms as a control 
group, our conclusion will be the more valid. 
Beidleman argues that income smoothing can provide more 
1. Gordon, M., op. cit., (1964). 
2. Hepworth, S., op-cit., p. 33. 
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relevant information to users than is available under a 
I. 
I 
nonsmoothing strategy. By allowing a certain leeway to enable 
managers to normalise an income trend, Beidleman believes that 
information in financial statements is made more realistic, 
useful and relevant to users. In this regard, we may argue that 
the present accounting practice is subjective enough as it is at 
present and a smoothing strategy would present an even greater 
demand on individual opinions. For instance, where are the lines 
to be drawn between interpretation and misrepresentation and what 
is it that allows a more realistic and relevant picture of the 
firm's performance? How is a certain degree of uniformity 
between firms to be imposed? Even with strict regulation there 
is still concern about a potential gap between what management 
may want to present and what is useful for the users. 
Accordingly, the justification of smoothing is questionable, at 
least from the implementation point of view. 
Increase and Decrease of Reported Income 
In the present study, increase of early reported income 
is def ined as a strategy to report higher measurement of present 
income at the expense of the future reported income, while 
decrease of early reported income is the opposite strategy. 
Alternative theories of the firm provide a variety of 
reasons that might lead management to adopt either one of these 
two strategies. on the one hand,, Marris's theory suggests that 
management derives utility from growth and such growth will be 
1. Beidleman, C., op. cit. 
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primarily financed out of retained earnings. Furthermore, 
Williamson argues that the managers will return to the 
stockholders just the minimum level of dividends necessary to 
satisfy them. Thus to the extent that managers seek to retain 
prof it rather than pay dividends, managers might use accounting 
practices which lead to minimum profit reporting for reasons of 
stockholder relations. ' on the other hand, alternative theories 
of the firm indicate that management's income is one of the major 
components of management's utility function. Also Jensen and 
Meckling suggest that when the manager's compensation is 
conditioned on the outcome of his decisions the conflict between 
owners and managers is alleviated. But Watts and Zimmerman2 and 
Hagerman and Zmljewski3 suggest that if a manager's income is 
related to accounting earnings, then one must expect that 
management has an incentive to use accounting practices that 
increase accounting earnings. Thus management might use 
accounting practices which lead to higher measurement of early 
prof it. In this regard, Larner investigates the relations 
between the income of top executives and the profitability, size 
and growth of their firms. His conclusion is as follows: 
For example see: Hall, M. and Weiss,, L.,, "Firm Size and 
Profitability",, The Review of Economics and Statistics,, 49 
(Aug. 1967), p. 321. 
2. Watts, R. and Zimmerman, J., "Towards a Positive Theory of 
the Determination of Accounting Standards",, The Accounting 
Review, January (1978), P. 118. 
3. Hagerman,, R. and Zmijewski, M., Some Economic Determinants 
of Accounting Policy Choice",? Journal of Accounting and 
Econanicst 1 (1979) 0, p. 145. 
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"The results suggest that the corporation's dollar 
profit and rate of profit are the major variables 
explaining the level of executive remuneration and 
compensation, "' 
Additionally,, Lyle Jacobsen proposes a flexible 
reporting theory as an attempt to describe modern accounting 
practices. His theory suggests that two general techniques have 
been presented under the accrual system, namely min i- measurement 
of revenue and max 1 -measurement of expense. He refers to the 
combination of these two techniques as optimeasurement of income 
and he concluded that: 
$1* 00 optimeasurement in good years, and change in 
accounting method in less prof i tab le, 2year s, combine 
to 
produce a flexible reporting theory. ' 
According to Jacobsen, such presentation is misleading 
where he indicates that: 
if " 00 These techniques raise 
issues about the role of 
accounting in discouraging misleading financial 
reporting. " 
Empirical Evidence: 
Morris and Breakwell investigated whether changes in 
accounting practice are related to a firm's profitability in such 
a way that profitable f irms will use accounting changes to reduce 
Larner,, R.,? Management Control and the Large Corporation, 
New York: Dunellen Publishing Company Inc., 1970, p. 61. 
2. Jacobsen,, L.,, "The Rise of the Profit Deferral Notion". The 
Accounting Review, 38 (April 1963), p. 292. 
3. Jacobsen, L. r op. cit., p. 290. 
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profit, while less profitable firms will use accounting changes 
to increase profit. They conclude that there is no empirical 
evidence of such a relation, although a small minority of firms 
may have resorted to such tactics when profits were falling. ' 
Thus, with accounting changes, profitable firms did not decrease 
reported income, while some of the less profitable firms 
increased their reported income. Copeland and Wojdak examine the 
choice between purchase and pooling methods to see whether 
managers account for mergers in a manner which maximises reported 
income. Their results indicate that managers adopted the 
method that yields the highest future accounting income. 2 
other earlier studies which suggest that management manipulates 
reported earnings include Schiff 3 and Simpson. 4 The relatively 
recent studies which used owner-controlled f irms as a 
control group include Smith, 5 Salamon and Smith6 and 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Morris,, R. and Breakwell, H., "Manipulation of Earnings 
Figures in the United Kingdom", Accounting and Business 
Research, Summer 1975, p. 1983. 
2. Copeland,, R. and Wojdak, J., "Income Manipulation and the 
Purchase Pooling Choice", Journal of Accounting Research, 
Autumn (1969), p. 193. 
3. Scnif f,, M.,, "Accounting Tactics and the Theory of the Firm", 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 4,, No. l,, Spring 1966. 
4. Simpson, R., "An Empirical Study of Possible manipulation", 
The Accounting Review, October 1969. 
5. Smith,, E.,, "The Effect of Separation of Ownership from 
Control on Accounting Policy Decisions",, The Accounting 
Review, October 1976. 
6. Salc-unon, G. and Smith,, E. j, "Corporate Control and Managerial 
Misrepresentation of Firm Performance",, The Bell Journal of 
Economics, Spring 1979. 
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Dhaliwal et. al. 
1 The findings of Smith indicated tnat income 
smoothing is more prevalent in Manager-controlled than in Owner- 
Controlled firms, while the findings of Salamon and Smith (1979) 
and Dhaliwal et. al. (1982) indicated that managers of Manager- 
Controlled firms present their operational results in a most 
favourable way. In fact Salamon and Smith went as far as 
suggesting that 
"The evidence of this paper provides support for the 
position of those parties who favour limiting 
management's discretion regarding decisions over 
accountin I method changes and other accounting policy 
matters. " 
Finally, the empirical findings of Penno and Simon3 
indicated that publicly traded firms are more likely to use 
income-increasing accounting methods than privately-held firms. 
In so far, a brief review of several theories of the 
f irm was conducted witri particular emphasis on the motivational 
foundations of such theories. Also the broad implications of 
alternative theories of the firm were presented, as were previous 
studies which provide interpretations of those implications, 
particularly related to accounting reports. 
This review was found to provide a number of insights 
into the incentives of management to manage reported income and 
Dhaliwal, D., Salamon, G. and Smith,, E., "The Effect of 
Owner Versus Management Control on the Choice of Accounting 
Methods", Journal of Accounting and Economics, 4,1982. 
Salamon,, G. and Smith, E.,, op. cit.,, p. 327. 
3. Penno, M. and Simon, D.,, "Accounting Choices: Public Versus 
Private Firms"r Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
(314), Winter 1986. 
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the findings of several studies indicate that managers manipulate 
reported income. When the variable of ownership control was 
introduced, the findings of several studies indicated that 
Manager-Controlled firms are more likely to smooth and bias their 
accounting policies towards income increasing methods than Owner- 
Controlled firms. 
In the next part of this chapter,, further analysis of 
management incentives to manage reported income will be conducted 
with more emphasis on the U. K. situation. Also certain 
properties of listed and unlisted firms will be considered and, 
hopefully, the propositions for empirical investigation will be 
stated. 
Further Analysis of Management Incentives 
The findings of Smith (1976), Salamon and Smith (1979) 
and Dhaliwal et. al. (1982) indicated that the management 
sensitivity to the discipline of shareholders is dependent upon 
the degree of management's ownership. These studies gave 
emphasis to those incentives which are the result of the 
separation of ownership from operational control. 
However,, recent literature on the theory of the firm 
appear to limit the area' of conflict between owners and managers. 
For instance Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
1 
suggested that owners 
can solve most of the conflicts by appropriate incentives and 
expanding resources on monitoring activities, while Fama (1980)2 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Jensen, M. and Meckling, W., op. cit. 
Famar E., op. cit. 
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suygested that primary monitoring of managers comes from the 
discipline of the market forces. Furthermore,, Fama argued that a 
better understanding of modern corporations may be achieved witn 
the separation of two functions usually attributable to the 
traditional entrepreneur, namely management and risk bearing. 
Also Fama suggested that managers are subject to the discipline 
and opportunities provided by the markets for their services both 
within and outside the firm, while shareholders have cnarket for 
their services - capital markets - which allow them to shift 
their capital among f irms with relatively low transaction costs. ' 
Under these conditions,, Fama suggested that the separation of 
ownership and control over the firm can be an ef f icient form of 
economic organisation. 
Based on this logic, management may consider the impact 
of its decisions on the relationship with shareholders in a more 
positive way than that predicted by managerial theories of the 
firm. In this context, Sarnuels and Wilkes (1986) suggested that: 
of ... investors can buy and sell the shares of wnichever 
company they like, influenced by the returns they 
expect. They will move their funds to where they 
expect the highest returns, which may not even be in 
equity investments. This means that as long as some 
ccmpanies see their objectives as the maximisation of 
shareholders' wealth, it is difficult for other 
companies to survive, or at least to expand, with more 
socially-minded objectives... The theory of business 
finance is based on the assumption that the company 
should seek to maximise the wealth of the shareholder. 
The shareholders own the company and there is therefore 
some logic in the idea that it should be run in their 
interests.,, 2 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. ibid., p. 289-291. 
2. Samuels, J. and Wilkes,, F.,, Management of Company Finance,, 
Van Nostrand Reinhold (UK) Co. Ltd.,, 1986, p. 3. 
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Furthermore,, the shareholders of publicly traded firms 
may rely on the stock market, which provides a tentative 
potential value of their firms,, to judge the performance of 
management. If management fails to recognise the interest of 
shareholders, it may find itself worrying about survival and 
takeover. 
Thus the study of the management of reported income may 
have to be in line with the assumption that the f irm should seek 
to maximise the wealth of the shareholders and consequently, 
management must adhere very closely to this assumption. for 
management to manage reported income and adhere to the above 
assumption, incentives other than those resulted from ownership 
control need to be found. To this end,, the literature of f inance 
suggests that the theory of business finance and the theory of 
investment are intimately interdependent. 
' This is to say that 
the management of af irm should be concerned about its cash 
inflows even before being concerned about its cash outflows in 
the form of growth and expantion. Thus the area of business 
f inance might provide insight into the management incentives to 
manage reported income. The task is therefore to identify two 
sets of firms where the management of each faces different 
situations to secure adequate financial resources. To this end, 
perhaps the most obvious distinction between firms is of being 
listed or unlisted in the stock market. This is certainly true 
in the U. K. situation where all limited companies are subject to 
the Companies Acts with regard to financial reporting 
require,, nents. 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. For example see: ibid.,, p. 10. 
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To anticipate differences between listed and unlisted 
firms regarding the criteria of choice among accounting 
alternatives, the following reasons might be advanced: 
1. Since listed f irms are expected to be more diluted in terms 
of ownership than unlisted firms, any residual effect based 
on the separation of ownership from control is preserved. 1 
2. Listed firms are expected to be more dependent on external 
finance than unlisted firms and the management of a listed 
firm is expected to recognise the impact of share prices on 
its welfare and security. It will therefore be argued that 
managers of listed f irms might have the incentives to smooth 
and increase reported income. 
3. Unlisted firms are expected to be more dependent on internal 
finance than listed firms and the management of an unlisted 
f irm is expected to recognise the impact of taxation on the 
financial resources available to the f irm. It will 
therefore be argued that managers of unlisted firms mignt 
have the incentive to decrease reported income. 
Here it is necessary to emphasise that the dichotomy of 
listed and unlisted f irms makes it possible to relate the 
management of reported income to the motivations of their owners 
rather than being dependent upon the degree of management's 
ownership. This is Particularly true in the U. K. situation where 
listed firms include a large number of companies that are OC. To 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. For example see: Penno,, M. and Simon, D., op. cit.,, p. 562. 
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elaborate further, listed firms, whether OC or MC, might behave 
similarly to enhance the corporate financial image through 
smoothing and increasing early reported income. In this respect, 
Gale listed the following advantages of promoting the financial 
image of af irLn: 1 
i) a higher market value for the company's shares than would 
otherwise be the case, 
ii) a greater availability of funds at lower cost, 
iii) avoiding unjustifiable fluctuations in share prices, 
iv) increasing the shareholders loyalty to the firm, 
V) a stronger position against undesirable takeover activity, 
and 
vi) favourable references for the use of credit and banking 
agencies. 
In the following sections, the argument that listed 
firms are more likely to smooth and increase reported income, 
while unlisted firms are more likely to decrease reported income 
are presented in more detail. 
Source of Finance and Management Incentives 
Sound management of financial resources is necessary 
for af irm's survival and its growth. It is obvious that 
inadequate financial resources may not only jeopardise the firm's 
chances to growth and prosperity but it also may put itself into 
liquidation by creditors. it would therefore be expected that 
-- ---------------------------- ------------------- 
Gale, S., v Financial Management Handbook,, Gower Press, 1972, 
p. 321-322. 
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management might behave differently under different financiai 
circumstances. In this section, an attempt is made to identify 
the sources of finance available to listed and unlisted f irims, 
highlight the nature of the differences and identify the most 
likely incentives to manage reported income. 
The firm's sources of finance may be broadly classified 
as internal and external sources. For most firms, internal 
resources are the primary source of finance and they arise from 
retained prof its and depreciation allowances. on the other hand,, 
external resources of finance are funds available to the firm 
through borrowing and/or through additional equity investments. 
However, the combination of the overall sources of finance 
available to listed and unlisted firms are expected to be 
different in nature and these are discussed in turn. 
1. Unlisted f irms: 
By definition unlisted firms include private companies 
and those public companies not officially listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. 
Private companies are prohibited by law from issuing 
shares,, debentures or transferring shares to the general public. 
The Companies Act of 1980 has relaxed some of these restrictions 
by allowing private firms to raise funds from a very limited 
group of people who must satisfy certain conditions such as being 
a member of the family of existing owners or employees. Thus if 
a private company needs to raise equity funds, it has three 
choices: (1) the present owners accept the of f er, (2) the of f er 
must be carefully placed, or (3) the firm must go public. 
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Although there are other methods of external finance 
presumably available for a private firm, it may find that the 
financing of growth and expansion is very difficult. ' For 
instance,, the takeover of another company where the payment can 
Ie-- made in the form of shares may seem to be an alternative 
method of expansion, but the shares of a private company are not 
likely to be an acceptable method of payment simply because of 
their limited marketability. Furthermore, a private firm may be 
able to borrow funds from banks but there are short term 
implications of servicing these funds such as the requirement of 
interest,, high liquidity ratios, appropriate capital structure 
etc. 
The other form of unlisted companies are those which 
are public firms but not officially listed on the Stock Exchange. 
These f irms face most of the above mentioned problems to obtain 
funds but they have certain advantages over private firms. 
Unlisted public firms may choose to trade on the Unlisted 
Securities Market, established in November 1980, where only 10% 
of the company's issued shares needs to be made available on the 
market. Also the firm can invite the public to subscribe for the 
company's shares. 
However, unlisted firms often find even their internal 
growth limited by a shortage of funds because of limitations by 
status, problems of reputation,, investors preference to the 
marketability of securities, etc. Therefore, the sources of 
1. For example see: ibid., p. 85. 
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external finance available to an unlisted company are either 
limited or difficult to obtain. 
Under these circumstances,, the management of an 
unlisted firm is left with no choice other than to make the most 
efficient use of its internal resources to finance growth and 
expansion. The management might therefore try to reduce or at 
least delay those cash outflows which are manageable. Perhaps 
the most obvious application of this policy would be found in the 
area of the taxation of corporate. Accordingly if unlisted firms 
choose to manage reported income, then the managers are inore 
likely to bias their policies towards income-decreasing methods 
for the purpose of reducing current taxation changes. 
2. Listed firms: 
This group consists of firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. These f irms have the advantage of being able to raise 
funds from a wide variety of external sources and this often is 
the main reason for seeking public status. For instance listed 
firms can raise funds through the issuing of debentures, the 
selling of new shares to present and/or potential investors and 
the borrowing of funds from a wide variety of financial 
institutions. This enables listed firms to finance growth and 
expantion more readily than in the case of unlisted firms. 
However, the management of a listed firm must recognise 
that it is in competition for funds with other firms and with 
other forms of investments which are available to the suppliers 
of funds. Thus, to secure the flow of adequate funds, management 
must satisfy present shareholders and attract potential investors 
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and these will simultaneously increase its ability to borrow 
funds from other sources. For the management to achieve this 
end, it must consider the effect of its decisions on the share 
price. By failing to recognise the impact on share prices, 
management can put its welfare and security in danger. For 
instance, if equity investors are not satisfied with the 
movements in their share prices, management may be subject to 
various pressures which may lead to liquidity problems and may 
even lead management to worry about survival and takeover. 
Accordingly the most relevant question is how equity investors 
(or alternatively their financial analysts) value the shares of a 
f irm? 
Equity investors are the suppliers of ordinary capital 
and their interest is the riskiest of all which is usually 
referred to as the residual interest. Investors are expected to 
search for those shares which maximise the percentage return on 
their f unds. They look to two principal rewards from their 
holdings, namely dividends and capital growth (i. e. increase in 
share prices). In the literature of finance, several reasons 
have been put forward which indicate that equity investors are 
more likely to be interested in capital growtn rather than the 
current level of dividends. For instance,, Keane (1986) examined 
the relevance of the pattern of dividend payments to shareholders 
by reviewing the literature on dividend policy. The author 
concluded that: 
there are strong reasons for believing that the 
taxation implications of dividend policy may under 
certain circumstances outweight any positive aspects of 
dividends and, even in the context of a clientele 
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structure in shareholder ownership, it would appear 
advisable for growth companies, certainly those in the 
tax exhaustion category, to bias their policy towards 
low payment ratios ... it would be desirable to strive 
after a stable, slowly growing pattern on the principal 
that, if companies do attract investor clienteles, an 
unpredictable payout stream is unlikely to appeal to 
any group seeking to ýlan its income preferences or its 
taxation strategies. " 
It may therefore be argued that a change in the level 
of dividends is not necessarily dependent on the change in 
reported income and hence management might increase reported 
income without worrying about proportional increase in dividends. 
In fact Davies (1976) stated that: 
"In general,, the better a company's future profits 
prospects are believed to be, the lower will be the 
current dividend which it needs to offer the investing 
public to persuade it to purchase an issue of its 
share. "2 
It should be noted that the above statement emphasises 
the importance of future earnings and the uncertainty regarding 
their estimations. 
In the literature several share valuation models have 
been proposed to assist equity investors. These models may be 
classified into five groups dependent on their bases: 
i) Dividends-based valuation 
ii) Earnings-based valuation 
Keane,, S.,, Issues in Finance, Philip Allan, Oxford, 1986, 
p. 87. 
2. Davies,, B.,, Business Finance and the City of London, 
Heineman ED. Books Ltd., London, 1976, p. 4. 
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111) Price-earnings ratios valuation 
iv) Cash flows valuation 
V) Capital asset pricing model. 
Most of these models incorporate earnings, earnings growth, and 
earnings payout ratios as important factors. In practice, 
however,, Arnold and Moizer (1986) found that over 80 per cent of 
a sample of financial analysts use the price-earnings ratio for 
share valuation. 
' But whatever model of share valuation is used 
by or for equity investors, the accuracy of their estimated 
values is a function of the quality of inputs used in such 
calculations. In this context, Samuels and Wilkes (1986) 
suggested that: 
"The information system between the company, its 
shareholders and its potential shareholders is far from 
perfect... The capital markets are faced with 
incomplete information, and they are influenced by th 
statements and actions of a company or its directors. " 
Management may therefore believe that equity market is influenced 
by reported income numbers and hence it might choose to manage 
reported income as an attempt to post the price of its shares. 
To do so, management is expected to consider the attitudes and 
expectations of equity investors. And since equity investors 
seek to maximise their wealth, one would expect that their 
Arnold, J. and Moizer,, P.,, "A Survey of the Methods used by 
U. K. Investment Analysts to Appraise Investment in ordinary 
Shares",, Accounting and Business Research, Summer 1984, 
p. 200. 
2. Samuels, J. and Wilkes, F.,, op. cit., p. 7. 
59 
satisfaction increases with higher earnings, reasonable rate of 
growth and the stability of earnings as a relative measure of the 
risk involved. Accordingly, if listed firms choose to manage 
reported income, then managers are more likely to smooth reported 
income and bias their accounting policies towards income- 
increasing methods. 
In summary this chapter consisted of three major parts. 
In the first part, a brief review of several theories of the f irm 
with particular emphasis on their motivational foundations was 
conducted. In the second part, the imPlications of such theories 
particularly related to accounting reports were presented, as 
were previous empirical studies which provided interpretations of 
such implications. In the third part, recent developments in the 
theory of the f irm were considered and their implications on the 
present study were emphasised. Also certain properties of listed 
and unlisted firms were examined with emphasis on management's 
incentives to manage reported income. 
In conclusion it was found that the separation of 
ownership from operational control within the domain of publicly 
traded firms has implications with regard to accounting choice 
where the findings of several empirical studies indicated that 
manager -con tro 1 led firms are more likely to smooth and bias their 
accounting policies towards income- increasing methods when 
compared with owner-controlled firms. 
When this area of research was extended to listed and 
unlisted f inns, the following two propositions were developed: 
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i) Managers of listed firms are more likely to smooth reported 
income and bias their accounting policies towards income- 
increasing methods 
ii) Managers of unlisted firms are more likely to bias their 
accounting policies towards income-decreasing methods. 
Accordingly the above two propositions will be 
empirically examined later in this thesis. 
In the next chapter, the proposition that managers are 
able to manipulate reported results through acceptable accounting 
means will be theoretically examined. 
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Chapter III 
ACCOUNTING RULES OF MEASUREMENT 
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine, 
theoretically, the assertion that management is capable of 
managing reported income through acceptable accounting means. 
Accor ingly, both the development of accounting rules and the 
state of accounting practice are of interest. This chapter will, 
therefore,, include two major parts: (i) the development of 
accounting rules, and (ii) the state of accounting practice. 
The Development of Accounting Rules 
During the 19th Century, a series of related economic 
events gave rise to tremendous expansion of accounting, for 
example, the development of cost accounting to cope with the 
rapid growth of industry and the growth of railroads, which 
contributed to the clarification of the concepts of capital and 
income. Also,, the development of corporations with limited 
liability gave rise to legal and accounting requirements. 
However,, the outcome of such accounting expansion as far as the 
present study is concerned, may be described in the following 
statement by the American Accounting Association in 1936: 
"... many of the simplest and most fundamental problems 
of accounting remain without an acceptable solution. 
There is no authoritative statement of essential 
principles available on which accounting records and 
statements may be based. Public accountants have been 
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asked to certify to the correctness and adequacy of 
accounting statements, where no satisfactory crýterla 
of correctness and adequacy have been agreed to. "' 
In both the United States and the United Kingdom the 
development of accounting rules was subject to two periods of 
turmoil, namely the 1930's and the 1960's. In these periods, 
considerable pressure for change came from the public, 
accompanied by dissatisfaction with the extant situation by 
practising accountants and academics. The following two sections 
are, therefore, devoted to the development of accounting rules 
since the 1930's. 
The Development of Acco Rules to the 1960's 
The winds of the 1929 financial collapse have produced 
a strong and decisive influence on the pace of accounting change. 
one of the results of such collapse was that financial statements 
should provide more adequate information to investors and 
shareholders and hence comparability came to focus. This led to 
the following changes in accounting thought: 
2 
1. By adhering more closely to the going-concern concept, inore 
emphasis has been placed on the income statement as opposed 
to the balance sheet,, 
2. the increased emphasis on a uniform concept of income, 
American Accounting Association,, "A Statement of 
Objectives", The Accounting Review, (March 1936),, p. l. 
2. Hendriksen, E., Accounting Theory, 3rd Edition,, R. Irwin, 
Inc., 1977, p. 55. 
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3. the need for full disclosure of relevant financial 
information, and 
4. the increased emphasis on consistency in reporting rules. 
Meanwhile, the expression 'generally accepted accounting 
principles' (GAAP) has come to play a significant role in the 
accounting profession. 
Since the history of accounting standards setting in 
tl-e U. S. is relevant and goes back further than that of the U. K.,, 
the development of accounting rules in both countries is 
discussed respectively. 
1. The U. S. Case 
During the 1930's, a general recognition of the fact 
that improvements in accounting rules and disclosure were overdue 
led to closer cooperation between the American Institute of 
Accountants (the American Institute) and the Committee on the 
Stock List of the New York exchange. The result of such 
cooperation was released in 1934 as an Institute Pamphlet. 1 It 
embodied a number of basic principles of accounting to be 
followed by listed companies and it has been suggested that it 
was the first recorded instance where the phrase "accepted 
accounting principles" was used. In the same period,, the 
Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) was created by an Act of 
Congress to administer several Securities Acts. This new body 
American Institute of Accountants,, Audits of Corporate 
Accounts, 1934, reprinted in G. May, Twenty-Five Years of 
Accounting Responsibility,, 1911 - 1936,, Vol. 1,, p. 112-144,, 9-cholars Book Co.,, 1971. . 
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has broad power to prescribe accounting procedures and form of 
accounting statements filed with it. In fact, the SEC engaged,, 
during the years of 1936 to 1938, in heated controversy regarding 
whether or not it should promulgate a set of accounting 
principles to be followed by all firms filing with the SEC, but 
the SIDC decided in 1938 to permit the profession to lead the way 
in the formulation of accounting principles. ' 
In 1938, the American Institute established a research 
department to put the effort of developing accounting principles 
on a permanent basis. To this end,, the Committee on Accounting 
Procedures (CAP) was established, whose purpose it was to reduce 
the area of difference in accounting practice by narrowing the 
choices available in prevailing accounting principles. The CAP 
considered many accounting problems and issued pronouncements in 
the form of 51 Accounting Research Bulletins during the years 
from 1939 to 1959. These Bulletins have made significant 
contributions to accounting theory, but their contribution to the 
improvement of accounting practice has been less marked. In this 
regard,, Hendriksen has stated that: 
"As evidenced by the topics of the Special Committees 
and Accounting Research Bulletins published by the 
Committee on Accounting Procedures prior to 1960,, the 
(AICPA) devoted its attention almost entirely to 
resolving specific accounting problems and topic 
rather than developing general accounting principles. " 
1. Hendriksen,, E., OP-cit.,, p. 69. 
2. ibid.,, p. 66. 
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In 1959, the CAP was replaced by the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB),, which will be discussed in more detail in 
the second period of accounting development. 
2. The U. K. Case 
In the U. K.,, there was much dissatisfaction with 
accounting practices in the 1930's. 1 Among other things, the 
RoYal Mail Case, in 1932, brought attention to the ethics of the 
practice, when taken to the extreme, of covering up corporate 
2 
collapse. 
In 1935,, the Society of Incorporated Accountants and 
Auditors established a research committee which provided 
arrangements for the publication of monographs on professional 
3 
subjects and the formation of research groups. Also,, the 
Accounting Research Association was established, having the 
following objectives: 4 
1. to promote research into the history and development of 
accounting, 
2. to discover, in particular, how economic, social and legal 
See for examplej, IlDirectors and Auditors",, The Economist, 
April 11th, 1942,, pp. 507-508. 
2. See for examplej, Davies, P. and Bournsi, A., "Lord Kylsant 
and the Royal Mail",, Business Historyl, 1972. 
3. Zeff, S., Forging Accoun Principles in Five Countries. 
A History and an Ana of Trends, Arthur Anderson & Co.,, 
Lecture Seriesf 1971, p. 4. 
4. Accounting Research Association, The Accountant,, (November 
28th, 1936), pp. 731. 
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changes have affected the development of accounting methods, 
and 
3. to examine the present state of accounting theory and 
practice. 
The English Institute became involved in the 
establishment of accounting principles in 1942 with the 
formulation of the Taxation and Financial Relations Committee. 
The objective of this committee was to formulate drafts of 
guidance statements for the consideration of the Institute 
Council. Between 1942 and 1969, the English Insitutute issued 29 
recommendations which provided guidance on a number of accounting 
matters, and they were persuasive rather than mandatory. With 
regard to Scotland, the Scottish Societies merged, in 1951, to 
form the present Scottish Institute. However,, its Council had 
elected not to issue guidance to members and so the matters were 
left to the integrity and judgement of the Institute's members 
until the early 1970's. 
The statutory requirements of the Companies Act 1929 
necessitated major reforms in financial reporting by limited 
companies, including the requirement of a profit and loss account 
for the first time. The Companies Act, 1948, required that both 
balance sheet and income statements should give a "true and fair 
view". Its provisions were largely confined to matters of 
presentation and disclosure rather than to accounting princip es 
and auditing practices. 
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The Developuent of Accounting Rules Since the 1960's 
1. The U. S. Case: 
While the Accounting Research Bulletins made a 
significant contribution to the advancement of accounting theory, 
valid criticisms were directed at the Committee's approach as 
well as the complaint that some of the important controversial 
areas in accounting have been avoided. Among other things, the 
fear that the government would take over the direct control of 
the accounting profession resulted in the replacement of the 
Comnittee on Accounting Procedures by the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) in 1959.1 The objectives of the APB were to advance 
It-114F- written expression of generally accepted accounting 
principles, narrow the area of difference in accounting 
practices, and lead the discussion of unsettled controversial 
2 issues. 
During the years from 1959 to 1973, the APB issued 31 
opinions. These Opinions and the effective Accounting Research 
Bulletins were enforced primarily through the prestige of the 
American Institute until 1965, when the council accepted the 
recomendation which requires that all departure from these 
statements should be disclosed in footnotes or in the audit 
reports of members. 
Howeverr the force of re-examination and change, both 
within the profession and outside of it, continued to be active. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1. (1) Hendriksen, E., op-cit., p. 75. 
2. (2) ibid. I p. 77. 
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In 1972, a study group (known as the Wheat Committee) issued a 
report which recommended the establishment of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) with full-time paid members to 
increase the independence of the board members. Also, the report 
recommended that the FASB should include substantial 
representation from several groups of statement preparers and 
users in addition to members from the public accounting 
profession. The American Institute quickly adopted the 
recommendation of the Wheat report and the FASB began to function 
in mid-1973. 
The FASB has issued more than 90 statements since 1973 
and these statements have made a significant contribution to 
narrow the range of acceptable accounting principles, while much 
remains to be done in the future. 
The U. K. Case 
While the English Institute's recommendations of "best 
practice" continued during the 1960's, the financial market 
experienced a series of dramatic take-over battles and financial 
collapses. For example, the sudden collapse of John I. Bloom's 
Rolls Razor Ltd.,, in 1964, a few weeks following the publication 
of audited annual accounts that gave no indication of financial 
difficulties. ' This collapse provoked some questions in the 
financial press regarding the adequacy of financial reports. So 
did the GEC and AEI battle, in which the General Electric Company 
For example see,, "Rolls Razor Calls it Quits", Business 
week, July 25th, 1964F pp. 114-118. Also, The Economist, 
July 25th,, 1964,, pp. 399-401. 
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(GBC) succeeded in a take-over of Associated Electrical 
Industries Limited (AEI). AEJ forecasts a profit of 10 million 
for 1967 (this forecast was made during the heat of the take- 
over). Yet in July of the following year, it was made public 
that the AEI segment of GEC had suffered in 1967 a loss of E 4.5 
millions. As a result of these and other events,, the accounting 
profession came increasingly under attack. 
' In addition, an 
article was published in the Times on llth September 1969 by 
E. Stamp entitled,, "Auditing the Auditors,,. 2 According to 
R. Ashton,, it is difficult to think of any article in accounting 
3 which had such a dramatic ef fect on the profession. 
Such a climate stirred up the English Institute's 
Council to announce a new and more stimulated approach to the 
development of accounting principles. This new approach started 
with the publication of a "Statement of Intent on Accounting 
Standards in the 1970's". This Statement set out a plan to 
advance the setting up of accounting standards along the 
following lines: 4 
For more examples, see Heller,, R.,, "When is profit not a 
profit? The Observer,, November 16th,, 1969. 
2. Stamp.,, "Auditing the Auditors", reprinted by E. Stamp and 
C. Marley,, Accounting Principles and the City Code. The 
Case for Reform, Butterworths, 1970,, pp. 159. 
3. Ashton, R., U. K. Financial Accounting Standards, Woodhead- 
Faulkner Ltd., 1983, p. 2. 
4. (ICAEW),, Stateiments of Intent on Accounting Standards in the 
1970'si, reprinted in Accounting Standards,, 1980,, The 
Institute of Chartered Accountant in England and Wales, 
p. 13. 
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1. narrowing the areas of difference and variety in accounting 
practice, 
2. disclosure of accounting basesv 
3. disclosure of departures from established definite 
accounting standards, and 
4. wider exposure for major new proposals on accounting 
standards. 
To this end, the Council announced the formation of the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee, later renamed the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC). Both the Scottish and 
Irish Institutes joined the English Institute immediately, while 
the other bodies joined in later years. The ASC re-emphasised 
the need for and nature of accounting standards in a consultative 
document published in 1978 where the ASC stated: 
' 
"(a) Accounting standards are necessary and will 
continue to be necessary. one of their main aims 
should be to narrow the choice of accounting 
treatment so as to make financial statements 
reasonably comparable one with another. 
(b) Statements of Standards Accounting Practice (SSAP) 
should continue to be used as definitive 
principles for use in financial statements and not 
merely as a benchmark against which deviations can 
be measured. 
(c) A material departure from a SSAP should continue 
to be allowed only in those exceptional 
circumstances where to adhere would fail to give a 
"true and fair view" in a particular case, or 
because to follow the SSAP would be demonstrably 
inappropr iate. 11 
Accounting Standards Committee, Setting Accounting 
Standardst A Consultative Document, 1978, p. 29. 
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During the years from 1971 to 1986, the ASC issued 23 
Statements and several standing Exposure Drafts. 
The Companies Acts 1967 and 1976 require that the 
directors of a company keep adequate accounting records and lay 
before the company audited balance sheets and profit accounts 
which give a "true and fair view of the company's affairs". 
Also, these documentst accompanied by the auditor's and 
directors' reports, must be filed with the Registrar of 
Companies, to be available for public inspection. The Companies 
Act 1981 provides a choice of two alternative sets of rules for 
the basis of financial statements: the historic cost and the 
alternative accounting rules. Also,, it embodies a number of the 
principles contained in SSAPs in legislation, including the 
concept of accruals, consistency, going concerns, and prudence 
from SSAP No. 2; the stock valuation rules from SSAP No. 9,, and 
the depreciation requirements of SSAP No. 12.1 The Companies Act 
1985 went further and laid down the minimum statutory 
requirements for the preparation of the accounts of companies in 
more detail. This Act implements the EEC's Fourth Directive on 
the Harmonization of Company Law which not only stipulated the 
form and content of company financial statements, but also 
defined the fundamental accounting concepts upon which financial 
2 
accounts should be based. 
In summary it could be said that the development of 
accounting principles in both the U. S. and the U. K. is similar in 
-------------------------- -------------------------------------- 
1. Canpanies Act 1981, Schedules 1 and 2. 
2. Glautierr M., Underdown,, B. and Clark,, A.,, Basic Financial 
Accounting,, Bath Press,, Avon, 1985, p. 244. 
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many respects. But it appears that there is a greater commitment 
in the U. S. to standardise accounting principles when compared 
with the U. K. situation. Additionally it is worth mentioning 
that Bromwich has stated: 
"The Accounting Standards Committee would seem to be 
especially vulnerable to the criticisms which were 
regarded as very important in causing the downfall o 
these sister bodies in the U. S. A. (i. e. CAP and APB) ." 
With the main emphasis on the U. K., the development of 
accounting principles to be applied by the accounting profession 
can be divided into three distinct periods: 
Firstly, the period of laissez-faire, when accountants 
were expected to apply their own judgement in determining the 
appropriate practice in each case. This period existed in 
England and Wales prior to the early 1940's and in Scotland to 
the formation of the ASC, in 1970; 
Secondly, the period in which the English Institute 
established recommendations of "best practice" to be followed by 
members on a persuasive basis. This period existed in England 
and Wales from 1942 to 1969; 
Thirdly, the period of authoritative practice, when 
accountants were expected to follow SSAPs which have existed 
since the formation of the ASC, in 1970. 
Although there has been a real and substantial progress 
over the last fifteen years in narrowing the range of acceptable 
alternatives in accounting principles, the well-equipped user of 
Bromwicho, M.,, The Economics of Accounting Standard Setting, 
Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd., 1985, p. 36. 
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published accounts knows that much remains to be done in these 
areas. 
The ASC has clearly stated that one major aim of 
setting accounting standards is: 
to narrow the choice of accounting treatment so as 
to make finanýjal statements reasonably comparable one 
with another. " 
The answer to the following question remains of interest: 
To what extent has the ASC succeeded in narrowing the 
choice of accounting treatment in practice? 
Accordingly,, we will consider the state of accounting 
practice. 
The State of Accounting Practice 
The financial statements published in corporate reports 
are prepared by, or under the direction of, the management of the 
corporation. The auditors examine the financial statements, 
along with the related records and other evidence and render an 
opinion as to whether the statements represent a "true and fair 
vieV' of the Company's affairs. But the most generally accepted 
interpretation of the phrase "true and fair view" in an 
accounting context is that accounts are true and fair if they are 
prepared and presented in accordance with generallY accepted 
accounting principles. In this regard, Lee has provided the 
following definition: 
1. Accounting Standards Conmittee, op. cit., p. 29. 
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"Today,, 'the true and fair view' has become a term of 
art. It is generally understood to mean a presentation 
of accounts, drawn up according to accepted accounting 
principles, using accurate figures as far as possible, 
and reasonable estimates otherwise; and arranging them 
so as to show, within the limits of current accounting 
practice, as objective a picture as possible, free from 
wilful bias, dis ortion, manipulation or concealment of 
material facts. " 
Accordingly, the expression "Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles" has come to play a significant role in the 
accounting profession. To the Accounting Principles Board, this 
expression incorporates: 
the consensus at any time as to which economic 
resources and obligations should be recorded as assets 
and liabilities, which change in them should be 
recorded, how the recorded assets and liabilities and 
change of them should be measured, what information 
should be disclosed and how it should be discl2ed, and 
which financial statements should be prepared. " 
Consequently, the mode in which such generally accepted 
principles are developed through official pronouncements is of a 
great interest to the purpose of this study. 
The Mode in Standard Setting 
In the literature of accounting, there have been two 
schools of thought regarding the mode in which accounting 
standards should be established through official pronouncements: 
Lee,, G. f Modern Financial Accounting, T. Nelson and 
Sons 
Ltd. j, 
1973, p. 311. 
2. AICPA,, APBS No. 4,, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles 
underlying Financial Statements,, New York,, 1970, p. 27. 
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1. The first school includes those who advocate that accounting 
rules should be developed so that the variations which 
cannot be justified by identified differences in 
circLxnstances should be eliminated, (fixed mode); 
2. The second school includes those who advocate that 
accounting rules should be developed so that the f irms have 
the choice to select the most appropriate accounting rules 
within authoritative broad guidelines (flexible mode). 
The first school claimed that: 
1. The wide variety of accepted accounting practice makes 
comparability among firms impossible or at least difficult, 
2. The auditors have identified with the management by 
cmplying with the desires of the client, 
3. Managements have used this freedom to achieve their own 
economic and social goals, and 
4. If tne accounting profession does not take steps to achieve 
uniformity, the government may do so. 
' 
The second school has dominated the process of 
developing accounting standards. To support this assertion two 
accounting variables are presented in the following sections as 
evidence of such a flexible mode. 
Hendriksen,, E.,, "Toward Greater Comparability Through 
Uniformity of Accounting Principles", in Keller and Zeff, 
Financial Accountin_q Theory II: Issues and Controversies, 
McGaw-Hiii Book Co.,, 1969, p. 161-62. 
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1ý Stock and Work in Process: In most f irms the cost of goods 
or services sold is the single most significant cost category and 
to determine the cost of sales for a given accounting period, the 
problem of inventory valuation arises. In this regard, the ASC 
issued SSAP 9 which starts with the following remarks: 
"No area of accounting has produced wider differences 
in practice than the computation of the amount at which 
stocks and work in progress are stated in financial 
accounts. This statement of standard accounting 
practice seeks to define the practice, to narrow the 
differences and variations in those practices and to 
ensure adequate disclosure in the accounts. " 
According to SSAP 9, the basic principle of inventory 
valuation is that it be valued at "the total of the lower of cost 
and net realisable value of the separate items of stock and work 
in process or groups of similar items". ' With regard to long- 
term contract work in process, the statement provides the 
following valuation rule. 
of 0" cost plus any attributable profit,, less any forseeable ýosses,, progress payments received and 
receivable. ' 
Although the basic principles of inventory may seem 
simple and straightforward, the complexities and the variety of 
alternatives to which these principles are subject are 
highlighted in appendix 1 of SSAP 9. of special interest are 
those complexities and variety of alternatives related to the 
--------------------------------- ----- 
SSAP9. Para. 26. 
2. if)id., para. 27. 
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allocation of overheadsF the methods of costing and tne 
determination of the attributable profit to be included in the 
aalount at which long-term contract work in process is stated in 
the accounts. 
In spite of the variety of alternatives available to 
evaluate inventory and in spite of the importance of inventory 
valuation in the determination of reported income, the matters of 
what costs are included in inventory and what assumPtions are 
made with regard to the flow of inventory costs through af irk-n 
are either rarely or very briefly discussed in published 
accounts. In this regard,, the Survey of U. K. published accounts 
indicates that: 
"73% of the companies (included in thi sample) did not 
state the method of arriving at cost. " 
In addition, 30% of the companies included in the 
survey did not include any statement regarding the inclusion of 
overheads. 
2 Furthermore,, the most common phrase used by those 
finns which include a statement regarding overheads is 
"appropriate overhead charges are included". This phrase is of 
limited utility to the users of published accounts. 
Additionally, the timing of the recognition of prof it on long 
term contract work in process and to some extent the amount of 
such a profit are always subjective issues and they are difficult 
ICAEW, Financial Reporting 1984-1985: A Survey of UK 
published Accounts, 1985,, p. 251. 
joid.,, p. 252. 
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to assess without additional detailed information. 
Thus the area of inventory valuation provides potential 
discretionary power to management with respect to: 
1. The selection of the method of costing, 
2. The allocation of overheads, and 
3. The timing of the recognition, of and the amount of,, 
attributable prof it on long-term contract work in process. 
2 -Fixed Assets and Depreciation: Fixed assets are those assets 
which have an expected life of a number of years and they are 
used in operations and not acquired for sale in the ordinary 
course of the business. In this regard, the valuation and the 
depreciation of fixed assets are discussed in turn. 
With regard to the reported values of fixed assets, 
Griffiths states that: 
"The great thing about fixed assets is that their 
values are completely mobile. For many companies these 
assets are the backbone of the business, providing the 
foundation and framework which allows it to carry out 
its operations. Yet despite their importance the rules 
which govern the rep? rted values of fixed assets are 
remarkably flexible. " 
The first step in the valuation of an asset is the 
determination of the asset cost and, although this step may seem 
less open to manipulation, the fact of the matter is that there 
are no clear guidelines about what should or should not be 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Griffiths,, I.,, Creative Accounting,, Firethorn Press, 1986, 
p. 92. 
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included in tne determination of such cost- Furthermore, tnere 
is a wide range of choice of figures available for reporting, 
after the deterinination of the asset's cost, as a result of the 
fact that management can adjust such cost almost at will. 1 
This value must be allocated to the accounting periods 
which benefit from the use of the asset. In practice, this 
process is governed by SSAP 12 which simply states that: 
"The management of a business has a duty to allocate depreciationas fairly as possible to periods expected 
to benefit from the use of the asset and should select 
the method regarded as most approp, iate to the type of 
asset and its use in the business. " 
'5 
In spite of ttie fact that many subjective assumptions 
enter in the determination of useful lives of assets and their 
scrap values and that alternative methods of depreciation co- 
exist which can result in a widely differing depreciation 
charges, the policy of accounting for depreciation has been left 
entirely to management. In this regard, Lewis et al. state that: 
"It is unfortunate that the ASC did not feel that it 
was able to provide more specific guidance in selecting 
the accounting policy for depreciation... If the 
profit figure is to have any meaning the choice of 
depreciation policy must be justifiable as something 
more than a random seýyction from a number of standard 
depreciation methods. " 
1. 
2. 
3. 
ibid., p. 92. 
SSAP 12, para. 7. 
Lewis,, R.,, Pendrill,, D. and Simon,, D., Advanced Financial 
Accounting, Pitman,, 1982, p. 460. 
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It is therefore justifiable to conclude that both the 
valuation and the depreciation of fixed assets are left almost 
entirely to the management of the enterprise and hence there is a 
wide scope for creative accounting in these areas. In the 
following sections further examination of the flexible mode of 
standards setting will be conducted and the purpose of this 
examination is to highlight the major shortcomings of this mode 
and to provide further support for managemenlýs ability to 
manipulate reported results given the present state of accounting 
practice. 
The Assumptions Underlying the Present Mode 
As we move away f rom the area of the broad basic 
assumptions which underlie the periodic financial accounts of 
firms to accounting procedures which are the means of 
implementing the accounting standards, we encounter the major 
diversity in practice. More examples of such diversity are 
listed in SSAP 2 paragraph 13. 
The basic argument behind this diversity is that 
management should choose the method which best reflects the 
unique circumstances of the situation and this should lead to 
better comparability than would be the case with more restricted 
rules. In addition, the independent auditor should ensure that 
management selects the most appropriate method for the 
presentation of a "true and fair view". 
Accordingly, it seems that three assumptions underlie 
the case for diversity: 
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i) Management has no self interest in the outcomes of its 
accounting policy and hence the most appropriate accounting 
Policy is expected to be applied; 
ii) The various procedures and methods available to implement a 
given accounting principle are not alternatives, but merely 
constitute varying methods which are necessary to reflect 
varying sets of facts; 
iii) There are no constraints regarding the auditor's position. 
While the previus chapter of this research covers the 
first assumption, the other two will be considered in turn. 
1. Accou Alternatives in Practice 
The assertion that different accounting alternatives 
are used in similar situations is beyond doubt. In fact, a sub- 
committee of the Accounting Principles Board declared: 
"The most important unsolved problem is the use of 
alternative accounting practices and methods under 
circLnstances which themselves do not appear to be 
sufficiently different to justify different accounting 
treatments. "' 
This problem has led several writers to favour 
limiting management's discretion regarding accounting policy 
matters. 2 moreover, Cadenhead elaborated on the phrase 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)j, 
A. P. B. Subcommittee Draft of opinion on "Basic Concepts and 
Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements of 
Business Enterprise" New York, 1968, p. 114-15. 
2. For example see, R. Sterling, "Accounting Power",, Journal of 
Accounting, (January 1973); also Salamon and Smith, The Bell 
journal of Economics, (Spring 1979),, (see Bibliograý-hy). 
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"differences in circumstances" which is commonly used in 
accounting standards and concluded that: 
"Until accounting principles are developed which rank the attributes to be measured and until accounting 
methods for measuring the attributes are formulated and 
accepted, it will be impossible to know whether the 
phrase "differences in circumstances" has reference to identifiable external condit I ons or is merely a cloak for idiosyncratic diversity. " 
Various studies lend empirical support to our 
assertion. We may rely on a study of alternative inventory 
pricing methods by L. Chasteen. This study supported the 
hypothesis that there are no significant differences in economic 
circumstances among firms which use different methods of 
2 inventory valuation. Also, R. Sterling reached somewhat similar 
conclusions to those of Chasteen regarding depreciation methods 
and useful life when he presented a hypothetical case to a group 
3 of publ ic accountants. In a recent study,, Penno and Simon test 
the hypothesis that public firms are more likely to choose income 
- increasing accounting alternatives for financial reporting 
purposes than are private firms and their findings were 
Cadenhead, G.,, "Differences in Circumstances: Fact or 
Fantasy? ",, Abacus,, (September 1970), p. 80. 
2. Chasteen,, L.,, "An Empirical Study of Differences in Economic 
Circumstances as a Justification for Alternative Inventory 
Pricing methods",, The Accounting Review,, (July,, 1971),, 
p. 508. 
3. Sterling,, R.,, "A Test of the Uniformity Hypothesis",, Abacus, 
September, 1969. 
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consistent with this hypothesis for the choice of inventory and 
depreciation methods. 1 
The implication is that the present flexibility 
provides a wide range of choices, and that management might 
select the accounting methods which it believes best serve its 
own interest. Considering the auditor's position and based on 
the previous interpretation of the phrase "a true and fair view",, 
one expects that there are as many true and fair views as there 
are acceptable accounting alternatives. Hence, management has a 
range of different true and fair views from which to select as 
long as they are within the domain of generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
2. The Auditor's Position 
The function of the auditor is to make an independent 
examination of the accounts prepared by the management and 
formulate and express his opinion as to whether or not the 
accounts give "a true and fair view" of the company's affairs. 
Paragraph 5 of Auditing Statement No. 1 includes: 
"Responsibility for the accounts and financial control 
of a company rests upon the directors, their statutory 
duties include responsibility for ensuring the 
maintenance of adequate records and the preparation of 
annual accou9ts showing the true and fair view required 
by the Act. " 
Penno, M. and Simon,, D.,, "Accounting Choices,, Public Versus 
Private Firms", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,, 
(314), Winter 1986, p. 561-62. 
2. ICAEW,, Statements on Auditing, moorgate Place, London, 1976, 
p. 18. 
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Hence, the management selects the system, the rules and 
prepares the accounts, while the auditor is assumed to act as a 
"watchdog" with the threat of a qualified report. But unless the 
ccrnpany's accounts are clearly outside the boundary of that large 
area of generally accepted accounting principles, the auditor 
will be under a great deal of pressure to accept the management's 
views. ' The following analysis by R. Sterling sums up the 
auditor's difficult position: 
"The major problem facing public accounting today is 
its lack of power. First, in comparing the power or 
authority to the responsibility, we find that 
responsibility far outweighs the authority. The public 
accountant must act judicially but he has not been 
given the power to enforce the rulings. His ultimate 
weapon is resignation and silence, which puts him in a 
conf 1 ict-of- interest position. No other profession 
that I know of is put in a position where it must make 
econamic sacrifices in order to enforce judgements for 
which it is responsible. The authority is lessened for 
them by the existence of competition among accounting 
firms. Resignation from an engagement might be an 
effective means of enforcement if it were not for the 
fact that other firms may take the engagement and issue 
an opinion. 
Second, in comparing the power of the public accountant 
to that of management, we find that management's power 
far overweighs the accountant's. This imbalance is not 
considerable per se. When one considers that 
accountants must judge managements, however, it is not 
only undesirable, it is intolerable. It would wreck 
the legal system if litigants were able to hire and 
fire Judges. It would be equally damaging to the legal 
system if litigants were able to select from diverse or 
flexible laws as they saw it. The same is true in 
regard to accounting: if accountants are to judge 
managements, then we must deny managements the power to 
hire and fire accountants and the power to select froin 
diverse accounting principles as they see fit.,, 2 
Stamp, E. j, Marley,, C., Accounting Principles and the City 
Code: The Case for Reform, Butterworths,, 1970,, p. 122. 
2. Sterling,, R.,, "Accounting Power", r Journal of Accountancy, 
January 1973, P. 66. 
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It is not the writer's purpose to refute or justify 
such criticism, but it is reasonable to conclude that the present 
state of auditing is far from perfect. 
A Hypothetical Case 
For further elaboration upon the present mode of 
setting accounting standards, a hypothetical case is presented to 
show how management might affect the reported income, while its 
choice is still within the domain of generally accepted 
accounting principles. 
The first column of Table III-1 shows the profit and 
loss account of an assumed company (A) that faces economic 
conditions realistically within the historical cost system and so 
reports its result using the appropriate accounting policies. 
Columns 2 to 7 show the ef f ect of other accounting alternatives 
that are also generally accepted, while column 8 shows the 
combined effect of changes in the applied accounting policies on 
the reported income with no change in operations and it is 
presented as company (B). In this case, six accounting variables 
are presented, namely, inventory method, depreciation, research 
and development costs, pension costs, accounting for fixed 
investment and accounting for capital allowances. These 
accounting variables will be discussed in turn. 
1. Inventory Method: Column 2 presents the effect of the 
change made with regard to the flow of inventory costs through 
the f irm. While Company A uses the weighted average method in 
pricing inventoryl Company B chooses to use the first in first 
out (FIFO) method. In periods of inflation, the FIFO method 
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Table 111-2 
Ex lanation of Applied Accounting Policies 
Column Company (A) Company (B) Remarks (Company B) 
2 Uses weighed Uses FIFO In periods of inflation, 
average in method FIFO reduces the cost of 
pricing goods sold 
inventory 
3 Uses 25% rate Uses 20% rate Lower current depreciation 
to depreciate to depreciate charges. Calculated as 
fixed assets fixed assets follows 
800000 - 800000 x 20% = 640000 
25% 
4 Charges R. D. Capitalises Current charges 
costs to and amortises 
expenses half of R. D. 100000 + 100000 = 120000 
currently costs over 5 
five years 
5 Uses Uses low Lower current charges at the 
conservative current expense of the future 
current funding of the reported income 
funding of the same scheme 
pension scheme (low present 
value) 
6 Uses equity Uses cost Not to recognise share in 
method method losses or undistributed 
profits 
7 Uses full Uses partial Less deferred tax transferred 
provision provision to coming year 
method for method for 
deferred tax deferred tax 
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reduces the cost of goods sold and hence it increases the 
reported income. 
2. Depreciation: Column 3 presents the ef f ect of the change 
made with regard to the depreciation rate. In this case, Company 
A depreciates a certain set of assets over four years (rate of 
25%) . while Company B depreciates the same set of assets over 
five years (rate of 20%). 
3. Research and Development Costs: Column 4 presents the 
ef fect of the change made with regard to research and development 
(R and D) costs. Company A charges all development expenditure 
to profit and loss account of the year based on a certain degree 
of uncertainty,, while Company B capitalises and amortises over 
f ive years a half of such expenditure. 
4. Pension Cost: Column 5 presents the effect of the change 
made regarding the periodic contribution to the pension scheme. 
C(xnpany A predicted a higher present value of the future cash 
outflows and hence a higher current funding was required, while 
Company B predicted a lower present value of the future cash 
outf lows of the same scheme and hence a lower current funding was 
charged to prof it and loss account. 
5. Fixed Investments: in this case, fixed investment 
constitutes shares in another company. Column 6' presents the 
effect of the change made in accounting for this investment. 
Company A treats the investment as an associated company and 
hence the equity method has been used, while Company B accounts 
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for the same investment as a simple investment using the cost 
method. 
6. Capital Allowances: Column 7 presents the change inade in 
accounting for capital allowance. It is assumed that an asset 
I has been bought which is eligible for 100% first year allowance. 
Company A chooses to use full provision method, while Company B 
chooses partial provision method and hence lower deferred tax 
provision is transferred to the future. 
In this case,, Company B may choose any one of the 
presented set of earnings per share figures (i. e. from 0.90 to 
Alternatively, the company may choose any other 
combination of the presented accounting variables and hence it 
has even a greater set of choices than is actually presented. 
Also, the case shows that, other things being equal, differences 
in accounting procedures are fully reflected in the reported 
results and it is clear that the management of Company B may seek 
to maximise the current income at the expense of the future 
reported income. 
Therefore, it is of interest to highlight the possible 
factors which can contribute to the differences in the reported 
income between the two firms and to present the implication of 
such differences. In this regard, there are three possible 
factors which contributed to the differences in the reported 
inccme: 
i) The availability of alternative accounting procedures; 
ii) The management's desire to manipulate reported income and 
consequently earnings per share; 
90 
iii) The auditor's compliance with the desire of client. 
Although it may be argued that the second factor far 
outweighs the other two, it can be argued that accountants are 
paid to meet the public's expectations which include preventing 
or at least reporting misrepresentation by management, and hence 
it is largely an accounting problem from the public's point of 
view. 
Concerning the implication of such differences in t1he 
reported income, it may be argued that if investors or other 
users accept the accounting information in the form presented,, 
without adjustments for the method of accounting used, then 
Company A and Company B, otherwise identical except for the 
accounting procedures employed, might receive inappropriate 
allocations of capital funds in the financial market. The 
implication is that the use of alternative accounting procedures 
could lead to a misallocation of resources in the economy. on 
the other hand, if investors attempt to make adjustments for the 
different accounting procedures in analysing the financial 
reports of various firms, then they face two problems: 
i) An adjustment of this kind is not an easy task even for 
sophisticated users; 
i i) In practice, the present disclosures of accounting policies 
are in many cases inadequate to provide the necessary 
information for complete adjustment. 
' 
Perks,, R. and Butler,, L.,, "Accountancy Standards in 
Practice: The Experience of SSAP 2",, Accounting and Business 
Research, r No. 29 (Winter 1977),, p. 32-3. 
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Hence, a consistent and appropriate ad3ustment is 
either impossible or at least difficult and we may argue that the 
majority of investors will not properly be able to compare 
alternative investments, which will lead to sub-optima! 
investrrent decisions. 
In conclusion, it appears that the present state of 
accounting practice provides management with potential power to 
exercise control over the information contained in the annual 
accounts. Accordingly the inost relevant question is to determine 
whether management does exercise such power. This leads us to 
the main issue of the present study: 
Do managers act to use accounting alternatives to serve non- 
accounting ends? 
In this and the previous chapter, we have elaborated 
upon this question, and the remaining chapters of the present 
study will set out to describe and pursue a methodology which 
will attempt to provide an answer. 
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Chapter iv 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
This chapter consists of four parts. The first is 
devoted to a brief statement on the general approach adopted in 
this research. The second part specifies the data domain and the 
sources of the sample of firms as well as their financial data. 
The third part describes the sampling process and the data 
collection,, while the fourth part includes the operational 
hypotheses and the statistical methods. 
The General Approach 
Basically, the present study is an empirical 
-investigation of three reporting strategies that have been 
suggested in the literature. These are the smoothing of, 
increase of and decrease of reported income. In the U. S.,, 
several empirical studies suggested that these strategies arise 
from theories of the firm dependent upon the separation of 
ownership from operational control. * However,, in tbe U. K. 
situation, an attempt is made to extend this area of research to 
listed and unlisted firms. By doing so, additional incentives to 
manage reported income beside those resulted f rom the extent of 
ownership control might be revealed. In this context,, two 
See the second chapter of the present study p. 33-49. 
93 
propositions for empirical investigation were developed and these 
are* 
i) listed firms are more likely to smooth and bias their 
accounting policies towards income-increasing methods, and 
ii) unlisted firms are more likely to bias their accounting 
policies towards income-decreasing methods. 
As previously stated, the main hypothesis of this 
research is that there are major differences between listed and 
unlisted firms regarding the criteria of choice among accounting 
alternatives. If this hypothesis is accepted or proved to be 
true,, then differences should exist between certain properties of 
their reported results. Accordingly, the proposed approach is an 
analysis of the reported results of two sets of firms whereby one 
represents listed firms, while the other represents unlisted 
firms. The aim of such an analysis is to examine, empirically, 
the relative adherence of one set compared with the other to one 
or more of the above mentioned reporting strategies. 
Data Domain 
To serve the purpose of this research,, the distinction 
between firms into listed and unlisted was based on the argument 
that listed firms are expected to be more dependent on external 
finance than unlisted firms, while the opposite is expected with 
respect to internal finance. It may therefore be appropriate to 
See the second chapter of the present study, p. 49-61. 
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exclude those firms which are unlisted on the London Stock 
Exchange but have access to another financial market (i. e. 
Unlisted Securities Market). This procedure is expected to 
enhance the validity of the above mentioned argument. 
Furthermore, in a recent study, Penno and Simon have used a 
sample of publicly traded firms and privately-held firms to 
examine the accounting choice of public versus private firms. ' 
It is therefore feasible to use private and quoted 
companies as the data domain of the present study. Figure IV-I 
presents a classification of limited companies in the U. K. 
Public and private companies are both subject to the Companies 
Acts wi regard to financial requirements. Thus the data domain 
will contain quoted companies and large private companies, as is 
indicated in Figure IV-1 by the dotted line. The sample will 
therefore include two sets of firms as follows: 
i) A set of firms will be selected from the top private 
companies (referred to as the set of unlisted firins). In 
this regard, Jordan's Survey of 1985 includes Britain's top 
private companies and hence it will be the source of this 
set of firms; 
ii) A set of firms will be selected from listed companies 
(referred to as the set of listed firms). In this regard, 
The Times 1000 of 1985 includes, among others, Britain's top 
--------------- 
Penno, M. and Simon, D.,, "Accounting Choices: Public Versus 
Private Firms", Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
13(4), Winter 1986. 
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Figure IV-1 
A classification of limited companies 
Limited Companies 
Private Companies 
(Ltd) 
Public Companies 
(PLC) 
Small Large Quoted 
Companies 
Unquoted 
Companies 
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listed companies and hence it will be the source of this set 
of f irms. 
In addition, the 1967 Act has required the compulsory 
filing of the annual report and accounts at Companies House for 
all limited companies and the 1976 Act took a further step 
towards ensuring the prompter filing of annual accounts. 
Therefore, the source of financial data for analysis is those 
accounts f iled at Companies House. 
Sampling Process and Data Collection 
According to the literature, two variables, namely size 
and industry (main activity) of a firm, influence the operational 
results and, to some extent,, the accounting decisions. 
Accordingly, it is essential to control for these two variables. 
Thus the selection and the number of f irms picked during the 
present study were in line with the above mentioned rule. Here, 
the size and industry have been considered simultaneously through 
Lnatcriing listed and unlisted firms on a firm for firm basis. 
Figure IV-2 represents a simple schematic view of the 
sampling process, while Appendix A provides specific information 
about the sample. In this context, the size is measured in terms 
of turnover and the industries have been analysed as follows: 
i) Firms within the relevant range of turnover have been 
classified according to four main activities, namely 
retailing, manufacturing, construction and others. 
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Figure IV-2 
A schematic View of the Sampling Process 
Quoted Companies 
Source 
The Times 1000 1985 
Firms within the 
relevant range 
of turnover 
I 
Matchable f irms in 
in terms of size and 
industry (main activity) 
A set of 
unlisted f irms 
Top Private Companies 
Source 
Jordan's Survey 1985 
Others 
(excluded) 
Umatchable f irms 
(excluded) 
A set of 
listed firns 
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ii) Manufacturing firms are then classified according to the 
industrial classification used on the Stock Market, while 
retailing firms are classified according to the specific 
type of retailing activity. 
As a result of this analysis, it was only possible to 
select a total of 128 firms of which 64 were unlisted and 64 
listed firms. It is worth noting that the overall sample 
included 54 retailing, 48 manufacturing and 26 construction 
f irms. 
The source of the financial data is the annual reports 
and accounts filed at The Companies House. This data was 
produced in the form of microfiche. it has then been transferred 
to the V. M. E. computer service at the University of Hull. The 
initial accounting periods range from six to ten years with an 
average of 9.48 years for the whole sample and they lie between 
1975 to 1985. Also it should be noted that the firms in the two 
sets are matched in terms of turnover, industry and the 
accounting years. 
Operational Hypotheses and Statistical Methods 
The present study includes two major parts. The f irst 
is to investigate the existence of the smoothing phenomenon, 
while the second part is to investigate the deliberate increase 
and decrease of early reported income. 
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Incorre Smoothing Phenomenon 
By definition, income smoothing is a strategy to report 
an income stream with a relatively low degree of variation from a 
pre-determined pattern. Such a pattern is considered to IDe the 
norm around which management might smooth reported income. In 
this regard, literature suggests that management mignt seek to 
present an increasing pattern of reported income based on the 
notion that investors prefer less volatile income growth trends. ' 
Here, it is of interest to search for indicators that 
allow us to accept the income smoothing hypothesis. one of these 
indicators relates to the reported results where, f or the 
smoothing hypothesis to be accepted, it would be expected that 
listed firms would report on average a smoother income stream 
over time than would unlisted firms. Alternatively, it would be 
expected that the set of the listed firms would have a 
significantly higher proportion of firms with relatively smooth 
income streams than would the set of unlisted firms. 
1. Hypotheses 
The following two hypotheses will be tested: 
1H 
The proportion of listed f irms with relatively smooth 
income streams is not significantly different from that of 
unlisted firms. 
Ronen, J.,, Sadan,, S. and Snow, C., "Income Smoothing: A 
Review", Accounting Journal, Spring 1977, p. 21. 
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1HA 
The proportion of listed firms with relatively smootn 
income streams is significantly higher tnan that of unlisted 
f irms. 
In order to identify those firms with relatively smooth 
income streams, it is necessary to identify: 
One or more expectancy models around which the reported 
income stream might be smoothed, 
a measure of the variability of income as a function of 
tiffe, and 
iii) a criterion for a low degree of variation. 
If smoothing f irms seek to present a pattern of 
increasing reported income, then it can be expected that the 
relationship between income and time will be close to one of the 
models stiown *in Figure IV-3. The first model (A) represents a 
constant change in reported income over time, while the second 
model (B) represents increasing changes in reported income over 
time. Hence, these two models will be used as expectancy models 
to investigate the existence of the smoothing phenomenon. The 
exponential curve can be reduced to a linear relationship using a 
logarithmic transform as follows: 
Log I= Log A+ (Log B) t 
By regressing reported income on time using each model 
in turn, the size of the coefficient of determination R can be 
used to identify the most appropriate model for each firm and 
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Expectancy Models 
also it is a suitable measure of the variation of reported 
income over time. Since a low degree of variation produces a 
relatively high size of R 2, those firms with a reasonably hign 
size of R2 with positive correlation coefficient are of 
particular interest as far as smoothing of reported income is Aw- - 
concerned. 
Regarding tne criterion of a low degree of variation, 
Imhoff has suggested that R2 >,, 0.80 is a reasonable criterion for 
a relatively smooth time series. ' Hence, the same criterion will 
be used in the present study. But, another criterion namely 
2 >,, 0.70 will also be considered to test the robustness of the 
conclusion. 
, Additionally, if management chooses to smootn reported 
income, it must decide what sort of reported income is the object 
of smoothing. In this regard, previous studies have used 
different objects of smoothing, for example, net income was the 
object of smoothing in Dopuch and Drake [1966]2 and Copeland and 
Licastro [1968]3, while ordinary income was the object in Ronen 
and Sadan [197514. However, four objects of smoothing will be 
Imhoff,, E.,, "Income Smoothing -A Case for Doubt", 
Accounting Journalj, Spring 1977, p. 91. 
2. Dopuch,, N. and Drake,, D.,, "The Effect of Alternative 
Accounting Rules for Non Subsidiary Investments", Empirical 
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies, 1966. 
3. Copeland,, R. and Licastro, R., "A Note on Income Smoothing", 
The Accounting Review, July 1968. 
4. Ronen,, J. and Sadan, S.,, "Do Corporations Use Their 
Discretion in Classifying Accounting Items to Smooth 
Reported Income? ",, The Financial Analysts Journal,, September 
- October 1975. 
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considered in the present study. These objects are: 
1. Ordinary income before finance and tax charges (referred to 
as I, ); 
2. Ordinary income before tax charges (referred to as 2); 
3. Ordinary income (referred to as 3); 
4. Net income (referred to as 4). 
For this part of the present study, two hypotheses have 
been developed. The principal hypothesis (1HO) states that: 
The proportion of listed f irms with relatively smooth 
income streams is not significantly different from that 
of unlisted f irms. 
The alternative hypothesis (1HA) states that: 
The proportion of listed firms with relatively smooth 
income streams is significantlY higher than that of 
unlisted f irms. 
Accordingly, these hypotheses will be tested for the above 
objects of smoothing. 
Test statistics 
If we are willing to restrict the conclusions to 128 
firms included in the present study, a comparison between the 
absolute proportion of smoothing firms in the two sets will show 
&'---, Wth the differences and the direction of such differences. 
However, it is of interest to draw inferences about populations 
or at least some larger numbers of firms than those actually 
studied and hence,, a test statistic is needed. To this end, let 
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P, and P2 denote the population proportions of all firms of 
listed and unlisted respectively which have relatively smooth 
income streams. Thus we must decide between the following 
hypotheses: 
HO: 
HA: 
Pi = P2, and observed differences due to chance 
Pl > P2, and smoothing phenomenon exists. 
HO and HA are statistical statements only and they 
represent the testable expression of the research hypotheses. In 
this case,, the most appropriate test statistic is the T test: ' 
T 
Xi X2 
n, n2 
,j (1/n, + 1/n2) 
with P 
Xi + X2 
n, + n2 
Where: 
Xi is the number of smoothing listed firms 
x2 is the number of smoothing unlisted firms 
n, is the number of listed firms in the sample 
n2 is the number of unlisted firms in the s&nple. 
Bhattacharyya,, G. and Johnson,, R., "Statistical Concepts and 
Methods". John Willey and Son, New York, 1977, p. 308-312. 
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The aim is therefore to test at a given significance 
level to see if the proportion of listed f irms which appear to be 
smoothing their reported income is significantly higher than that 
of unlisted firms. Since, a large positive value of T discredits 
(HO) in favour of (HA), an upper-tail test is appropriate. Thus 
if we consider 0.05 an acceptable significance level (a), then 
the test will proceed along the following lines: 
i) HO: Pi =P2 
HA: pl > p2 
ii) ot = 0.05 
iii) The test statistic: 
Xi X2 
n, n2 
T 
J-P (1 - P) (1/n, + 1/n2) 
Xi + X2 
wi th P 
n, + n2 
iv) An upper-tail test with critical value for T of 1.64 is 
needed. The rejection region is therefore defined by T >,, 
1.64. 
Find the sample results using the test statistic from (iii). 
vi) The decision rules for testing are: 
If T from the sample results is greater or equal to 1.64 
then reject the null hypothesis HO; otherwise accept the 
null hypothesis. 
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In summary,, the methodology of this part of the present 
study can be briefly described as follows: 
1- Regress the given object of smoothing on time for each 
individual firm using one expectancy model at the time. 
2- Identify those firms which satisfy the criteria of a 
relatively smooth income stream for each expectancy model. 
3- Test for differences in proportions of smoothing firms 
between the two sets of firms according to: 
(i) the first model, 
(ii) the second model, and 
(iii) a combination thereof. 
Increase and Decrease of Early Reported Income 
In the present study, increase of early reported income 
is a strategy to report a higher measurement of current income at 
the expense of the future reported income, while decrease of 
early reported income is the opposite strategy. 
To investigate such strategies, a theoretical approach 
can be described briefly as follows: 
1-A set of accounting variables needs to be identified which 
satisfies the following criteria: 
(i) there are at least two acceptable accounting 
procedures for each of the accounting variables, 
(i i) such accounting procedures have different effects on 
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the reported income and the effects are relatively 
unambiguous, and 
the chosen accounting procedure is usually disclosed 
by the firm in its annual reports. 
2- The accounting procedures of such accounting variables are 
then classified into two groups, namely, those which lead to 
a higher measurement of early reported income and those 
which lead to a lower measurement thereof. 
3- The researcher could then empirically examine the applied 
accounting procedures to see whether the set of listed firms 
tends to increase early reported income in comcarison with 
the set of unlisted firms. 
Unfortunately,, such an approach does not seem to be 
feasible in the U. K. environment mainly because most accounting 
variables do not satisfy one or more of the above mentioned 
criteria. This is a direct result of the fact that the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) has rejected the calls for 
issuing interpretations of accounting standards similar to those 
issued in the United States and hence, the present accounting 
standards in the U. K. are usually of a general nature rather than 
being more detailed. The implication of sucn a policy is that 
the present accounting disclosures are often inadequate to 
provide the required information for such an examination. 
1 Thus 
For more details on the quality of the present accounting 
disclosures in the U. K. see: Perks,, R. and Butler,, L.,, 
"Accounting Standards in Practice: The Experience of SAAP2", 
Accounting and Business Research, No. 29, Winter 1977. 
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it is not feasible directly to examine the accounting procedures 
applied by the sample of f irms. Accordingly, an alternative 
approach has to be sought. 
Since the deliberate increase or decrease of reported 
income will influence the level of reported income rather than 
the changes thereof , as was the case with smoothing strategy, it 
is feasible to adopt an approach based on analysing the level of 
reported income of the two sets of f irms. The following 
discussion introduces such an approach. 
In the long run, it is seldom possible to consistently 
increase or decrease the yearly reported income, since a higher 
(or lower) measurement of reported income in one period must be 
followed by a lower (or higher) measurement in later periods. In 
other words, it is known that over the whole life of the firm, 
income is equal to cash receipts minus cash expenditures and 
thus,, to the extent that reported income of any given period is 
higher (or lower), earnings of other periods must be lower (or 
higher). As a result the outcome of such strategies is clearly 
in conflict with the concept of matching costs with revenues that 
result from the application of accounting period assumptions. 
With such a conflict in mind, two firms otherwise identical 
except for differences in their reporting strategies,, are 
expected to report different average incomes at least in the 
short run. To elaborate upon such propositions, it is known that 
there are those accounting decisions which are of a long term 
nature such as the depreciation of long lived assets, the 
allocation of pension costs,, the valuation of the different 
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classes of inventory,, etc. With regard to such accounting 
decisions, the management may deliberately increase or decrease 
the average reported income of a given set of revenues. 
Therefore, it is feasible to investigate such reporting 
strategies through an analysis of the reported results and the 
aim is to see whether there are signficant differences in the 
reported results between listed and unlisted firms of similar 
size and industry. 
To this end, the ma3or assumption made in attempting to 
investigate such strategies is that listed and unlisted firms 
operate on average with similar ef f iciency and these f irms are 
subject to the discipline of the price mechanism which determines 
'both what they pay for their inputs and what they can charge for 
their sales. This assumption is not totally unsupported since 
all the firms in the sample are wei l-establ i shed in their 
business and since the sample size is sufficiently large to 
diversify random differences. Furthermore,, economic literature 
suggests that the market dictates the limits within which a 
profit-oriented firm can operate, otherwise it cannot survive for 
long. Given this assumption, it is of interest to consider the 
incoine-generating process. 
In a functional sense,, the net reported income is the 
result of total revenues less total costs. This equation may be 
modified in two ways. First, it can be modified to represent a 
typical profit and loss account as follows: net income is the 
result of turnover less the net of total costs and other 
revenues. Furthermore, this new equation includes several 
variables which might lead to differences between firms of 
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similar size and industry. These variables include extraordinary 
items, taxes, finance charges and, to some extent, exceptional 
items and other ordinary income. Thus, further modification is 
required and the aim of such modification is to increase the 
likelihood that any differences in the reported income between 
the two sets of firms, are attributable to differences in 
accounting procedures rather than to real differences. To this 
end, it is necessary to take the following steps: 
1. The variables which might lead to real differences in the 
reported income between firms of similar size and industry 
must be considered; 
2. For each firm, the data for analysis Lnust be from several 
accounting periods to diversify the differences in reported 
income within the firm and hence the comparability between 
fi rms wi 11 be enhanced; 
3. Since turnover is the principal source of revenue for most 
firms, the effectiveness of controlling for turnover must be 
tested; 
4. Instead of directly analysing the reported income figures, 
the profitability rate, that is the profit for one pound of 
turnover, will be analysed for two reasons: 
(i) firms are expected to strive to achieve the average 
profitability rate in the industry since it is commonly 
used to evaluate the operating performance of the firm, 
(ii) The distribution of profitability rates is expected to 
be closer to a normal distribution than that of 
reported income figures because of the differences in 
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size among the sample firms. 
With regard to the first step, four variables, beside 
size and industry, will be considered. These variables are: 
1. exceptional items and other ordinary income, 
2. finance charges, 
3. tax charges, and 
4. extraordinary items. 
These variables are of special interest for the following 
reasons: 
1. The relationship between these variables and the level of 
turnover is relatively ambiguous, and 
2. These variables can have material effects on the level of 
reported income. 
In dealing with these variables, it is feasible to 
consider several income classifications. In this regard,, Figure 
IV-4 represents a typical consolidated profit and loss account 
with some modifications to serve the purpose of the present 
study. In this figure, five income classifications have been 
identified as follows: 
1. ad3usted trading profit (referred to as I), 
2. ordinary income before finance and tax charges (referred to 
as I, ) , 
3. ordinary income before taxes (referred to as 12), l 
4. ordinary income (referred to as 13), and 
net income (referred to as 14). 
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Figure IV-4 
A modified consolidated Profit and Loss Account 
Turnover 
- Cost of Sales 
- Distribution costs 
- General and administrative expenses 
(I) Adjusted Trading Profit 
- other operating income (net) 
- exceptional items (net) 
- other income and expenses 
- Income from fixed investment 
- Share of profit (loss) of Assoc. Comp. 
- Other interest receivable and similar income 
- Amount written off investment 
Ordinary Income, but before finance and tax charges 
- Interest payable and similar charges 
Ordinary Income, but before tax charges 
- taxation charges 
Ordinary Income 
- Extraordinary Items (net) 
Net Income 
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In this context,, the expression "adjusted trading 
profit" is defined as gross profit after charging distribution, 
general and administrative expenses including depreciation, 
directors' remuneration,, and auditor's fees. It should be noted 
that this income figure does not include any of those variables 
stated earlier, namely exceptional items, ..., extraordinary 
items. 
I., Therefore, the proposed approach is basically an 
analysis of the profitability rates of the two sets of firms and 
this approach is described in more detail in the following 
sections. 
The aim of this investigation is to determine whether 
listed f irms increase early reported income. In this regard, 
increase of reported income has been defined as a strategy to 
report a higher measurement of current income, while decrease of 
reported income is the opposite strategy. Accordingly, if listed 
firms seek to increase early reported income, then listed firms 
are expected to report higher income than that of unlisted f irms 
of similar turnover and industry. Thus if it can be shown that 
the turnover figures of the two sets of firms are in fact drawn 
from the same population, then it would be expected that their 
reported income figures are also drawn from the same population 
or from populations with similar parameters. Alternatively,, it 
would be expected that their average profitability rates are the 
same. Therefore, it is of interest to analyse the turnover and 
the profitability rates of the two sets of firms. 
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1. HYpotheses 
As far as turnover is concerned, the following two 
hypotheses will be tested: 
2Ho: 
There are no significant differences in the means, 
variances and distributions of turnover between the two sets of 
f irms. 
2HA: 
There are significant differences in the means, 
variances and/or distributions of turnover between the two sets 
of f irms. 
if the null hypothesis (2HO) is accepted, tnen any 
differences in the average profitability rates between the two 
sets of firms cannot be traced to differences in turnover and 
hence the likelihood that such differences are attributable to 
accounting differences will increase. At this stage,, it can be 
expected that the null hypothesis will be accepted since size in 
terms of turnover has been controlled. 
With regard to the profitability rates, the following 
two hypotheses will be tested: 
3HO: 
There is no significant difference in the means of the 
profitability rates between the two sets of firms. 
3HA: 
There is a significant difference in the means of the 
115 
profitability rates between the two sets of firms. 
If the null hypothesis 3HO is accepted,, then the 
conclusion is that the Present study does not support the 
proposition that listed firms seek to increase early reported 
income. On the other hand, if the alternative hypothesis 3HA is 
accepted, then it may be concluded that the present study 
provides evidence which supports the existence of increasing and 
decreasing strategies depending upon the magnitude and the 
direction of the observed differences between the average 
profitability rates of the two sets of firms. It should be noted 
that these two hypotheses will be tested using computed 
profitability rates of those income classifications previously 
identified. 
Additionally, there is the possibility that listed 
firms may include those firms which increase and those which 
decrease reported income and hence it is essential to know 
whether both strategies exist among listed firms. If both 
strategies exist among listed firms, then it is expected that the 
variation of the profitability rates would be higher than would 
otherwise have appeared. Accordingly, it is feasible to compare 
the coefficient of variation in the profitability rates between 
the two sets of firms. The coefficient of variation is a measure 
of the deviations from the mean and hence it can be used to 
determine whether the deviations from the mean of profitability 
rates among listed firms is higher than that among unlisted 
f irms. 
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Test Statistics 
In the previous sections, two sets of hypotheses were 
developed. The first set is concerned with turnover, while the 
second set is concerned with the profitability rates. These 
hypotheses include three parameters,, namely the means,, the 
variances, and the distributions. Hence, the test statistics for 
these parameters are discussed in turn. 
To test the hypothesis concerning the means, the Two 
Sample T-Test is an appropriate tool. This test enables us to 
determine whether the two sets of firms are drawn from the same 
population as far as the means of turnover and the means of the 
profitability rates are concerned. In this regard, the set of 
unlisted firms is considered as a sample drawn from the 
population of unlisted firms with a mean of M, while the set of 
listed firms is considered as a sample drawn from the population 
of listed firms with a mean of M20 Hence, the question is 
whether M, and M2 are equal. If M, and M2 are equal, the T-Test 
calculates the probability that a difference at least as large as 
the one observed would occur. This probability is known as the 
of observed significance level" and if this level is small enough, 
usually less than 0.05,, then the hypothesis that the population 
means are equal is rejected. On the other hand, if the observed 
significance level is large enough, then the equality hypothesis 
is accepted and any observed difference in the sample means is 
regarded as being a sampling difference. 
To determine the appropriate significance level, it is 
necessary to reflect upon the fact that no statistical test 
guarantees a certain result and hence there is always the 
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possibility of the null hypothesis HO being rejected when it is 
correct or accepted when it is false. ' The former is known as 
TYPE I error, while the latter is known as TYPE II error. 
To reduce the likelihood of committing any given error, 
the researcher can reduce the probability of that error, but 
reducing the probability of one error automatically increases the 
probabiiity of committing the other error. Thus the appropriate 
significance level can be determined by reference to the 
consequences of committing either of the two types of errors. 2 
In this regard, the writer believes that: 
1. For the means of turnover, the consequences of committing a 
TYPE II error,, i. e. wrongly accepting the equality 
hypothesis,, are more serious than that of committing TYPE I 
error and hence, the significance level must be sufficiently 
large. In other words,, the equality hypothesis of the means 
of turnover will not be accepted unless there is strong 
evidence. 
2. For the means of the profitability rate, the consequences of 
comitting a TYPE I error, i. e. wrongly rejecting the 
ecruality hypothesis,, are more serious than that of ; a- 
comitting TYPE II error and hence, the significance level 
0 
must be sufficiently small. In other words, the equality 
------------------------------------------- 
Clark, C., and Schkade,, L.,, Statistical Analysis for 
Administrative Decisions,, South-Western Publishing Co., 
Brightont 1974, p. 332. 
2. Bhattacharyya,, G. and Johnson,, R. r op. cit., p. 174. 
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hypothesis of'the means of the profitability rate will not 
be rejected unless there is strong evidence. 
Accordingly, for the means of turnover, the 
significance level of a=0.20 can be used, while for the means 
of the profitability rate, the significance level of a= 0.05 as 
a two-tailed test and consequently a= 0.025 as a one-tailed test 
are reasonable choices. 
Additionally, the Two Sample T-Test of f ered by the 
SPSS x provides the F-Test which is a test of the equality of 
variance. The F-Test provides the ratio of the large sample 
variance to the smaller and the observed significance level. 
Accordingly, the F-Test will be used to test the equality 
hypothesis of the variances of turnover. Although the F-Test is 
often used to compare the distribution of two data sets, it does 
not consider the possibility that the two data sets may have 
emial means and variances, but they are oppositely skewed. Since 4- 
the reported income is expected to be sensitive to any 
differences in the distribution of turnover, it is important to 
investigate such a possibility. In this regard, the Mann-Whitney 
Test is appropriate and it will be discussed in more detail at 
the application stage. 
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Chapter V 
THE SMOOTHING PHENOMENON 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse 
the results obtained from the empirical investigation with 
respect to the income smoothing phenomenon. Accordingly,, this 
chapter consists of five sections. The first includes a brief 
statement on the raw data as well as an introduction to the 
statistical package used in the present study. The second 
section includes the operational hypotheses and the test 
statistics. The third section is devoted to the presentation of 
the results obtained from applying the two expectancy models to 
the data on af irm by f irm basis. The fourth section includes an 
analysis of the results. The final section draws the conclusions 
available from this part of the presentation. 
Data and Statistical Package 
In the present study, the source of the raw data is the 
annual reports and accounts filed at the Companies House in 
London. This data was produced in the form of microfiches. It 
has then been transferred to the V. M. E. Computer Services at the 
University of Hull. The period available for analysis includes 
those accounting periods which lay between 1975 and 1985 with an 
average of 9.48 years for the whole sample of firms. It should 
be noted ttiat the firms in the two sets are matched in terms of 
turnover, industry and the accounting periods under examination. 
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To identify individual firms, each firm has oeen 
assigned an identification number [ID] whereby odd numbers 
represent unlisted firms, even numbers represent listed firms, 
and the f irst f irm is matched with the second and so on. 
To analyse the data, the Statistical Package for Social 
Scienceý (SPSSx) has been used. This package is a comprehensive 
tool for managing, analysing, and displaying information. It is 
an integrated system of computer programmes with a wide range of 
statistical facilities. The package used in the present study is 
the latest edition of such systems and it brings together data 
management, report writing and statistical analysis in one 
comprehensive system with a single language. 
Hypotheses and Test Statistics 
For this part of the present study, two hypotheses were 
developed in the previous chapter. The null hypothesis (1HO) 
states that: 
the proportion of listed f irms with relatively smooth income 
streams is not significantly different from that of unlisted 
f irms. 
while the alternative hypothesis (1HA) states that: 
The proportion of listed firms with relatively smooth income 
streams is significantly higher than that of unlisted firms. 
To identify those firms with relatively smooth income 
streams, two expectancy models were proposed in the previous 
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chapter. The f irst model is a simple linear relationship between 
reported income and time, while the second model describes the 
relationship in the form of an exponential curve which nas been 
transformed using logarithms to reduce the model to a linear 
form. When applying the second model, we have excluded those 
firms which have reported at least one loss during the accounting 
periods under examination because of the fact that the 
transformation is only possible with positive values. As far as 
the second model is concerned, such firms will be classified as 
non smoothing firms. In this regard, we may argue that the 
possibility of a smoothing f irm reporting a loss is minimal. 
However,, the scattergrams from the first model will enable us to 
examine such firms to see whether there is any indication of 
smoothing behaviour. 
To test the above hypotheses, the most appropriate test 
statistic is: 
Xi X2 
n, n2 
T= 
jp 
(1 - 1/n2) 
Whereby: 
Xi + X2 
wi th P 
n, + n2 
Xi is the number of listed firms considered smothers 
x2 is the number of unlisted firms considered smoothers 
n, is the number of listed firms in the sample 
n2 is the number of unlisted firms in the sample 
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Since a large positive value of T from the sampie 
results discredits the principal hypothesis 1HO in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis 1HA, an upper tail test is appropriate. 
Thus if we consider 0.05 an acceptable significance level , then 
the decision rules for testing are: 
If the sample's T value is greater than or equal to 1.645,, 
then reject the null hypothesis, otherwise accept the null 
hypothesis. 
In the following section, the regression results 
obtained from applying the two expectancy models to the data of 
the last five accounting years are presented. 
The Regression Results 
In the present study, four objects of smoothing are 
considered as follows: 
1. ordinary income before finance and taxation charges 
(referred to as I, ),, 
2. ordinary income before taxation charges (referred to as 12)1 
ordinary income (referred to as 3), 
4. final income (referred to as 
Each of these objects is regressed on time for each 
f irm using one model at a time. In this regard, the SPSS x offers 
the Scattergram command with several procedures which print 
statistics associated with the simple regression of one variable 
upon the otner. Such Scattergrams enable us to visualise the 
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relationship between reported income and time for each f irin, 
while the other procedures print the coefficient of correlation 
(R) and the coefficient of determination (R2). Since we are 
interested in those firms with increasing income streams over 
time, the sign of R will enable us to identify tnose firms with 
negative correlation between the reported income and time. 
In this section,, only the regression results of the 
last five years data are presented. This period will be modified 
later in this chapter. Table V-1 presents the results of the 
first model, while Table V-2 presents that of the second model. 
Each table includes nine columns. The first column specifies the 
identification number (ID) of each firm, while the remaining 
columns are arranged, first according to each object of smoothing 
i. e. income Il,, 12l, 13 and 14. Second,, for each object, there 
are two sub-columns namely the correlation coefficient Rand the 
coefficient of determination RR. 
The following sections provide an analysis of these 
results and further testing of the findings. 
Analysis of the Results 
Our analysis is conducted in two stages. In the f irst 
stage the operational hypotheses will be tested. In the second 
stage we will test the robustness of the conclusions reached in 
the first stage. 
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TADLE V-1 
COPRELATION COEFF. (P) AND CCEFF. OF DETERMINATION (RR) 
ACCORDING TO INCOME CLASSIFICATIONS FROM THE FIRST 
MODEL (USING THE DATA OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS) 
ID 11 13 14 
------- R ---- RR ----- R ------ RQ ----- R ------ RQ ----- R ------ RR 
ýý5 7ý3 -iý6 -7; ý 053 ei36 . 
ýý4 
2 . 992 . 985 . 994 
: 
939 . 955 . 913 . 368 . 135 
3 . 049 . 002 -. 012 . 0,30 -. 131 . 017 -. 130 . 017 4 . 964 . 969 . 989 . 978 . 9a7 . 975 . 989 . 978 
5 . 000 . joo . 408 . 167 .? 15 . 046 . 115 . 013 
0 . 926 . 357 . 596 . 603 . 913 . 834 . 804 . 647 
7 -. 561 . 338 -. 204 . 041 -. Qol . 812 -. 901 . 812 
8 -. 634 . 402 -. 387 . 150 -. 009 . 000 -. 074 . 005 
9 . 909 . 827 . 967 . 935 . 812 . t)60 . 813 . 669 
10 . 899 . 608 . 985 . 97u o014 . 836 . 749 . 561 
11 sQ24 . 655 . 935 . 875 . 529 . 687 . 755 . 570 
12 . 96 5 . 783 . 904 . 817 &017 . 842 . 931 . 868 
13 . 845 . 714 . 792 . 028 S53 . 729 -. 372 . 138 
14 -. 551 . 304 -. 475 . 226 -. 585 . 343 . 033 . 001 
15 -. 543 . 30J -. 499 . 243 -. 267 . 071 -. 143 . 020 16 . 183 
75 
1- 1 . 573 . 328 . 499 . 249 . 313 . 098 
17 -. 310 r Q6 . 173 . 030 . 053 . 002 . 193 . 037 
18 -. 46Q 20 -. 199 . 039 -. 271 . 073 -. 840 . 706 
19 174 3 -. 146 . 021 -. 252 . 030 -. 282 . 080 
29 -. 396 157 -. 828 . 636 -. 831 . 690 -. 733 . 538 
21 -. 777 004 -. 609 . 371 -. 766 . 587 -. 735 . 541 
22 . 711 5Co . 686 .470 -. 555 .31U -. 
798 . 637 
23 .523 . 273 . 43.2 . 187 . 333 . 111 -. 
125 . 015 
24 . 615 . 379 . 479 2? 9 . 417 . 174 . 
417 . 174 
25 . Q35 c74 . 935 . 875 . 
ý6? . 778 . 382 . 778 
26 -. 495 45 -. 566 3. ) 1 -. 627 . 394 -. 727 529 
27 . 224 . ý5j -. 443 . 1po -. 
735 . 540 -. 696 . 485 
28 . 516 . 266 . 149 . 
322 .1 j7 . 011 -. 
072 . 005 
29 -. 874 . 765 -. 861 . 777 -. 895 . 
8)1 -. 871 . 759 
30 . 20 . 071 . 
257 D6o . 073 . 005 -. 185 . 
C34 
31 . 771 . 593 o043 . 
689 . 975 . 950 -. 475 . 
22o 
32 . 04 3 . 900 . 
965 . 932 . 973 . 957 . 
933 . 870 
33 . 559 . 313 a274 . 
075 -. 370 . 137 -. 370 . 137 
34 . 856 .734 . 
711 . 505 . 899 . 808 . 925 . 
855 
35 -. 019 . 00i -. 019 JOO -. 681 . 464 -. 
681 . 464 
36 . 826 . 683 . 
857 . 734 -. 039 . 0)1 . 
216 . 046 
37 . 807 . 651 . 
845 . 714 . 375 . 140 . 
250 . 062 
30 . 686 . 471 0910 . 
829 . 021 . 848 . 
919 . 829 
39 -. 756 0 572 -. P34 . 696 -. 
964 . 745 -. 814 . 664 
4J -. 573 . 325 -. 67S . 449 -. 
262 . 063 -. 569 . 324 
41 . 128 . ul 16 . 016 . 
000 . 113 . 012 -. 125 . 
015 
42 -. 232 . 054 -. 338 . 114 -. 525 . 
275 -. 525 . 275 
43 . 925 . 857 . 925 . 
857 aQ23 . 652 . 931 . 
868 
44 . 763 . 583 . 763 . 582 . 
789 . 6? 4 -. 708' . 502 
45 -. 113 . ýjl 3 -. 609 . 371 -. 
281 . 079 -. 261 . 079 
4o .? 93 . 936 . 
996 . 993 . 987 . 
974 . 987 . 974 
47 . 754 . 569 . 
737 . 5L4 . 9,33 
"15 . 8ý . 893 795 
48 0981 . 963 . 
984 . 971 . 972 . 945 . 
969 . 939 
49 . 613 . 375 . 759 . 
57o . 686 .4 
7-j . 198 . 039 
50 . 874 . 764 . 
813 . 661 . 427 . 183 . 472 . 
222 
51 o7U3 . 404 . 
766 . 586 -. 097 . 
009 -. J97 . 009 
52 .5 22 .273 . 
349 . 121 -. 073 . 
005 . 512 . 262 
53 . 529 . 280 .5c? . 
273 . 573 .3? 5 . 
514 . 264 
54 . 805 o49 . 900 .8 
11 *924 . 854 . 
348 . 719 
55 . 339 . 115 -. 192 .J37 -. 
286 . 091 -. 433 . 
192 
56 . 725 . 52o . 757 . 573 . 
197 . 038 . 303 . 094 
57 3o& . 131 -. 384 . 147 -. 713 
508 -. 731 534 
56 . 646 . 716 . 842 . 710 . 786 . 619 . 
322 . 103 
59 .940 . 394 . 941 . 835 . 
865 . 783 . 873 . 771 
6J . 970 . 942 o'Q76 . 953 . 932 . 869 . 
997 . 994 
61 . 294 .036 . 189 . 036 . 114 . 013 -. 382 . 146 
6-) . 093 . 98o oQ94 . 98b oO85 . 971 -. 
264 . 070 
63 -. 913 OC! O . 010 DIU -. 691 . 477 -. 701 . 492 
64 01)90 . 981 . IP94 . 989 . osý? . 976 . 992 . 985 
(TABLE V-1 CONTINUED) 
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CONTIkQED) TA9LE V-1 ('ý 
CORRELATION COEFF. (R) AND COEFF. OF DETERMINATION (RR) 
ACCORDI04G TO INCOME CLASSIFICATIONS FRO04 THE FIRST 
040DEL (USING THE DATA OF THE LkST FIVE YEARS) 
ID 11 12 13 14 
Q R RR R ---- RR ----- R ------ RR ------ 
65 
66 . 731 . 534 . 700 . 491 . 721 . 520 . 725 . 526 
67 . 912 . 
632 . 947 . 717 . 
7ol . 580 . 447 . 
200 
68 . 965 . 932 . 974 . 950 . 996 . 803 . 925 . 857 
69 . 2UI . 04U . 194 .U37 -. 010 . 
000 -. 074 . 005 
70 -. 107 . 011 -. 181 . 032 -. 136 . 018 - 294 . 080 71 . 967 . 936 9966 . 933 -. 02) . 000 -: 02) . 000 72 -. 524 . 275 -. 513 . 263 -. 857 . 73o -. 774 . 599 
73 . 229 . 052 . 472 . 2? 3 . 862 . 
744 . 629 . 
396 
74 -. 071 . 005 -. 304 .u92 -. 908 .8? 4 - 
61 4 . 
377 
75 -. 617 . 381 -. 713 . 509 . 360 . 130 -: 356 . 126 76 -. 040 0001 . 300 . 090 . 299 . 089 -. 008 . 000 77 . 946 . 715 . 975 . 951 . 847 . 717 . 596 . 356 78 -.! 89 . 790 -. 931 . 866 -. 
9J6 
. 821 -. 909 . 827 
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92 115 . 013 . 407 . 165 . 391 . 153 . 652 . 425 93 -. 234 J41 -. 350 . 122 -. 828 . 6-96 -. 777 . 604 94 -. 848 . 720 -. 456 . 206 -. 473 . 224 -. 634 1402 
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110 . 8a3 . 780 . 860 740 . 745 . 556 646 417 
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TV-ILE V-, 
CORRELATION COEFF. (R) AND C07FF. OF DETERPINATION (RR) 
' TO INCOME ACI"ORDINQ - CLASSIFICATIONS FRO"! THE SECONý 
MODEL (USINQ THE DATA OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS) 
ID 11 12 13 14 
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214 .507 . 257 
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03 5 . 564, . 319 aS56 . 309 . 623 . 335 . 
549 30 3 
55 
. 363 . 132 -. 
175 . D30 -. 
21 OL6 - . 527 . 276 
57 . 424 .1 -. 432 .1 37 -. 77 6 DZ) - .6 D2 . 363 
59 959 . 921 *Q62 I . 9? 6. . 92S . 661 . 912 . 832 
6j 
. 
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TABLE V-2 (CONTINUý-D) 
CORPELATION COEFF. (R) AND COEFF. OF DETERMINAIION (RR) 
ACCORDIN'o TO INCOME CLASSIFICATIONS FRCOý THE SECOND 
MODEL (USING THE DATA OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS) 
I r, 
.1 11 171 13 14 
------- R ----- RR ------ R ------ RP ---- R ------- RR R RR 
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125 -. 24 3 . 059 -. 329 -1 ob -. 293 -099 -. 4 Cd 7 . 165 
127 . 117 . 013 . 331 -139 -. 535 . 2S6 -. 612 . 375 128 . 966 . 972 . 985 . 971 mQ65 . 932 . 965 . 932 
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Stage I: Testing the Hypotheses 
The main purpose of this stage is to test the null 
hypot sis that the proportion of listed firms with relatively 
smooth income streams is not signif icantly higher than that of 
unlisted firms. Since it is worthy to know whether one of the 
two expectancy models is more commonly used, as a predetermined 
pattern to smooth reported income,, we will, first, consider each 
model separately. Secondly, we will analyse the results of 
combining the two models. 
Table V-3 presents a summary of the results obtained 
from the f irst model. The f irst column includes the four objects 
of smoothing whereby each object is classified according to the 
type of firms, namely unlisted and listed. The second column 
includes the number and percentage of firms which satisfy the 
smoothing criterion. The third column includes the number and 
percentage of those firms having R2<0.80 or negative 
correlation coefficients, while the fourth column includes the 
total number of firms in each set of firms. The fifth column 
states the sample's T value calculated according to the test 
statistic formula. The final column states the decision reached 
about the null hypothesis based on the following rules "If the 
sample's T value is greater than or equal to 1.645,, then reject 
the null hypothesis; otherwise accept the null hypothesis". This 
table shows that the null hypothesis is rejected with respect to 
all objects of smoothing, using the f irst model. Thus the 
proportion of listed firms with relatively smooth income streams 
is significantly higher than that of unlisted firms for all 
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objects of smoothing considered in the present study. 
Furthermore, ordinary income (1 3) has the highest T value i. e. 
3.80 and the highest percentage of smoothing f irms i. e. 32.8%. 
Table V-4 presents a summary of the results obtained 
from the second model. This table is organised in the same way 
as the previous table. The last column shows that the null 
hypothesis is rejected with respect to reported income Il, 13 and 
14, while it is accepted with regard to income 12. Again 
ordinary income 13 has the highest T value and the highest 
percentage of smoothing firms. The former is 2.64,, while the 
latter is 25%. Although both models provide sufficient evidence 
of smoothing among listed firms, the first model provides 
stronger evidence than the second model. 
Table V-5 presents a combined summary of the results 
obtained from both models. In this regard the first model has 
considered the base and those f irms which have been 
identified as smoothers using the second model, but not 
identified by the first model, have been added to the base. 
Since the main reason for using two expectancy models is the fact 
that we do not know the patterns that management might choose as 
a norm for smoothing, a combination of the two models is 
considered to be more appropriate for the purpose of the present 
study,, if such a combination provides additional information. 
Table V-5 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected 
for all objects of smoothing. Again ordinary income 13 has the 
highest T value and the highest percentage of smoothing firms 
among the set of listed firms. In fact,, the null hypothesis is 
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rejected even at a significance level lower than 0.005 with 
respect to income 13 and 14. 
In summary,, the empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis that the proportion of listed firms with relatively 
smoth income streams is significantly higher than that of 
unlisted f irms. Also it is worth noticing that ordinary income 
13 has the highest T value in all cases and hence it imay be 
perceived to be the most common object of smoothing among listed 
firms. The peculiarity of such an object of smoothing may stem 
from the fact that it is the most relevant figure in the income 
staternent for the calculation of earnings per-share which is used 
to calculate the price-earnings ratio, one of the most commonly 
used stock market indicators. For this object of smoothing, the 
percentage of smoothing firms is 32.8% among listed firms, while 
it is only 9.4% among unlisted f irms. 
Stage II: Testing the Robustness of Empirical Findings 
The main purpose of this stage is to test the 
robustness of the conclusions reached in the first stage. This 
test is conducted through certain modifications with respect to: 
1. The criterion of a smooth income stream; and 
2. The length of the period under examination. 
Additionally, in this stage the concept of natural 
smoothing is examined. 
134 
1. Modifying the Criterion of a Smooth Incom Stream 
In the previous stage, the analysis was limited to 
those f irms with R2 >/ 0.80 as a criterion for a smooth income 
stream. The main reason for setting such a high criterion is to 
include only those firms which can be seen as successful in their 
attempts to smooth reported income over time. But it is also of 
interest to know what will happen if such criterion is reduced to 
a lower range, e. g. R2 ), 0.70 with positive correlation 
coef f icient. By doing so,, we will be able to include those f irms 
which might attempt to smooth reported income, but do not 
necessarily succeed in their attempts. In this regard, it may be 
argued that if income smoothing is more common among listed 
firms, it would be expected that the proportion of listed firms 
which attempted to -smooth reported income, but did not 
necessarily succeed, should be higher than that of unlisted 
firms. * Hence this proposition will be tested. To this end, 
Table V-6 presents the combined results of both models used in 
the first stage of the analysis of this chapter but using R2 >1 
0.70 with positive correlation as a criterion of distinguishing 
between f irms. This table shows that the results are consistent 
with the above proposition with respect to all objects of 
smoothing. Therefore such findings provide further support to 
the conclusions reached in the f irst stage of this analysis. 
---------------- -------------------------------- ------ 
Notice that R2), 0.70 with positive correlation is in 
relative terms not a very low criterion of a smooth income 
stream. 
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2. Modifying the Period Under Examination 
The period under examination has been modified to see 
wh(-ther such modification may provide further insights regarding 
the smoothing phenomenon. In this regard, the period under 
examination has been extended to cover the whole period available 
for analysis and hence the accounting periods lay between 1975 
and 1985 with an average of 9.48 years for the whole sample. The 
regression results are presented in table V-7 and table V-8 which 
are organised in the same way as previous tables. 
Table V-9 presents a summary of such results through 
combining the two models. In this case, the original criterion 
of distinguishing between smoothing and non-smoothing f irms has 
been used. 
The null hypothesis is accepted with respect to income 
Il and 12, while it is rejected with respect to income 13 and 14. 
This demonstrates that listed firms are consistently smoothing 
ordinary income 13 and net income 14. Furthermore, ordinary 
income has again the highest T value. While this provides 
further support to the findings of the previous stages, the 
magnitudes of the T value indicate that the five year period 
provides stronger evidence of smoothing among listed firms than 
the longer period. To justify such a difference, two general 
reasons might be advanced. First, in the relative long run, 
management might change the pattern around which the reported 
income is smoothed and hence the smoothness of time - series can 
be affected. Secondly, effective smoothing requires adjustment 
with some precision and knowledge of techniques to accomplish 
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. S36 6 99 
. 516 267 
9 2') . 846 
171 . 029 
593 . 358 
. 423 . 176 
. 059 . 003 
-. 6S6 471 
n . 069 -64, 17 Q C32 
51? 262 
9u101? 24 
Q43 o39 
-. 444 1 'a 7 
. 911 831 
. 330 109 
. 874 764 
. 966 751 
. 923 853 
. 335 113 
.1 93 . 
037 
. 886 . 795 
. 037 . 
037 
442 1 15 
56? 316 
. 637 . 406 
4J3 162 
254 7? 9 
'? 32 868 
64Q 421 
. 164 960 
.3J. 3 091 
. 894 81D (TABLE V-7 
14 
----------- RRR 
. 596 35 S 72 3 523 
oo 3 361 
Q6? 9' 1 
. 533 2ý LD 
. 712 507 
. 623 3S8 
-o2o6 . 370 
. 786 61 8 
. 381 777 
.94 2) 888 
. 2o9 . 072 
. 487 237 
-. 1 )g 6. . 016 
. 345 . 121 
-. 204 . 041 
-. 380 144 
. 412 170 
. 566 . 320 
- . 3o5 . 133 
-. 491 . 242 
. 647 . 419 
-. 339 . 000 
. 513 . 661 
. 978 . 95 4, 
- . 351 . 123 
. 356 . 127 
-. 419 . 175 
-. 60ý? . 37) 
.2 42 4 . 050 
. 621 . 386 
. 338 . 792 
. 516 . 267 
. 915 . 837 
. 170 . 028 
. 605 . 366 
. 063 . 004 
-. 027 . 000 
-. 613 . 376 
. 273 . 074 211 . 044 
51 6.266 
9o. 0 . 922 
. 742 . 550 
7.476 . 227 
. 903 . 816 
. 294 . 086 
. 859 . 738 
. 586 o 343 
. 924 . 854 
. 333 . 111 
. 522 . 273 
. 879 . 772 
-. 154 . 023 
. 351 . 123 
o4bg . 239 
o4G3 . 162 5o4 . 318 
ý82 . 779 9G2 81 5 
251 J63 
. 750 o563 
. 349 . 122 
. 890 . 792 
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TA5LE V-7 (CONTINJED) 
C0kQELATIO! i COEFF. (R) AND '. OEFF. OF )ETERMINATION (RQ) 
ACCORDING TO INCOOE CLASSIFICATIONS FROM THE FIRST 
AVAILAPLE DATA FOR ANALYSIS) . AODEL (USING 
ID 11 12 13 14 
-------- P ----- RR -------- R ---- kp -------- Z? ---- Rý ------- q ----- RR 
65 41 . 17 
---i 40 --Z-- 1 J3 133 76 -3-- : 142 ---7 3ö :: ýU . 133 
: 113 
60 . 663 .44ü . 619 .3"4 60 . 436 . 648 . 421 
67 . 4o6 .2«, b . 301 . or)i . 781 . 610 . 821 . 675 
6-3 ý 17 . u68 . 849 . 719 .Q2? . 851 . 919 . 844 
69 8,29 .z 36 . 82 1 . 674 . 635 . 433 . 597 . 356 
70 u714 . 509 . 643 . 413 . 558 . 311 . 535 . 286 71 9 ')u4 . 317 oQ 14 .a3 'A) . 559 . 313 . 572 . 327 72 . 505 . 255 . 459 . 211 . 527 . 277 . 171 . 029 
73 -. 715 . 512 -. 75ý . 57a . ý53 . 002 . 309 . 095 
74 -. 340 . 115 -. 477 . 227 -. 4j3 . 162 -. 573 . 328 75 . 303 ü92 . 263 . 069 . 652 . 425 . 170 . 029 
76 -. «-' 10 . J57 -. 278 . 377 -. 337 . 113 -. 253 . 064 
77 . 3ý, 3 . 147 . 41ý . 172 . 677 . 458 . 7G2 . 4Q2 7b . 272 174 -. 413 . 171 -. 191 i39 -. 138 . 019 79 . 649 . 421 . 550 . 313 .5 34 . 341 . 311 . 097 
so -. s26 G32 -. 762 . 531 -. 5o2 . 31c) -. 276 . 076 
81 . 366 750 gül . 641 742 . 551 . 781 . 611 
. -^14 . 624 391 .6 1)7 . 369 63 . 397 83 -. 1 « 3 ü33 -. 06 2 OD3 -. 232 .J54 -. 280 . 078 
c, 4 . 063 ü04 -. 257 .. D66 -. 195 . 036 -. 090 . 008 85 . 211) 044 . 284 .iý1 . 3o7 .15 -. 14 . 022 
86 . 362 . 779 798 .ö3 ci .27 .65 . 814 . 663 87 . 379 . 143 . 255 . 065 . 3,52 . 131 . 564 . 318 8 c-) . 766 . 615 . 599 . 359 . 326 . 683 . 714 . 510 
89 . 839 . 791 . 823 . 67 1 . '75 3 . 575 . 753 . 575 91 . 809 . 740 .F35 . öl? 7 .5? 6 . 355 . 6ö6 . 444 91 . 816 . 667 . 79c . 625 . 733 . 537 . 6o8 . 474 
92 . 752 . 566 . 343 . 117 . 4o3 . 214 . 345 . 119 93 . 6,07 . 369 . 477 ')'> ö 0 &. - . 431 136 . 318 . 101 94 . 440 . 193 -. 524 . 275 -. 286 . 032 -. 375 . 141 
95 -. 035 ., 301 -. 093 .j 13 -. 1-69 . 034 -. 147 . 021 
90 -. 353 . 723 -. 965 . 932 -. 903 . 325 -. s62 . 743 
97 . 923 . 672 . 927 . 634 .A42 . 739 . 864 . 748 
98 . 459 .Z 11 . 2, ý2 . 079 . 487 . 
237 . 592 . 351 
99 -. 558 . 311 -. 673 .45u -. 110 . 012 ., 321 000 
1 Oi -. 759 .57ö -. 964 . 747 -. 5 12 . 262 -. 615 . 379 
101 5 d&., 3 . 274 -. 176 . 031 . 124 . 015 . 122 . 015 
102 991 . 983 . 9t> 9 . 939 . 5o4 . 319 . 686 . 471 
103 . 821 o75 . 738 . 544 . 817 . 663 . 
788 . 622 
1 04 . 729 . 531 . 454 . 206 -. l 55 . 
024 -. 366 . 134 
105 . 572 . 327 -. 485 . 236 -. 
242 . 058 -. 161 . 032 
106 a739 . 547 . 312 . 097 . 
492 . 242 . 479 . 229 
107 . 676 . 457 -. '301 DDÜ . 
425 . 131 . 386 . 149 
106 . 724 . 324 . 554 . 3.07 . 
534 . 341 .. 599 . 359 
109 . 929 . 864 . 695 . 434 . 
663 . 440 . 663 . 440 
11j . 81 ? .ö72 . 808 . 653 . 
331 . 690 . 481 . 232 
111 . 4o3 . 214 -. 005 . 
030 -. 086 . 007 -. 522 . 273 
112 . 572 . 326 . 553 . 
3ý6 . 245 . 060 . 475 . 225 
113 Pü3 . 653 . 775 . 611 . 
533 . 284 . 612 . 375 
114 
. 327 b85 -. 
lö9 . 328 -. q73 . 005 -. j90 OOS 
115 . 711 . 5-35 . 691 . 478 . 
664 . 468 . 684 . 468 
11 Z) . 479 . 22 9 . 636 . 367 
3b6 . 751 t225 . 051 
1 17 0u4 . GOU -. 332 111 291 . 
084 -. 295 . 087 
1 18 1J3 .01u -. 16 c . 325 -. 
127 . 316 -. 028 000 
119 -. 412 . 170 -. 499 . 249 -. 026 . 
000 . 050 . 002 
12i e"56 . 572 . 739 . 546 . ý33 . 695 . 
756 . 572 
121 . 243 9%. j59 . 328 Ü3U . 
286 Osi . 284 OBO 
122 . 70? oll . 786 . 619 . 
813 . 661 . 766 . 618 
123 . 300 -. 693 . 48J -. 293 . 084 -. 297 . 088 
124 . 1,192 . 795 9277 . 769 . 8199 . 808 . 899 . 808 125 -. 1c) . 033 -. 4217 5 376 3 . 035 . 175 . 030 
12D -. 479 Z3(i -. e39 . 714 -. 3ý7 . 651 - . 869 . 756 
127 997-3 MI8 . 863 . 745 . 642 . 413 . 503 . 250 123 . 194 . 9ý8 . 'ý94 . 9R9 . 902 . 925 . 9o2 . 925 
139 
TADLE V-0 
CORRELATION COLFF. (R) AND CD---FF. OF DETERMINATION (PR) 
ACCORDINo- TO INCOwE CLASSIFICATIONS FRCOO, THE SECCND 
MODEL (USING THE DATA AVAILABLE FOR ANALISIS) 
ID 11 12 13 14 
------- p ----- R ------- R ----- ------- R ----- PR R RR 
1 47 . 663 879 0 6ý4 2 24 10 Ej 55 a If- '51 0059 .9? 3 . 754 56 Eý 3 . 773 . 593 .74 4 P23 .677 . 823 677 4 9 PLI, ? . 976 a0 . 939 . 97) a ^742 .9oQ . 949 7 . 329 . 11)8 . 133 . Jl 7 . 665 . 4,43 . 66 r, 443 9 . 3- 93 76 . 640 .4? 1 736 a . 541 . 735 
. 
540 
10 . 921 ý-5 49 .57 . 955 . 915 . 911 s L- -)g 11 Ou3 927 9o 2 90 9 7 9 . 9-15 S74 12 5 '09 a . 472 23 2j . 040 . 167) 032 13 oQ67 . 935 . 960 921 0064 . 929 . 36-5 . 145 18 . 747 .5 55,9 . 764 5ý4 .; 10 . 671 . 613 . 376 19 . 786 . 61 S . 790 . 625 . 784 . 04 . 764 . 614 20 4 31 1 1S6 -. 117 . 013 43 . J-59 3q 4d . 193 22 o'034 673 w036 . 377 . 355 .74 c'o . 722 . 521 24 . S47 . 717 . 590 , 340- .S5ý . 733 .85q . 739 25 .93Q 1 9 30 S7o )4 so, . 930 ý? 6 4 93 26 .5 91 . 353 -. 616 .3ý1 -. 452 . 204 -. 393 . 154 27 . 763 . 613 .40 C' . 16) . 593 45 . 637 . 369 31 . 925 ;, -6 w :) .F53 . 720 91 . 844 . 772 596 
32 . 693 w 4, , Qj . 666 . 443 79 55 . 632 . 792 . 027 33 . 764 .5F4 . 582 . 339 . 623 . 338 . 623 . 386 34 &F-86 . 73o . 524 . 275 . 8. -1)7 .7ý8 .87 01 . 758 35 -. 399 . 159 -. 399 . 159 . 326 . 106 . 326 . 106 36 . 361 . 130 . 2900 . 034 . 676 . 457 . 670 .44 5z 
37 -. 198 . 039 -. 482 8232 . 457 . 209 -. 02-2) . 000 42 . 255 . 065 . 182 . 933 .55ý . 311 . 564 . 318 43 . 971 . 944 . 971 . 944 &964 . 930 . 970 . 942 44 0c a, 53 .9 Cl 9 94F 90D . 892 . 7? 6 70 . 561 45 -. 043 . 002 61 '-' . 375 -. 476 . 227 -. 499 . 249 46 . 991 . 9E3 . 989 . 979 01066 . 
973 .981 . 964, 
43 . 882 . 779 S5'-' . 722 R-72 . 763 S22 . 675 49 . 563 . 322 . 880 . 775 . 97ý . 755 . 57) . 325 50 . 97S . 956 &073 . 948 eQ51 . 9ý5 . 953 . 909 51 m799 . 05 -. 059 .0ý3 . 4,34 . 163 . 400 .1 6C 
03 . 931 . 868 . 921 .84,;, ( 896 0ý .6 1) 3 . 915 .83 55 . 793 C) 
7) 9 68 r-', ' . 463 . 617 .3 --'5 
1 .45B . 21 n 
57 . 939 o-F2 ý -2 1 C)75 
7 %S D . 6: 
D S .4 Iýj 
3 
. 1601 
9 . 741 . 549 . 73C . 533 Sý3 -F 1 .7 . 597 - . 797 
60 94S . 809 . 915 S3S s994 Ul S5L . 725 
61 5C)7 a 157 -. 04-7 . ill . 723 . 519 .1 t-) s . u- 3S 
(TA-ELE V-8. CONTINUED) 
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TAEILE V-3 (CONTINUED) 
CbRPELATION COErF (R) AND COE F F. OF D ETERMINATION ( RR) 
ACCORDING TO INCONE CLASSIFICATIONS FROm THE SECOND 
MODEL (USING THE DATA AVAILAELE FOR ANALYSIS) 
IDIII-,., 13 14 
------------ ------------ ------------ RRRRRRPRRRRR 
62 . 994 .9F6 .99 _7 .9s 1b, . 
972 . 944 . 876 . 768 
63 . 25P D67 . 240 . 056 . 544 . 2Q6 . 576 . 332 
6 4' . 933 . 371 . 915 . 633 a Q41 SS7 . 927 . 860 
66 . 924 354 &67 . 75 2, 091.0 . S29 . 875 . 767 
6ý F. 1 741C E95 . 16 -) 1 w926 . 858 . 915 . 637 
69 F 14 . 063 a .65 707 . 530 67 . 461 
7D . 763 . C) 7) 2 .7 12' . 5,38 . 71) .5 
0- 5 . 6S2 . 465 
71 . Fo5 . 749 .86 
'21 77 0ý . 779 . 6.37 . 810 . 656 
7 22 . 521 . 271 .47 
'C" :>1 . 573 . 328 . 268 . 072 
75 29 7 u . 2, S1 . 379 . 697 . 437 . 368 . 150 
77 . 447 3 1 -)3 71 . 513 . 
744 . 554 
79 7c1 . 641 . 411 . 535 . 344 . 473 . 
224 
81 . 779 7,8 E o22 70 . 512 . 528 . 685 
82 . 1903 . ý51 6 . 642 . 413 . 653 . 433 
6 64 . 447 
83 -. 155 . . 324 . 070 . 004 13 C 19 
?22 . 049 
88 53 729 . 346 934 . 872 . 721 . 520 
89 . 866 75j . 814 . 662 . 
791 6? o . 791 . 626 
9J 324 . 877 . 769 0756 . 573 7 -S 4 . 614 
93 . 647 . 419 .46 . 233 . 573 . 328 . 
264 . 069 
94 . 552 . 3: 5 -. t89 . 239 -. 34Q . 122 -. 
434 . 189 
95 -. 045 .3C2 -. 208 . 043 . 039 . 001 -. 
138 . 019 
98 w439 . 193 . 242 . 
058 . 501 . 251 . 613 . 
375 
101 . 527 . 278 -. 191 . 336 . 
117 . 013 . 116 . 013 
102 . 9' 78 . 957 .94? .8ý9 . 
597 . 357 . 694 .48 12' 
103 . 751 . 564 . 535 .2 ES 
7 .6 2ý? .3? 5 . 642 . 412 
109 . 949 9 1-1; 1 . 637 4 DO o . 
825 . 651 8 &215 . 681 
110 894- . 796 . 876 . 767 
89 . 797 . 438 40 1 9C. 
ill . 437 . 191 . 
097 . 009 -. OJ2 . 000 -. 
506 . 256 
112 55,3 1 2F2 50ý . 259 . 271 . 
073 . 411 . 169 
113 80 5 . 649 . 783 .6 '-' 1 .751 . 
564 . 796 . 634 
114 837 . 701 -. 254 . 064 -. 
22D . 048 -. 243 . 059 
115 
. 
. 722 . 521 . 
711 . 535 w705 . 498 . 
TD 5 . 498 
116 &461 . 213 . 
55') . 304 2 47 . 717 . 
517 . 268 
119 -. 436 19 D 5 14 -. 5 s265 -. 063 . 034 . 
018 . 000 
123 772 . 507 . 757 0 .7 . )74 
F4S . 720 . 774 . 599 
122 
. 
. 761 61D 
7 8% .5 . 617 .ý17 . 
667 . 791 .6 2' 7 
123 714 9 of)-' -. 732 536 -. 323 . 1,34 -. 332 . 110 
124 1 3D 9 . 830, F94 . 
799 . 894 . 799 
125 -. 215 a 4. "Il 6 . 103 a32 . 
110 . 152 . 023 
127 ý93 . 905 3 19 
737 a '43 a . 
5C3 . 253 
12 1ý o965 . 
9-11 *063 . 967 "9-)-) #-. . . 
847 . 92-0 847 
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the desired adjustment and hence income smoothing may only be 
practical in the relatively short run. 
3. The Concept of Natural Smo 
This concept was introduced in the second chapter of 
the present study. * In this regard, Imhoff states that: 
"The fact that any given model indicates that an income 
series is smooth or not smooth conveys absolutely no 
information concerning the income generating process. "' 
In this context,, Imhoff suggests that if the pattern 
for the income stream of a given firm is supported by a similar 
pattern for the turnover stream, the smooth income stream might 
2 be a natural result of operations. However,, Imhoff realises 
that it is possible to manipulate turnover in a way to achieve a 
3 smooth trend in both turnover and reported income. 
Therefore, it is of interest to relate the findings of 
the present study to the income-generating process and to avoid 
the possibility that a given firm might smooth both the turnover 
and the reported income time-series. To this end, the following 
discussion is presented. 
In this part of the present study, unlisted firms have 
been used as a control group and hence, the possibility of 
See the second chapter of the present study, p. 40-41. 
Imhoff j, E.,, "Income Smoothing: A Case for Doubt",, Accounting 
journal, Spring 1977,, p. 88. 
2. ibid., p. 89. 
3. ibid., p. 90. 
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natural smoothing is, to some extent, controlled. In addi-11--ion, 
it is feasible to analyse the turnover time series of the two 
sets of firms. The aim of such an analysis is to see whether 
there is evidence that the incidence of natural smoothing in the 
set of listed firms is higher than that in the set of unlisted 
firms. According to Imhoff,, the possibility of natural smoothing 
arises whenever there is a smooth turnover stream. Therefore, if 
it can be shown that the set of listed firms does not have more 
f irms with relatively smooth turnover streams than does the set 
of unlisted firms, then the likelihood of natural smoothing in 
the two sets of f irms is at least the same. And since two 
expectancy models with R2 >/ 0.80 were used to identify firms with 
relatively smooth income streams,, it is appropriate to use the 
same approach to identify the proportion of those firms with 
relatively smooth turnover streams in each set. The regression 
results of the two models of turnover over time are presented in 
Table Vý10. This table is, first, divided horizontally into two 
major sections, the first includes unlisted firms, while the 
second includes listed firms. Secondly, each section is divided 
into three sub-sections. The first includes the identification 
number (ID) of each f irm. The second includes the results 
obtained from the first model (F. M. ),, while the third includes 
the results obtained from the second model (S. M. ). In this 
Table,, R represents the correlation coefficient, while RR 
represents the coefficient of determination. 
Table V-11 presents a summary of such results and it 
includes four main columns. The first states the expectancy 
model with the control variables, namely unlisted and listed. 
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TABLE V-10 
CORRELATION COEFF. (R) AND COFFF. 
OF TURNOVER TIME SERICS ACCORDING 
AND EXPECTANCY MUDELS (USING 
UNLISTFL) iTiým, ý, 
LI 
OF DETERMINATION (RR) 
TO TYPES OF CONTROL 
5 YEARS DATA) 
LISIFu Flkma 
----- --------- -- M0bK S. AKK 
------ ---- RW ----- p ---- KP - ----- R ----- RR ----- R ---- RR 
-3 -2 9-9 Z -. 77 ;ý 
2 .9 
7i 
.4 
U-7 7z --3 . 94i 3 . 538 . 346 . 623 . 388 4 . 960 . 921 . 93A . 
830 
5 . 998 . 996 . 988 . 976 6 . 914 . 835 . 
980 . 960 7 . 708 . 501 . 686 . 471 8 -. 439 . 193 -. 425 . 181 9 . 968 . 938 . 965 . 932 10 . 892 . 796 . 
895 . 801 11 . 993 . 987 . 086 . 973 12 . 868 . 755 . 383 . 
781 
13 . 925 . 857 . 035 . 874 14 -. U46 . 002 -. 
024 000 
15 . 93u . 365 . 931 . 868 16 -. 895 . 649 -. 797 . 636 17 . 556 . 309 . 534 . 235 18 . 891 . 794 . 
898 . 807 19 . 924 . 853 . 939 . 832 2u . 950 . 903 . 954 . 
910 
21 U2U OUO . 048 . 002 22 . 999 . 993 . 
096 . 992 23 . 958 . 918 . 960 . 921 24 . 981 . 963 . 
096 . 993 
25 . 976 . 953 . 983 . 967 26 . 822 . 676 . 336 . 699 27 . 903 . 815 . 899 . 809 28 . 966 . 933 . 983 . 
968 
29 -. 285 . 081 -. 345 . 119 30 . 594 . 353 . 586 . 
344 
31 . 812 . 659 . 826 . 682 «K 2 . 819 . 671 . 320 . 673 33 . 954 . 910 . 970 . 942 '; 4 . 954 . 911 . Q61 . 923 35 . 983 . 966 . 982 . 964 36 . 806 . 650 . 803 . 653 37 . 948 . £, 90 . 059 . 913 78 -. 4? 9 . 184 -. 403 . 167 39 . 735 . 540 . 71Q . 517 40 . 856 . 733 . 365 . 749 41 . 980 . 973 Q93 . 986 42 . 933 . 371 . 936 . 877 43 . 992 . 084 . 965 . 972 44 . 934 . 872 . 972 . 944 45 . 872 . 760 . 888 . 788 46 . 984 . 970 . 977 . 954 47 . 974 . 949 . 977 . 954 48 . 990 . 981 . 995 . 991 49 . 992 . 985 Q90 . 980 50 . 958 . 917 . 929 . 863 51 . 948 . 900 Q52 . 907 52 . 666 . 443 . 645 . 416 53 . 972 . 946 . 964 . 930 54 . 058 . 003 . 052 . 002 55 . 992 . 985 . 096 . 9Q3 56 . 770 . 594 . 756 . 572 57 . 531 . 282 . 564 . 318 58 . 405 . 164 . 383 . 147 59 . 964 . 929 . 980 . 961 60 . 980 . 961 . 990 . 981 61 . 977 . 955 . 969 . 940 62 . 970 . 942 . 988 . 976 63 . 818 . 670 . 839 . 705 64 . 979 . 958 . 969 . 
940 
65 . 977 . 956 . 969 . 939 66 . 856 . 733 . 932 . 
869 
67 . 980 . 960 . 987 . 975 68 . 940 . 884 . 980 . 961 69 . 977 . 955 . 976 . 953 70 . 954 . 911 . 969 . 938 71 . 227 . 051 . 235 . 055 72 . 878 . 772 . 877 . 
770 
73 . 673 . 799 . 913 . 662 74 . 935 . 875 . 954 . 
91c 
75 . 931 . 368 .? 30 . 866 76 -.? 35 . 874 -. 928 . 851 77 . 940 . 883 . 942 . 887 78 . 942 . 88Q . 937 . 
878 
79 . 971 . 944 . 965 . 932 80 -. 226 . 051 -. 222 ü49 81 . 958 . 918 . 986 . 973 82 . 957 . 916 . 1963 . 927 83 . 858 . 736 . 870 . 757 94 . 678 . 460 . 693 . 480 85 -. 473 . 224 -. 493 . 243 86 . 984 . 969 . 974 . 950 87 . 955 . 912 Q69 . 940 88 . 940 . 883 . 919 . 845 89 . 99b Q72 . 990 . 981 90 . 997 . 994 . 955 . 
991 
01 . 845 . 714 . 827 . 685 92 -. 685 . 469 -. 679 . 461 93 . 469 . 220 . 462 . 213 '04 -. 277 . 077 -. 235 . 055 05 . 850 . 723 . 840 . 706 06 . 969 . 940 Q78 . 956 97 . 982 . 964 . 990 . 981 98 . 995 . 990 . 1093 . 987 99 . 951 . 905 . 974 . 95ü 100 . 778 . 6C5 . 788 . 621 101 . 962 . 927 . 968 . 938 102 . 923 . 853 . 920 . 
847 
103 . 982 . 965 . 974 . 95u 104 . 990 . 980 . 988 . 
976 
105 . 885 . 783 . 899 . 808 106 . 930 . 866 . 
922 . 851 
107 . 572 . 328 . 540 . 2Q2 1n8 . 983 . 968 . 993 . 
987 
109 . 976 . 953 Q91 . 9gL 110 . 862 . 743 . 841 . 
707 
111 . 964 . 930 . 980 . 961 112 . 9Q6 . 993 . 998 . 
996 
113 . 998 . 997 . 996 . 993 114 . 978 . 957 . 975 . 
951 
115 . 992 . 984 . 990 . 982 116 . 576 . 332 . 
557 . 310 
117 . 5ng . 259 . 465 . 210 118 . 496 . 246 . 477 . 
227 
119 . 977 . 955 . 982 . 965 120 . 960 Q23 . 954 . 
911 
121 . 990 . 981 . 988 . 977 122 . 926 . 958 . 931 . 
867 
123 . 993 . 967 . 990 . 931 124 . 981 . 962 . 982 . 
966 
125 . 881 . 777 . 994 . 799 126 . 663 . 440 . 
667 . 445 127 . 961 . 924 . 972 . 946 128 . 997 . 995 . 958 . 
997 
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Table V-11 
Summary of Turnover Time Series 
Models and Control R2 
with 
0.80 
+ ve (R) 
M 
R2 < 
or 
0.80 
- ve (R) 
M 
Total 
M 
unlisted 43 (67.2) 21 (32.8) 64 (100) 
(1) First Model 
listed 36 (56.3) 28 (43.7) 64 (100) 
unlisted 43 (67.2) 21 (32.8) 64 (100) 
(2) Second Model 
listed 39 (60.9) 25 (39.1) 64 (100) 
unlisted 44 (68.8) 20 (31.2) 64 (100) 
(3) Both Models 
listed 39 (60.9) 25 (39.1) 64 (100) 
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The second column includes the number and percentage of 
f irms with relatively smooth time series, while the third 
column includes the number and percentage of the remaining f irms 
in each set of firms. The final column includes the total number 
of f irms in each set. This table shows that the absolute number 
of unlisted firms with relatively smooth turnover streams is 
higher than that of the set of listed f irms in all cases. 
Hence,, it is safe to conclude that as far as our sample 
is concerned, the likelihood of natural smoothing among unlisted 
firms is relatively higher than that among listed firms. This 
reinforces the findings of the present study in that if natural 
smoothing (i. e. through turnover pattern over time) is found to 
be predominant among unlisted firms, it would be expected that 
these firms should also be predominant in their reporting of 
sinooth income streams, at least as far as the sample is 
concerned. Therefore, this provides further support for the 
argument that the smoothing of reported income among listed firms 
is by design. 
Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the 
possibility of an income smoothing phenomenon among listed firms. 
Accordingly, it was hypothesised that the proportion of listed 
firms with relatively smooth income streams would be 
significantly higher than that of unlisted firms of similar size 
and industry. The findings of the present study are consistent 
with this hypothesis for all objects of smoothing examined. But 
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when the period under examination had been extended from five 
years to more than nine years on average for the whole sample, 
the findings are consistent with the above hypothesis with 
respect only to ordinary income 13 and net income 14. 
The results suggest that ordinary income is the most 
common object of smoothing among listed firms, if compared with 
unlisted firms. It is also clear that approximately 33% of the 
set of listed firms satisfied the research criterion of a smooth 
income stream. Also the concept of natural smoothing has been 
empirically examined and the results are consistent with the 
findings of the present study. 
It may therefore be concluded that the analysis 
described in this chapter does justify the proposition that 
listed firms do smooth their reported income over time to a 
greater extent than do unlisted firms of similar size and 
industry. 
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Chapter VI 
THE LEVEL WE REPORTED INCOME 
The main purpose of this chapter is to report and 
analyse the results obtained from the empirical investigation 
with respect to increase and decrease strategies. Accordingly, 
this chapter consists of three parts; the first part includes a 
brief statement on the approach and the hypotheses to be tested. 
The second part is devoted to the presentation and analysis of 
the results. The f inal part provides an overall summary and the 
conclusions of this chapter. 
Approach and Operational Hypotheses 
The proposed approach has been described in more detail 
in Chapter IV of the present study. Here the analytical 
structure could briefly be described in three steps: 
1. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that the 
distribution of turnover figures of the two sets of firms 
are not significantly different in terms of mean, variance 
and skewness; 
2. An attempt has been made to demonstrate that the 
profitability rates of the two sets are significantly 
dif f erent f rom one another in terms of mean and coef f iclent 
of variation. It is worth noting that this has been 
repeated for each income category and for different periods 
and for different industrial classifications; and 
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3. An attempt has been made to demonstrate where significant 
differences in the mean of the profitability rates have 
arisen by using stepwise multipule regression analysis, 
noting the significance of the coefficients. 
In Chapter IV,, two principal sets of hypotheses were 
developed. The first set includes two hypotheses regarding 
turnover. The null hypothesis (2HO) states that: 
There are no significant differences in the means, variances 
and distributions of turnover between the two sets of f irms. 
While the alternative hypothesis (2HA) states that: 
There are significant differences in the means,, variances 
and distributions of turnover between the two sets of f irms. 
The testing of these hypotheses is essential because 
the methodology of this part of the present study is based on the 
proposition that the turnover figures of the two sets of f irms 
are'in fact drawn from the same population. The second set 
includes two hypotheses concerning the means of tne profitability 
rate. The null hypothesis (3HO) states that: 
There is no significant difference in the means of the 
profitability rate between the two sets of firms. 
While the alternative hypothesis (3HA) states that: 
There is a significant difference in the means of the 
profitability rate between the two sets of firms. 
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The testing of tnese hypotheses will enable us to 
determine whether the two sets of firms are drawn from the same 
population as far as the average prof itaoility rates are 
concerned. 
Presentation and Analysis of the Results 
The presentation and analysis of the results are 
condLrted in two complementary stages. In the first stage, the 
hypotheses concerning turnover and those concerning the average 
profitability rates will be tested using two different data sets. 
The first set of data includes five variables as follows: 
1. Turnover T in (WOO); 
2. ordinary income before finance and tax charges II in (F-000); 
3. ordinary income before tax charges 12 in (EOOO); 
4. ordinary income 13 in (EOOO); 
5. Net income 14 in (EOOO). 
For eacti variable, the data set includes the relevant accounting 
data for an average of 9.48 years for the whole sample with a 
minimum of six and a maximum of ten accounting periods. The 
second data set includes the same variables but covers only the 
last three accounting periods for each firm. 
In the second stage, adjusted trading profit as a new 
income variable will be analysed along with the other income 
variables,, using the data of the last three accounting periods. 
The purpose of the second stage is two-fold: 
1. To test the robustness of the findings of the first stage; 
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2. To provide further investigations with regard to the nature 
of differences in the reported income. 
Stage I: Testing the H theses 
This stage consists of four sections. In the first 
section,, the hypothesis concerning turnover will be tested, while 
in the second section, the hypothesis concerning the average 
profitability rates will be tested. In these two sections, the 
first set of data will be used. In the third section, the second 
set of data set will be used to see whether the findings of this 
researcn differ if the period under examination is modified. The 
final section provides a summary of this stage. 
1. Hypotheses Regarding Turnover 
The results concerning turnover are presented in Table 
VI-1. This table presents the results of the Two Sample T- 
Tests. In this table, Group 1 represents unlisted firms while 
Group 2 represents listed firms and the variable for comparison 
is annual turnover T. The test calculates the relevant 
descriptive statistics and compares the sample means and 
variances. In addition, the test calculates tne Student's "t"I 
the 'T value" and tests the significance of the differences 
between the two sample means and variances. Hence, two 
statistics tests are presented in this table. The f irst is the 
F-test and the second is the T-test. The F-test consists of two 
parts, the 'T values" and "2-tail probability" where of the 
I former provides the ratio of the larger sample variance to the 
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smaller, while the latter provides the observed significance 
level for the F-test which is a test for the equality of 
variances. If the observed significance level for the F-test is 
small enough, usually less than 0.05, then the hypothesis that 
the population variances are equal is rejected; otherwise it is 
accepted. In this case, the observed significance level for the 
F-test is 0.410 and hence, the hypothesis that the population 
variances are equal is strongly supported. Another use for 
test in this table is tnat if the equality hypothesis of 
variances is rejected then the "Separate Variance Estimate" for 
testing the means should be used. on the other hand, if such an 
hypothesis is rejected then the "Pooled Variance Estimate" for 
testing the means should be used. In this case, there is no 
difference between the results of the two types of estimates 
since the number of cases is sufficiently large. The T-test 
consists also of two parts: the "T Value" and "2-tail 
Probability" wnere of the former represents the Student's "t" 
while the latter provides the observed significance level which 
is a test for the equality of means. In this case,, the observed 
significance level for the T-test is 0.453 and hence the 
hypothesis that the population means are equal is strongly 
supported. 
So far the hypotheses that the two sets of firms are 
drawn from the same population regarding the means and variances 
of turnover were tested and strongly supported. However, there 
is the possibility that any two sets of data may have equal means 
and variances, but they are oppositely skewed. And, since the 
reported income is expected to be sensitive to any differences in 
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the distributions of turnover, it is of interest to investi, jate 
such a possibility. To this end, the Mann-Whitney Test is 
appropriate because it enables us to determine whether the 
turnover of the two sets of f irms is drawn from populations which 
are oppositely skewed. 
Table VI-2 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney 
Test. It should be noted that the deviations from the mean of 
each data set for each observation were computed and used in this 
test. The test proceeded along the following lines: 
The deviations from the means are first combined and then 
ranked from smallest to largest; 
if the two sets of deviations have the same distribution, 
then their sample distribution of ranks should be similar. 
On the other hand, if one of the sets has more than its 
share of small or large ranks,, then their sample 
distribution of ranks should be different; 
iii) the test provides the observed significance level which is a 
test for the equality of their sample distribution of ranks. 
In this case,, Table VI-2 shows that ttie mean ranks of 
the deviations are almost the satue and the observed significance 
level is 0.980. Hence the results support the hypothesis that 
the turnover of the two sets of firms are drawn from the same 
populations concerning their properties of skewness. 
Therefore,, the results of this investigation are 
consistent with the hypothesis that there are no significant 
differences in the means, variances and distributions of turnover 
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TABLE Vl-c'- 
MAN',. '-WHI TNEY U- WILCOXON RANK SU4 W TEST 
rOP THE TWC-SAYPLE Dr_VIATIONS FROM 
THE MEANS OF TUPNIVER 
T 
BY TC 
MEAN RANK CASES 
-' 5 607 TC =1 63 7. C- %- 
607.75 6r., 7 TC =2 
1214 TOTAL 
CORRECTED FOR TIES 
uwz 21-TAILED P 
1-9407-7.0 366601.0 -J. Ll? 530.9301 
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between the two sets of firms. Accordingly, the main factor 
which has a very strong influence on the level of reported income 
for most firms has been effectively controlled. Since the 
industry variable has also been controlled, the implication is 
that significant differences in the average profitability rates 
are more likely to be attributable to accounting differences. 
2. Hypotheses Regarding Profitability Rates 
In Chapter IV,, four potential variables which might 
influence the reported income were identified. These variables 
are: 
1. Exceptional items and other ordinary income including other 
operating income; 
Finance charges; 
Tax charges, and; 
4. Extraordinary items. 
In this stage, only the last three variables are 
considered and hence it is assumed that the net difference in all 
other ordinary income and exceptional items between the two sets 
of firms is negligible. This assumption will be relaxed in the 
second stage of the analysis. Table VI-3 shows the output from 
T-test analysis for the sample of firms. This table includes 
five variables as follows: 
1. T is the average Turnover; 
2. PRI1 is the average profitability rate of income Il which is 
the average of ordinary income before finance and tax 
charges over turnover for each observation; 
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3. PR12 is the average profitability rate of income 12 which is 
the average of ordinary income before tax charges over 
turnover for each observation; 
4. PR13 is tne average profitability rate of income 13 which is 
the average of ordinary income over turnover for each 
observation; 
5. PR14 is the average profitability rate of income 14 which is 
the average of net income over turnover for each 
observation. 
These five variables are shown in the left side of 
Table VI-3 and it should be noted that the results concerning 
turnover are the same as those shown in table VI-1. 
With respect to the profitability rates, the table 
shows that the equality hypothesis of the means of the two 
populations is rejected for all profitabilitY rates. Also the 
direction of the differences indicates that the set of listed 
firms is reporting higher average profitability rates than the 
set of unlisted firms and the phenomenon of listed firms 
reporting higher average profitability rates persisted across the 
different classifications of reported income considered at this 
stage. Table VI-4 presents a comparison between the means of the 
profitability rates in the two sets of firms. This table shows 
that the average profitability rate of listed firms ranges from 
128% to 137% of that reported by unlisted firms. Also it shows 
that the gap between the average profitability rates decreases 
when finance, tax and extraordinary charges are included 
separately and collectively. It may be worthwhile to determine 
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Table VI-4 
Coinparisons of the Average Profitability Rates 
Between the Two Sets of Firms 
2 3 
Profitability Unlisted Listed 2/1 
Rates Firms Firms % 
PRI1 0.0458 0.0627 137% 
PR12 0.0386 0.0518 134% 
PR13 0.0248 0.0327 132% 
PR14 0.0252 0.0323 128% 
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whether there is a significant difference in the effective tax 
rate between the two sets of firms. The average effective tax 
rates are approximately 36% and 37% for unlisted and listed firms 
respectively. * 
The decrease in the gap between the prof italDility rates 
shown in Table VI-4 is also shown in Table VI-3 by ttie increase 
in the T value. For the rate PRI1. the T value is -6.56, while 
for the rate PR12 it is -5.12 and so on. Hence, the changes in 
the T value can be used to highlight the changes across the 
different profitability rates. 
It is also important to examine the possibility that 
the set of listed firms includes a reasonable percentage of firms 
which attempt to increase and those which attempt to decrease 
reported income but the overall average suggests increasing 
behaviour. If such a possibility exists, then the coefficient Of 
variation of profitability rate among listed firms is expected to 
be higher tnan that of unlisted firms. In other words, the 
existence of the two strategies among listed firms will lead to a 
flatter distribution of observations around the mean than would 
otherwise have appeared. The coefficient of variation is the 
he standard deviation of a given data set as a result of tI 
proportion of the mean of that data set. 
Taole VI-5 presents the coefficient of variation of 
profitability rates. In this regard, the means of tbe 
-- -------------------------------------------------------------- 
To calculate the average effective tax rate, the following 
equation was used. Average effective tax rate = PR12 - PR13 
PRI 2 
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Table VI-5 
Comparisons of the Coefficient of Variation Between 
the Two Sets of Firms 
Coefficient of 
Variation (COV) 
Unlisted 
Firms 
Listed 
Firms 
(1) COV for PRII 0.97 0.57 
(2) COV for PR12 1.10 0.69 
(3) COV for PR13 1.05 0.67 
(4) COV for PR14 1.03 0.77 
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profitability rates for each firm was calculated to exclude the 
variation within the firm and then the mean and the standard 
deviation were computed. This table shows that the coefficient 
of variation among unlisted firms is higher than that among 
listed firins for all profitability rates. Accordingly, the 
profitability rates among listed firms are more concentrated 
around their means than those of unlisted firms. Hence the 
majority of listed firms are reporting relatively higher 
prof itability rates. 
Therefore, the findings of the relatively long period 
(on average more than nine accounting periods) support the 
proposition that listed firms are reporting higher average 
profitability rates than unlisted firms of similar size and 
industry. Furthermore, the majority of listed firms report 
relatively higher profitability rates. But the average 
profitability rates discussed so far include, among others, the 
net of all other ordinary revenues and exceptional items. In the 
previous analysis, it was assumed that the net difference in such 
itEms between the two sets of firms is negligible. Hence, the 
possibility that this assumption is not valid must be considered 
and this is one of the major objectives of the second stage of 
the analysis which will be presented later in this chapter. 
3. Modifying the Period Under Examination 
Here it is of interest to see whether the findings of 
this stage differ if the period under examination is modified to 
include only the last three years. One of tne aims of such 
modification is to determine whether the movement from the 
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relatively long period to the relatively short period is 
justif iable. 
Table VI-6 presents the output of T-test analysis for 
the sample using the data of the last three accounting periods. 
As far as turnover is concerned, the table shows that the two 
sets of firms have means drawn from the same population and the 
observed significance level is 0.719, which is higher than that 
of the relatively long period. Also, it shows that the equality 
hypothesis of the average profitability rate is rejected for the 
first three profitability rates,, while it is accepted for the 
fourth rate at the observed significance level of 0.076. In all 
cases, the direction of the differences indicates that listed 
firins report higher average profitability rates than those of 
unlisted f irms and the gap between the rates decreases when 
finance, taxes and extraordinary charges are included separately 
and collectively. This decrease explains the acceptance of the 
equality hypothesis for PR14 as it is shown by the increase in T 
values. 
Table VI-7 presents a comparison between the means of 
the average profitability rates in the two sets of firms. This 
table shows that the average profitability rates of listed firms 
range from 128% to 145% of those reported by unlisted firms. By 
comparing the last column of this table with that of Table VI-4, 
we find that the gap between the average profitability rates has 
increased from 137% to 145% for PRI1 and from 134% to 139% for 
PR12 while it remains approximately the same for the rates PR13 
and PR14. Also these tables show that for each set of firms, 
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Table VI- 
Canparisons of the Average Profitability Rates for the 
Last Three Acc. Periods 
Profitability 
Rates 
Unlisted 
Firms 
2 
Listed 
Firms 
3 
2/1 
M 
PRI1 0.0397 0.0576 145% 
PR12 0.0325 0.0453 139% 
PR13 0.0224 0.0297 133% 
PR14 0.0214 0.0273 128% 
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there is,, surprisingly, a slight decrease in all profitability 
rates for the last three years for which no ex2lanation can be 
offered. In Table VI-6, the direction of the differences in the 
average profitability rates indicates that listed firms report on 
average higher rates than those reported by unlisted firms and 
hence the findings of the relatively short period are consistent 
with those of the relatively long period as far as the purpose of 
this research is concerned. Therefore, it is justifiable to use 
the last three years data for further analysis. 
In summary, the findings of this stage are consistent 
with the hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the 
means of the profitability rates between listed and unlisted 
firms of similar size and industry. Furthermore,, the direction 
of the differences indicates that listed firms are reporting 
significantly higher average profitability rates than those 
reported by unlisted firms. Also, the findings of the relatively 
short period are consistent with those of the relatively long 
period. In the next stage,, the robustness of such findings will 
be tested and the nature of the differences in the reported 
income will be examined. 
Stage II: Further Analysis 
The purpose of this stage is two-fold: 
1. To test the robustness of the findings of the first stage; 
2. To provide further investigations with regard to the nature 
of the differences in the reported income. 
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Accordingly, this stage consists of four sections. The 
first section includes the results after relaxing the assumption 
made in the first stage: that the net difference in other 
ordinary revenues and exceptional items between the two sets of 
firms is negligible. The aim is to determine whether the 
relaxation of such an assumption contributes to explaining the 
differences in the average profitability rates between the two 
sets of f irms. The second section includes the results of 
classifying the sample of firms according to three main sectors 
namely retailing, manufacturing and construction. The aim is to 
determine whether the same phenomenon exists across these 
sectors. The third section provides an examination of the 
observed differences in the average profitability rate between 
the two sets of f irms through analysing the relevant costs of the 
two sets of firms. The aim is to determine the potential areas 
of accounting differences. Also this section will include an 
overall summary of this stage. The final section will include 
the conclusions of this chapter. 
1. Testing the Robustness of the Findings 
To relax the assumption made in the first stage,, all 
other revenues and exceptional items were excluded from ordinary 
income before finance and tax charges, to arrive at Adjusted 
Trading Profit I for each observation in the data set. In the 
sample,, the most frequent items are other income (expenses), 
profit on sales of fixed assets, redundancy costs, reorganisation 
costs, shares of prof it (losses) of associated companies, income 
froin fixed investments, amount written off fixed investments and 
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interest receivable. Table VI-8 presents the output of the T- 
test analysis of Turnover (T), average profitability rate of 
adjusted trading profit (PRI) and the average profitability rate 
of ordinary income before finance and tax charges (PRIl) which 
has been reproduced for comparison. This table shows that the 
equality hypothesis is also rejected for the new rate PRI. In 
fact, the gap between the average profitability rates of the two 
sets o irms has increased from 145% for PRI1 to 154% for PRI. 
Therefore,, other revenues and exceptional items have not 
contributed to explain the differences in the average 
profitability rates between the two sets of firms and this 
supports the f indings of the first stage. 
2. Results According to Main Activity 
In tihis section, the sample of firms is classified 
according to three sectors based on the main activity. The 
reported results of each sector are analysed to determine whether 
the same phenomenon exists across such sectors. It is worth 
noticing that the sample includes 54 retailing, 48 manufacturing 
and 26 construction firms and hence the sub-samples are small in 
terms of sample size. 
Table-VI-9 presents the output of the T-test analysis 
for turnover (T),, the average probability rate of adjusted 
trading profit (PRI) and the average profitability rate of 
ordinary income before finance and tax charges (PRIl) in the 
retailing sector. This table shows that the equality hypothesis 
is accepted for the means of turnover, while it is rejected for 
both profitability rates. Also the direction of the differences 
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in icates that the listed firms report higher average prof it- 
ability rates. The percentages of the average profitability 
rates between the two sets of f irms are 159% for PRI and 152% for 
PRIL These percentages are slightly higher than the percentages 
of the whole sample and hence, potential areas of accounting 
differences in the retailing sector are of interest and this will 
be discussed in the third section of this stage. 
Table VI-10 presents the output of the T-test analysis 
for tunover (T),, and the average profitability rates PRI and PRI1 
in the manufacturing sector. This table shows that the equality 
hypothesis is accepted for the means of turnover and it is also 
accepted for the average profitability rates PRI and PRI1 at the 
observed significance levels of 0.090 and 0.165 respectively. 
The directions of the differences in these profitability rates 
indicates that listed firms report in absolute terms higher 
profitability rates,, but the differences are statistically not 
sufficiently significant to reject the equality hypothesis at the 
chosen significant level, i. e. > 0.05. The percentages of the 
average profitability rates between the two sets of firms are 
129% and 121% for PRI and PRII respectively. These percentages 
are far below the percentages of the whole sample, but they are 
sufficiently large to raise suspicions which require further 
investigation. In this regard,, the possibility of mis- 
classifications within the profit and loss accounts in the 
manufacturing sector is a potential area of accounting 
differences because it was found that listed firms report on 
average higher extraordinary charges than those reported by 
unlisted f irms. If extraordinary charges are calculated as a 
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percentage of the average profitability rates of ordinary income, 
it is found that the percentages are 7% and 9% for unlisted and 
listed respectively. Although these differences might be real 
because of the magnitude of the difference and the nature of 
extraordinary items, the possibility of misclassification within 
the profit and loss accounts is worth considering because it 
might contribute to the explanation of some of the differences in 
the other profitability rates between the two sets of firms and 
hence it will be discussed in the third section of this stage. 
Table VI-11 presents the output of the T-test analysis 
for turnover (T),, and the average profitability rates PRI and 
PRI1 in the construction sector. This table shows that the 
ecniality hypothesis is accepted for the means of turnover while L- 
it is rejected for the two profitability rates. The direction of 
the differences indicates that listed firms report higher average 
profitability rates than unlisted firms. The percentages of the 
average profitability rates between the two sets of firms are 
216% and 198% for PRI and PRII respectively. These percentages 
are far above the percentages of the whole sample and hence 
potential areas of accounting differences in this sector must be 
considered. Furthermore,, there are strong indications of 
misclassifications within the profit and loss accounts in this 
sector because it was found that listed f irms report on average 
higher extraordinary charges than that reported by unlisted 
firms. As a percentage of the average profitability rate of 
ordinary income, the extraordinary charges are 18% for listed 
firms, while they are only 5% for unlisted firms. Hence the 
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magnitude of the difference is sufficiently large and it -nust be 
considered. 
In summary, the sample of firms was divided into three 
sub-samples according to the main activity. The overall results 
indicate that listed firms report relatively higher average 
profitability rates in the three sectors,, but there are 
significant differences in the degree where it is the highest 
ainong construction firms and the lowest among manufacturing 
i rm s. Furtnermore,, several areas of potential accounting 
differences were highlighted and they will be discussed in the 
following section of this stage. 
3. The Nature of the Differences in the Profitability Rates 
In this section, an attempt is made to investigate the 
nature of the differences in the average profitability rates 
between the two sets of firms. The aim of this investigation is 
to identify potential areas of accounting differences. In this 
regard, adjusted trading prof it is the focus of this 
investigation for the following reasons: 
i) Adjusted trading prof it is inore relevant to the level of 
turnover than any of the other income classifications; 
ii) Any differenCes in adjusted trading profit týetween the two 
sets of firms are automatically reflected in all other 
income classifications considered in tnis research; 
iii) The gap in the average profitability rates of adjusted 
trading profit was the largest of all the other rates 
considered in this research and hence, there should be 
significant accounting differences between the two sets of 
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firms before arriving at adjusted trading profit. 
Therefore, there is a need to examine those costs which 
had been charged against turnover to arrive at adjusted trading 
prof it. In this regard, adjusted trading profit has been defined 
as gross profit after charging distribution, general and 
achinistrative expenses including depreciation, directors' 
remuneration and audit fees. It should be noted that other 
operating income, exceptional items and other income (expenses) 
are excluded from the above definition. Thus adjusted trading 
profit is the result of turnover less the above mentioned costs 
and these costs are referred to as related costs. While the 
means of turnover of the two sets of f irms were found to be 
identical, listed firms produced higher average profitability 
rates of adjusted trading profit than those produced by unlisted 
firms. Hence, the turnover of listed firms must be matched with 
lower related costs than the turnover of unlisted firms. And 
since related costs include those which change proportionally 
with the change in turnover (variable costs) and those which 
remain relatively constant over considerable range of turnover 
(fixed costs), it is essential to know whether the observed 
differences in related costs are the results of differences in 
variable costs and/or fixed costs. Knowing the source of such 
differences wili provide more insights with regard to the 
potential areas of accounting differences between the two sets of 
firms. To this end,, it is feasible to analyse the relationship 
between related costs and turnover in the two sets of firms. To 
do so, the relationship between related costs and turnover is 
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presented in its simple form as follows: 
RC = A, + B, . 
where: 
RC is related costs 
Al is constant to be estimated (intercept) 
B, is constant to be estimated (slope) 
T is annual turnover 
Since A, is the average of those costs which do not 
change directly with change in turnover, it can be used as a 
proxy of the average of fixed costs. Furthermore, B, is the 
average of marginal costs and hence B, can be used as a proxy of 
the average variable costs for each one pound of turnover. 
Accordingly,, the size of fixed costs can be measured by the size 
of A, and the size of the variable costs can be measured by the 
size of B, times turnover. Therefore, the objective is to 
determine whether the relationship between related costs and 
turnover,, measured in terms of A, and B, is significantly 
different between the two sets of firms for A,, B, or both. 
To test for differences between the two sets of firms, 
the original model has to be modified as follows: 
1) The original model suggests that: 
RC = Al + B, . 
ii) Two additional variables can be introduced as follows: 
0 if the firm is unlisted 
D= 
1 if the firm is listed 
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i i) 
iii) Then the overall regression model will be: 
RC = A, + Bi .T+ A2 .D+ B2 . D, (1) 
iv) If the firm is unlisted, the model becomes: 
RC = A, + B, .T (2) 
V) If the firm is listed, the model becomes: 
RC = (Al + A2) + (Bl + B2) .T (3) 
If model (2) is not significantly different from model 
(3), then A2 and B2 are not significantly different from zero, on 
the other hand, if Model (2) is significantly different from 
model (3), then A2 and/or B2 are significantly different from 
zero and hence there is a difference in the relationship between 
related costs and turnover between the two sets of firms. If 
there is a significant difference in A2 then there is a 
difference in the intercept, namely fixed costs, while if there 
is a significant difference in B2,1 then there is a difference in 
the slope,, namely marginal costs. Accordingly, the task is to 
test for A2 and B2 and hence, the stepwise regression offered by 
the (SPSSx) is an appropriate tool to use. 
Table VI-12 presents the results of the stepwise 
regression obtained from model (1). This table shows that there 
is a significant difference in the slope between model (2) and 
(3),, while there is no significant difference in the intercept 
between the two models. 
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The estimated regression model is: 
RC = -1325.5 + 0.986 (T) - 0.0134 (Dj) 
Hence: 
1. For an unlisted firm the model is: 
RC = -1325.5 + 0.986 (T) 
For a listed firm the model is: 
RC = -1325.5 + 0.973 (T) 
These models show that the average variable costs of 
listed firms are lower than those of unlisted firms and the 
difference is 0.0134. Accordingly, there is a difference in the 
variable costs between the two sets of firms, while there is no 
significant difference in the average fixed costs. Therefore, it 
is worthy to know the percentage of the difference in ttke- average 
profitability rate of adjusted trading profit between the two 
sets of firms, that can be explained by the difference in 
variable costs. According to Table VI-8,, tne average 
profitability rates of adjusted trading profit are 0.0487 and 
0.0317 for listed and unlisted firms respectively and hence the 
difference in the average profitability rate between the two sets 
of f irms is 0.017. If the difference in the average variable 
costs is compared with the difference in the average 
profitability rates, the former explains approximately 80% of the 
latter. Therefore,, the conclusion is that the potential area of 
accounting differences is more likely to be within the domain of 
181 
accounting procedures for variable costs. And since related 
costs with regard to adjusting trading profit include costs of 
sales, distribution costs, general and administrative expenses, 
elaboration upon these items is needed. 
1) Cost of Sales: In most enterprises the cost of goods or 
services sold is the single most significant cost category. 
In retail establishments, this category includes the cost of 
purchased merchandise as well as certain expenses which are 
directly related to this merchandise, while in manufacturing 
and construction firms, it includes materials, labour and 
overheads. Most costs in this category tend to be variable 
in nature. To determine the cost of sales for a given 
accounting period, the problems of inventory valuation 
arise. In this context, the basic principle of inventory 
valuation is that it be valued at "the lower of cost or net 
realisable value". This simple phrase belies the 
complexities and the variety of alternatives to which it is 
subject. This variety can,, in turn, lead to significantly 
different figures of periodic income all within the domain 
of generally accepted accounting principles. In spite of 
its importance in the determination of reported income, the 
matters of what costs are included in inventory and what 
assumptions are made with regard to the flow of inventory 
costs through a firm are only rarely discussed or disclosed 
in published financial statements. In fact, the majority of 
fin-ns considered in the present study didn't disclose more 
than the basic principle of inventory valuation (i. e. the 
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lower of cost or net realisable value). Therefore, 
inventory valuation is a major potential area of accounting 
differences between the two sets of firms. In this context,, 
the problems of evaluating the work in process in long term 
contracts are part of the inventory valuation. 
ii) Other Expenses: Among the other expenses are distribution 
expenses. In this regard, the management discretion is 
limited because these costs are mainly considered as 
per lo - ic expenses and this is also true in the case of 
advertising expenses. The remaining expenses include 
general, administrative and others such as depreciation, 
audit fees. Most costs in this category tend to be fixed in 
nature. This is largely true of depreciation as well as of 
administrative costs which include significant amounts of 
salaries and occupancy expenditure. And since there was no 
significant difference in fixed cost between the two sets of 
firms, the possibility of significant accounting differences 
with regard to this category is minimal. Although 
depreciation may seem to be a potential area of accounting 
differences between the two sets of firms, the existence of 
capital allowances in the U. K. might have contributed to 
narrow the accounting differences,, but the possibility of 
differences cannot entirely be eliminated. 
In the previous section of this chapter, the 
possibility of misclassifications within the profit and loss 
account has been introduced as a potential area of accounting 
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differences, especially in the construction sector where it was 
found that the ratio of extraordinary charges to the average 
profitability rate of ordinary income is far greater among listed 
ir-ms than among unlisted firms. Furthermore, for the whole 
sample, extraordinary charges constitute around 8% of ordinary 
income in the listed firms, while it is around 4.5% in unlisted 
f irms. The accounting for, and the presentation of, 
extraordinary items has always been subject to personal 
judgement. In this regard,, R. Ashton examined SSAP 6 and 
concluded that a clearer distinction needs to be made between 
extraordinary and exceptional items. 1 Thus tnis area of 
accounting gives management considerable discretion about what 
might or might not be considered as extraordinary items and hence 
extraordinary items can become one of the means by which 
managements attempt to modify the reported operating results. 
Accordingly, misclassification within the profit and loss 
accounts remains one of the potential areas of accounting 
differences between the two sets of firms. 
In summary,, the findings of this stage are consistent 
with the findings of the previous stage. The assumption made in 
the previous stage was examined and found to be a reasonable 
assumption. Also,, the sample of firms was classified according 
to three inain activities, namely retailing, manufacturing and 
construction. In this regard, the overall results revealed that 
-------------------------- ------------------------ 
Ashton,, R., U. K. Financial Accounting Standards,, A 
Descriptive and Analytical Approach, Woodhead-Faulkner Ltd., 
Cambridge,, 1983,, p. 83. 
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listed firms reported relatively higher average prof itabi i ity 
rates than unlisted firms in the three sectors but there are 
significant differences in degree. The gap between the 
profitability rates was largest in the construction sector and 
smallest in the manufacturing sector. When the hypothesis tnat 
listed firms report higher average profitability rates than 
unlisted firms was tested at a significance level of 0.025, the 
findings were consistent with this hypothesis in retailing and 
construction sectors, while it was rejected in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Furthermore, the nature of the differences in the 
average profitabilitY rates of adjusted trading profit was 
examined to identify major sources of such differences. The 
results indicated that listed f irms reported lower average 
variable cost tftan unlisted firms. 
Also,, two potential areas of accounting differences 
were discussed, namely inventory valuation including accounting 
for long term contracts and misclass if icat ions of items within 
profit and loss accounts. The following section provides an 
overall summary and the conclusions of this chapter. 
Conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter was to determine 
whether listed firms tend to increase reported income, while 
unlisted firms tend to decrease theirs. Accordingly, it was 
hypothesised that there is a significant difference in the 
average profitability rate between listed and unlisted firms of 
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similar size and industry. 
In order to increase the likelihood that the 
differences in the average profitability rates are attributable 
to accounting differences, the hypothesis that there are no 
significant differences in the means, variances and distributions 
of the two sets of f irms' turnover was tested and it was strongly 
supported. Furthermore,, several accounting periods were 
considered to enhance comparability between firms. Additionally, 
several variables that might influence the reported results of 
the two sets of f irms were considered through analysing several 
income classifications. 
The findings of this research are consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the means of 
profitability rates between the two sets of firms. Furthermore, 
the magnitude and the direction of the differences in the 
profitability rates indicate that listed f irms reported higher 
average profitability rates than unlisted firms. Also, the 
observations of the profitability rates among listed firms are 
more concentrated around their mean than those of unlisted f irms, 
for all profitaoility rates considered in this research. 
It may therefore be concluded that the findings of this 
research provide support to the proposition that listed firms 
tend to increase their reported income if compared with unlisted 
firms of similar size and industry. 
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Chapter VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter consists of three sections. The f irst 
section includes a restatement of the objectives and 
justifications of this research. The second section provides a 
summary of the approach adopted and the results of both the 
theoretical and empirical parts of this research. The third 
section is devoted to the conclusions which may be drawn f rom the 
present study. 
Objectives and Justifications 
This research was undertaken to ascertain whether users 
of annual reported income are receiving measurement of past 
activity that is free frcm management bias. To this end, an 
attempt was made to provide an answer to the following main 
issue: 
Do managers act to use accounting alternatives to serve non- 
accounting ends? 
In this regard, literature suggests that there are at 
least three possible non-accounting ends which might be sought as 
follows: 
1. Managers may seek to increase early reported income at the 
expense of future reported income; 
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Managers may seek to decrease early reported income to 
benefit future reported income; 
Managers may seek to smooth reported income so as to report 
a stream of income with a smaller variation from a 
predetermined trend than would otherwise have appeared. 
Therefore, the aim of this research was to investigate 
whether the above reporting strategies are in fact sougnt and 
whether they appear actually to be obtained. To this end, it was 
assumed that f irms seek to maximise shareholders wealth and the 
management of af irm adhere very closely to this assumption. 
Furthermore,, the dichotomy of listed and unlisted enabled us to 
relate the management of reported income to the motivation of 
their owners rather than being dependent upon the degree of 
management's ownership. This is to say that managers of listed 
and unlisted firms, whether owner or not,, are assumed to act in 
the interest of shareholders. 
Additionally, the following related issues were also 
addressed in this research: 
1. Why, theoretically, might managers seek to "manage" reported 
income in the three manners outlined above (a search for 
incentives)? 
2. Can, theoretically, such behaviour be expected to be 
successful (a search for means available to management)? 
Is there empirical evidence to suggest that such behaviour 
occurs (review of related literature)? 
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This research is about the quality of accounting 
information available to the public. And since there is always a 
public demand for a high quality of accounting information, this 
study is in the public interest. Furthermore, on the empirical 
side tnis phenomenon was not previously adequately examined in 
the U. K. situation and hence it is hoped that this research will 
contribute to the closing of such a gap in the literature. 
Sumary 
This research consisted of two parts: namely, the 
theoretical and the empirical. The second and the third chapters 
were devoted to the theoretical part, while the remaining 
chapters describe the methodology and the results of the 
empirical investigation. Accordingly, these two parts are 
sumarised in turn. 
In the theoretical part of this research,, an attempt 
was made: 
i) to identify the roots of the theoretical propositions for 
empirical investigation, and 
ii) to assess management's ability to manipulate reported 
results through accepted accounting means. 
To this end, two major propositions were theoretically 
investigated. The first proposition was that managers have 
incentives to manipulate reported results, while the second 
proposition was that managers are able to manipulate reported 
results through acceptable accounting means. Accordingly, the 
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approach adopted in this part of the present study was oasically 
an analytical review of the available literature irl these areas. 
In Chapter II,, the first proposition was examined. In 
this regard, a brief review of several theories of the firm was 
conducted with particular emphasis on the motivational 
foundations of such theories. More specifically, an attempt was 
i, nade to provide an answer to a number of questions which include: 
1. What is: 
i) The main objective of the f irm; 
ii) The profit concept; and 
iii) The firm concept? 
2. To what extent do managers have discretion under the 
corporate system? 
3. What might be an alternative objective of the firm under 
such a system? 
4. How does management achieve such objectives? 
Also the broad implications of alternative theories of 
the firm were presented, as were previous studies which provide 
interpretations of those implications, particularly related to 
accounting reports. 
Furthermore, recent development in the theory of the 
f irm and their implications on the present study were considered 
with more emphasis on the U. K. situation. Also certain 
properties of listed and unlisted firms were discussed. 
The results of this review provide theoretical support 
to the proposition that managers of listed f irms are L-nore likely 
to smooth and increase reported income, wnile managers of 
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unlisted firms are more likely to decrease reported income. 
In Chapter III, the second proposition, that is that 
managers are able to manipulate reported results through 
acceptable accounting means,, was examined. In this regard, the 
development of accounting rules of measurement and the state of 
accounting practice were analytically reviewed. In such a 
review,, attempts were made to provide answers to the following 
main questions: 
1. How did the present accounting rules of measurement evolve? 
2. What is the present mode of setting accounting standards? 
3. What are the underlying assumptions of the present mode of 
setting such standards? 
4. What are the implications of such a mode? 
The analytical review presented in this research 
supports the proposition that managers are able to manipulate 
reported results through acceptable accounting means under 
present accounting practice. 
In the empirical part of this research, an attempt was 
made to investigate whether the increase of, the decrease of 
and/or the smoothing of reported income were actually practised. 
In this regard,, the main hypothesis was that there are major 
differences between listed and unlisted firms regarding the 
criteria of choice among accounting alternatives and hence 
differences should exist between certain properties of their 
reported results. Accordingly, the approach adopted in this part 
of the present study was an analysis of the reported results of 
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two sets of firms, wherein one set represented listed firms, 
while the other represented unlisted firms. The aim of the 
analysis was to determine the relative adherence of one set, 
compared with the other, to one or more of these reporting 
strategies. In order to enhance the comparability between the two 
sets of firms in the sample, the following steps were taken: 
1. The two sets of firms were matched in terms of size and 
industry on a firm for firm basis; 
2. The variables which might lead to real differences in the 
level of reported income between firms of similar size and 
industry were considered, using several income definitions 
in the analysis in order to account for such variables; 
3. Each f irm was represented by data for several accounting 
periods to diversify random differences within the firm; 
4. Each set of firms included 64 firms to diversify random 
differences across firms; 
5. The effectiveness of controlling for turnover, being the 
major source of revenue, was tested. 
Based on the main hypothesis of this research an 
attempt was made to determine the relative adherence of listed 
and unlisted firms to one or more of the following reporting 
strategies: 
i) the smoothing of reported income strategy, 
ii) the increase of early reported income strategy, 
the decrease of early reported income strategy. 
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To this end, two principal sets Of hypotheses were 
developed and tested. These sets are restated below. 
The first set consisted of two hypotheses regarding the 
income smoothing phenomenon. The null hypothesis stated that: 
the proportion of listed firms with relatively smooth income 
streams is not significantly different from that of unlisted 
f irms, 
while the alternative hypothesis stated that: 
the proportion of listed f ims with relatively smooth income 
streams is significantly higher than that of unlisted firms. 
The second set consisted of two principal hypotheses 
regarding increase and decrease of ealy reported income. The 
null hypothesis stated that: 
there is no significant difference in the means of the 
profitability rates of the two sets of finus 
while the alternative hypothesis stated that: 
there is a significant difference in the means of the 
profitability rates of the two sets of firms. 
The result from testing these principal hypotheses and other sub- 
hypotheses are outlined in the following sections. 
In Chapter V,, the possibility of an income smootning 
pnenomenon among listed firms was examined. To this en . it was 
hypothesised that the proportion of listed f irms with relatively 
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smooth income streams would be significantly higher than that of 
unlisted firms of similar size and industry. Based on the 
results presented from testing this hypothesis, the findings can 
be outlined as follows: 
1. the findings of this research are consistent with the above 
hypothesis for all objects of smoothing considered in this 
research; 
2. the findings indicate that ordinary income is the common 
object of smoothing among listed f irms; 
when the research criterion of smooth income was reduced 
from R2 > 0.80 to R2 > 0.70, the findings were consistent 
with the above hypothesis for all objects of smoothing 
considered in this research; 
4. when the period under examination was extended to more than 
five years, the findings were consistent with the above 
hypothesis with respect only to ordinary income and net 
income. 
Therefore, the findings of this research support the 
proposition that listed firms do smooth their reported income 
over time to a greater extent than do unlisted firms of similar 
size and industry. 
In Chapter VI,, trie possibility of increase and decrease 
of early reported income among the two sets of f irms was 
examined. To this end, it was hypothesised that there would be a 
significant difference in the means of the profitability rate 
between listed and unlisted firms of similar size and industry. 
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To ensure that such a difference is attributable to accounting 
differences, it was necessary: 
i) to test the hypothesis that there were no significant 
differences in the means, variances and distributions of 
turnover between the two sets of firms; a hypothesis was 
tested and strongly supported, and 
ii) to consider several income classifications. 
Also the possibiity of co-existence of increasing and 
decreasing strategies among listed firms was examined through 
hypothesising that listed firms would have a higher coefficient 
of variation of the average profitability rate than would 
unlisted firms. 
Based on the results from testing these hypotheses, the 
findings can be outlined as follows: 
1. The findings of this research are consistent with the 
hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the 
means of profitability rates between listed and unlisted 
finns of similar size and industry; 
2. The magnitude and the direction of the differences indicate 
that listed firms report significantly higher average 
profitability rates than those reported by unlisted firms; 
3. The observations of profitability rates ainong listed firms 
are more concentrated around their , -neans than are those of 
unlisted firms; 
4. When the sample of firms was classified according to their 
main activities, namely retailing, manufacturing and 
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construction, the overall results revealed that listed 
firms reported relatively higher average profitability rates 
than did unlisted firms in the three sectors, but there were 
significant differences between these activities. In this 
regard the gap in profitability rates between listed and 
unlisted firms was largest in the construction sector and 
smallest in the manufacturing sector; 
5. When the nature of the difference in the profitability rates 
was examined, the findings indicated that the domain of 
variable cost was the most likely source of such a 
difference. 
Therefore, the findings of this research support the 
proposition that listed firms tend to increase their reported 
income while unlisted firms tend to decrease theirs. 
Finally it must be noted that the present study uses 
statistical analysis of samples in order to draw conclusions 
about the whole population of listed and unlisted firms. While 
these samples are considered to be large enough to draw such 
conclusions as have been drawn, the conclusion must be seen 
within the statistical framework from which they have emerged and 
should not be relied upon to assert that any particular listed 
(or unlisted) firm at any particular time will be acting in such 
a way with a definable probability. 
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Conclusions 
This research was conducted based on the belief that 
managers,, whether owner or not,, use the existing diversity in 
accounting principles to manage reported income. To test this 
Fl, -edief, three assumptions were developed and examined. These 
assumptions are: 
1. that managers have incentives to manipulate reported 
results; 
that managers are able to manipulate reported results 
through acceptable accounting means; and 
3. tnat managers succeeded in their attempt to manipulate 
reported results. 
In the process of examining the above metnioned 
assumptions, the dichotomy of listed and unlisted firms was used 
based on the belief that there is a difference in the motivation 
of their owners. The following conclusions were reached through 
this research: 
1. managers have incentives to fnaniPulate reported results; 
2. managers are able to manipulate reported results through 
acceptable accounting means; 
3. managers appear to be successful in their attempt to 
manipulate reported results. 
It is therefore justifiable to conclude that users are 
receiving measurement of past activity that is not free from 
management bias. 
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EPILOGUE 
This research made practical, regulatory and academic 
contributions. These contributions are discussed in turn. 
Since on the empirical side this phenomenon had not 
previous y been studied adequately in the U. K. situation, the 
findings of this research may have a major contribution for most 
users of financial reports. For instance, the users can benefit 
from recognising the variable of management bias in their 
decision models. Alternatively,, they can benefit from the 
support that the findings of this research provide to tnose who 
advocate limiting the discretionary power of management over 
accounting matters. In short, the users of financial reports are 
the ultimate beneficiaries of this research. 
I 
Also, the findings of this research may assist the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in setting accounting 
standards. In this research it was suggested that there are 
three assumptions in the case of the present mode of setting 
accounting standards: * 
1. Management has no self interest in the outcomes of its 
accounting policy and hence the most appropriate accounting 
policy is expected to be applied; 
2. The various procedures and methods available to implement a 
given accounting principle are not alternatives, but merely 
----------------------------------------------------------- - 
See the third chapter of the present study, p. 81-82. 
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constitute the varying methods which are necessary to 
reflect varying sets of facts; 
3. There are no constraints regarding the auditor's position. 
Accordingly, the ASC can benefit from the findings of 
this research,, which indicate that the validity of these 
assumptions is subject to serious suspicion. 
Furthermore,, this research contributes to future 
research which may benef it from the development in methodology 
used in this research. Also, the way in which this research was 
conducted and the findings of this research have generated some 
ideas which might be considered for future research. These 
research possibilities are outlined below: 
1. This research highlighted the inadequacy of present 
accounting disclosures and hence there is a need to improve 
them. Accordingly, future research may seek for ways to 
improve present accounting disclosures; 
2. A search for ways to strengthen the current auditor's 
position may constitute another area for future research; 
3. This research was based on the belief that there is a 
difference between the behaviour of accounting decision- 
makers in listed and unlisted firms. Accordingly, the 
behavioural aspects of accounting practice may constitute a 
wide potential area for future research; 
4. The possibility Of corporate lobbying which might affect the 
setting of accounting standards may constitute another area 
for future research. 
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List of the Firms in the Sample 
NAME MAIN ACTIVITY 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
COUTINHOr CARD Trading as steel, general and 
and Co. Ltd. machinery as well as construction 
of complete plants 
H. A. T. Group p1c. Supplying specialist services and 
materials to industry as well as to 
the public 
A. H. Philpot and Various aspects of farming and Sons Ltd. agriculture products 
AVANA GROUP p1c. Food processing industry 
JOHN E. WILTSHIER Builders, management and interior 
GROUP Ltd., and Sub contractors, joinery manufacturers, 
mechanical and electrical contrac- 
tors and property developers 
HAWLEY GROUP p1c. Security services, cleaning and 
maintenance services, home improve- 
ment and travel 
SHEPHERD Building 
GROUP Ltd. 
BROWN and JACKSON p1c. 
EDWARD BILLINGTON 
and Son Ltd. and Sub. 
Building and ancillary activities 
Various aspects of trading and 
building and property development 
Manufacturing of food stuff and 
packaging material 
10. STEEL BROTHER Holdings Food and catering, lime, aggregates 
p1c. and cement supplies, engineering 
and trading 
11. TENNANTS Consolidated Manufacturing and sale of chemicals 
Ltd. and chemical products 
12. HICKSON International 
13. C. E. F. Holdings Ltd. 
14. 
Manufacturing of chemicals, timber 
products and distribution of 
building materials 
Manufacturing and wholesalers of 
electrical goods 
R. H. P. GROUP p1c. Manufacturing andsa1es0f 
bearings, electrical products and 
fasteners 
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15. A. OPPENHEIMER and Engineering merchants, manufac- 
Co. Ltd. turers of smokers' pipes and allied 
goods 
16. AURORA GROUP PlC. Manufacturing and distribution of a 
wide range of precision engineering 
products and special steel 
17. RYLAND VEHICLE GROUP 
Ltd. and Sub. 
Distribution, repairing, servicing 
and hiring of motor vehicles 
18. T. C. HARRISON p1c. 
19. MARSHALL of CAMBRIDGE 
(Engineering Ltd. ) 
20. SENIOR ENGINEERING 
GROUP p1c. 
21. JOHNSON SILVER 
(Holdings Ltd. ) 
22. CLIFFORD'S DAIRIES 
p1c. 
23. WEETABIX Ltd 
Distribution, hiring and leasing of 
motor vehicles 
General engineering connected with 
aircraft and vehicle body building 
Includes three divisions: (1) light 
engineering division, (2) steel 
tube division, and (3) air handling 
and plastic division 
Wholesalers of meat, poultry, bacon 
and processors of meat 
Processing and distribution of 
milk, milk bared products and fruit 
juices and drinks 
Manufacturing and marketing of 
ready to eat cereals 
24. BERNARD MATTHEWS Production and marketing of turkey 
p1c. and red meat as well as grain 
trading and pet food production 
25. FENWICK Ltd The operation of department stores 
26. The H. SAMUEL GROUP multiple retail Jewellers 
of companies p1c. 
27. CRYSTAL of HULL Ltd. Dealers in motor vehicles, motor 
and general engineers and garage 
properties 
28. CAFFYNS p1c. Dealers in motor vehicles and 
related activities 
29. SYKES GROUPF Ltd. Fuel merchants, manufacturing and 
merchants of plastic and rubber 
products as well as construction 
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30. CHAMBERLAIN PHIPPS 
p1c. 
31. JAMES MILLER and 
partners p1c. 
32. M. J. GLEESON GROUP p1c. 
Manufacturing of adhesives, mastics 
and insulation cladding also 
supplying materials to footwear 
manufacturers 
Construction and related ancillary 
activities 
Construction and related ancillary 
activities 
33. FOOD BROKERS (HOLDINGS) Marketing, selling,, sales, service 
Ltd. and distribution of groceries, 
confectionary and chemical products 
34. COURTS (Furnishers) p1c. Retailing of household, carpets, 
bedding 
35. LONDIS (Holdings) Ltd. Wholesaler of provisions and 
groceries 
36. WATSON and PHILIP p1c. 
37. READSON Ltd and Sub. 
38. ILLINGWORTH,, MORRIS 
p1c. 
Distribution of food and ancillary 
products 
Merchants and manufacturers of 
fabrics and clothing 
Processing of wool and f ibres 
including the production of woollen 
and woven spun yarns, cloth and 
garments 
39. FRANK FEHR and Co. Ltd. Merchants and Broker of a wide 
range of products 
40. WARING and GILLOW 
(Holdings) p1c. 
Retailing of household furniture, 
carpets and men's clothing 
41. D. B. MARSHALL 
(Newbrdige) Ltd. 
42. MAYNARDS plC. 
43. D. C. THOMSON and Co 
Ltd* 
44. EAST MOLAND ALLIED 
PRESS p1c. 
45. WIGGLESWORTH AND CO. 
Ltd. 
Distribution and production of 
poultry 
Manufacturing and retailing of 
confectionary 
Printing and publishing of news- 
papers, magazines and books 
Printlng and publishing of news- 
papers and magazines also engaged 
in retailing 
Merchants of f ibres,, edible and 
other products. Also the present 
company holds investnent 
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46. GLASS GLOVER GROUP p1c. Fresh produce marketing and 
distribution service to super- 
markets also other consultancy 
services. 
47. MACMILLAN Ltd. and 
Sub. 
48. ASSOCIATED BOOK 
Publishers p1c. 
Pub ishing of books and periodicals 
Publishing and book selling 
49. WILLIAM GRANT and SON Distilling, blending, bottling and 
selling potable spirits 
50. MANSFIELD BREWERY p1c. Brewing,, manufacturing of soft 
drinks, wholesaling of beers, soft 
drinks, wines and spirits 
51. D. S. M. AUTO Ltd. Sales of new and used vehicles and 
other related services 
52. ARLINGTON MOTOR Distribution and trading of motor 
Holdings p1c. vehicles and other related 
operations 
53. M. and W. MACK Ltd. 
54. BASSETT FOODS p1c. 
55. WARBURTONS Ltd. 
56. ASSOCIATED FISHERIES 
p1c. 
57. JOHN WILLMOT Holdings 
Ltd e 
58. TILBURY GROUP p1c. 
59. B. H. BLACKWELL Ltd. 
Marketing and distribution of fresh 
fruit, vegetables and flowers 
Manufacturing,, distribution and 
sale of confectionery 
Manufacturing and distribution of 
food and other retailing activities 
Related to seafood as processors 
wholesalers, fast food, etc. 
Construction with investment in 
motor industry 
Construction industry with several 
divisions 
Retailing, bookselling and supply 
of periodicals 
60. The WEBSTERS GROUP p1c. Books distribution with ininor 
activity in publications and 
printing 
61. W. S. ATKINS GROUP Ltd. Consultancy services,, building 
design, cinic, structural and 
transportation engineering 
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62. WILSON (CONNOLLY) Private housin9, bui1ding 
Holdings p1c. contracting, property development 
and property investment 
63. HOW GROUP Ltd. Design, manufacturing, supply 
installations and maintenance of 
services to buildings 
64. The HENDERSON GROUP 
p1c. 
65. LAWS STORES Ltd 
66. PENTLAND INDUSTRY 
67. FUEST DAY LAWSON 
Holdings Ltd. 
Manufacturing and sale of garage 
doors, s1idingdoorgear, 
industrial and vehicle doors and 
security systems 
operating of supermarkets 
Trading with particular emphasis on 
shoes and clothing 
Trading in agricultural fertilisers 
feeding stuffs and others 
68. ELLIS and EVERARD Merchants of chemicals and also 
p1c. processor of chemicals to some 
extent 
69. BAYFORD and CO. Ltd. Distribution of solid fuel and oil 
products 
70. ERITH p1c. 
71. R. G. CARTER Holdings 
72. GALLIFORD p1c. 
73. TULLIS RUSSEL and 
Co. Ltd. 
74. The EAST LANCASHIRE 
PAPER Group, p1c. 
75. JOHN ELII--, IOTT Holdings 
Ltd. 
76. GRAMPIAN Holdings p1c. 
77. MINORIES Ltd. 
Distribution of materials as 
builders merchants 
Construction and related industries 
and include building and plant 
hire, the sale of builder's 
equipment and the production of 
aggregates and concrete products 
Construction with some engineering 
activities 
Manufacturers of paper for printing 
and converting industries 
Manufacturing, processing and mer- 
chants of paper 
Building, building services, 
property development and property 
investment 
Transport and construction with 
some retailing activities 
Motor dealers and hire purchase 
financiers 
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78. ALEXANDERS Holdings Motor dealers and related 
p1c. operations 
79. MAY GURNEY Holdings Civil engineering and ancillary 
Ltd. and Sub. services including distribution of 
heating fuel and supplying of 
building materials 
80. JOHN FOLKES HEFO p1c. Engineering with different 
specialists supplying building 
material and house builders 
81. SAMUEL BANNER and Vegetable oil refining and solvent 
Co. Ltd. blending 
82. CARRS MILLING Flour milling, the manufacturing of 
Industries p1c. animal f eed ing stuf f s, the 
production of bread and bakery 
products, also merchants for other 
products 
83. LANCER BOSS Group Design and manufacturing of lift 
Ltd. and Sub. trucks, light engineering and 
distribution of agriculture 
equipment 
84. WEST'S Group Civil engineering, process 
International p1c. engineering and other industrials 
85. THOMAS ROBERTS Trading in timber, read materials 
(Westminster) Ltd. and public work, concrete pipes and 
tunnels as well as electrical 
industries 
86. HEYWOOD WILLIAMS GROUP Manufacturing andsupp1yin9 
p1c. building materials 
87. PROSPER DEMULDER Ltd. Collection, processing and sales of 
animal by products 
88. STYLO GROUP p1c. Retailers and wholesalers of 
footwear 
89. EDRINGTON Holdings Ltd. Various factors of scotch whisky 
and Sub. industry 
90. MATTHEW CLARK and Sons 
p1c. 
Distribution, manufacturers of 
wines and spirits 
91. BELLING and CO. Ltd. Manufacturing andsa1eof 
electrical appliences, fabricated 
components and metal sections 
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92. W. CANNING Plc. Supply of chemicals,, metals and 
electronics to manufacturing 
industry and of refined silver 
93. JAMES LONGLEY Holdings Building and civil engineerinj 
Ltdo contractors as well as property 
developers 
94. WILLIAM LEECH p1c. House building, development, 
contracting and property investment 
95. G. E. WALLIS and SON Ltd. Building and civil engineering, 
property development, decorating, 
electrical eng i neer i ng and 
manufacturer of reconstructed stone 
products 
96. BOUSTHEAD p1c. Engineering of consumer and 
industrial products as well as 
investment in several activities 
97. A. F. BLAKEMORE and Son Wholesale distribution and 
Ltd. retailing of food-stuffs, groceries 
and similar products 
98. BENTALLS p1c. 
99. LLOYD MAUNDER Ltd. 
operation of department stores 
Wholesale and retailing of ineat, 
poultry, breeding of chicks, cattle 
and animal feed milling 
100. FEEDEX AGRICULTURAL 
INDUSTRIES and Sub. 
p1c. 
101. DEES of CROYDON Ltd. 
102. C. D. BRAMALL p1c. 
and Sub. 
103. FOSTER YEOMAN Ltd. 
104. PLANET Group p1c. 
105. TAGGARTS (MOTOR 
Holdings) Ltd. 
106. JESSUP p1c. 
Production of animal feeds and 
manufacturing of agricultural 
equipment 
Motor dealers and re1ated 
operations 
Motor dealers and re1ated 
operations 
Operate as limestone quarry owners, 
producing and distribution of read 
stone,, concrete aggregates and 
coated manadum 
Manufacturer of windows for railway 
coaches, motor vehicles and 
building industry 
Motor dea1ers and related 
operations 
Motor deaIers and related 
operations 
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107. FEIN and Co. Ltd. Dealing in furs and skins 
108. CHURCH and Co. p1c. Wholesale and retail distribution 
of footwear 
109. CLARKE SECURITIES Ltd. Development of residential housing 
and commercial property and the 
carrying out of construction 
contracts 
110. LONDON and MIDLAND Consumer products and home 
Industrials p1c. improvement, engineering and 
industrial services 
111. SAN DILLIFFE Garage Motor dealers and re1ated 
Ltd. operations 
112. STEAD and SIMPSON p1c. Motor trading and related 
and Sub. operations as well as footwear 
retailing 
113. MCNAB GROCERIES Ltd. Operation of wholesale cash and 
carry warehouses 
114. A. GOLDBERG and SONS 
p1c. 
operating of retailing stores 
115. R. MANSELL Ltd. and its Building contracting and property 
sub. 
116. The IDC Group p1c. Designing and constructing 
industrial and commercial building 
as well as property development 
117. IRELAND ALLOYS Holdings Processing of complex alloy scrap, 
Ltd. stainless steel and other metals 
118. RATCLIFFS (Great Bridge) Manufacturers of brass and copper 
p1c. strip 
119. JAMES-WALKER and CO Ltd. Manufacturing and sale of packing, 
paintings, seals, ]ackets and 
allied products 
120. PARKER KNOLL p1c. Manufacturing and supplying of 
furnishing 
121. KIRIL MICHEFF Holdings 
Ltd 9 
122. JAMES BEATTIE p1c. 
123. MCARTHUR Group Ltd. 
Trading in processed and semi 
processed food products 
Operation of retail department 
stores 
Trading in steelf fnetal and plastic 
products 
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124. SHARPE and FISHER plC. Trading in building materials and 
operating D. I. Y. and garden 
supermarket 
125. P. M. G. Investment Ltd. Motor dealers and related operation 
and Sub. as well as letting of surplus 
office andco fn mercia 
accoinnodations 
126. WESTERN MOTOR Holdings Motor dealers and related 
p1c. operations as we 11 as the 
investment in and developinent. of 
property 
127. PALMER and HARVEY Ltd. Distribution of tabacco and 
confectionery goods 
128. NURDIN and PEACOCK p1c. operating wholsesale cash and carry 
warehouses, also engaged in 
developing properties and wholesale 
of canned fruit and vegetable 
products. 
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